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CORRUPTION IN THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: 
NEO-PATRIMONIALISM, THE PEACE PROCESS AND 
THE ABSENCE OF STATE-HOOD 
 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines the practice of corruption in the Palestinian Authority (PA) from 
the period of its establishment until the death of Arafat. Palestinian elite formation from 
the late Ottoman period until the establishment of the PA was assessed in order to 
identify the elites that came into power in the PA and the political cultures they came to 
espouse. The two primary elite groups’ (Outsider elites and Insider counter-elites) 
conflicting political cultures were assessed in how they influenced the decision making 
process, the construction, and exhibited institutional behaviour of the PA. With the 
signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
(Oslo Accords) on the 13
th
 of September, 1993 between the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) and the Government of Israel it established the Palestinian 
Authority as the government in transition for the Palestinians.  The agreements 
conferred the governing power and leadership role to the PLO Outsider elites (under 
Arafat).  Due to the secret nature and asymmetrical power relation by which the 
negotiations and agreements were conducted and signed between the PLO Outsider 
leadership and the Government of Israel, which excluded inputs from Palestinian 
Insider elites, the culminating PA structure came to exhibit institutional weakness with 
certain neo-patrimonial behaviour.  The political framework by which the Oslo 
Accords constructed the PA and influenced by international actors warranted 
institutional-weakness. Moreover, as external actors’ demands for the PA to deal with 
the declining Peace Process, and address political and security issues increased, PA 
corruption behaviour became more apparent and proliferated which became indicative 
of its fundamental problem in that it lacked statehood, lacked authority and legitimacy, 
and thus resorted to neo-patrimonial and repressive methods to govern.  This neo-
patrimonial political culture of Arafat and his governing Outsider elites used corruption 
as a PA political tool for survival thus suppressing a nascent democratic political 
culture of the Insiders and consequently led to an institutionalisation of corruption in 
the PA.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The protracted nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has prompted scholarly studies 
and attempts to decipher the persistent nature of the conflict as well as finding means to 
bring resolution.  Over sixty-years have passed since the establishment of the State of 
Israel and the division of the Palestinian territories; and yet, no genuine final status 
resolution has been reached. However, the memorable 13 September, 1993 signing of 
the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, also known as 
the Oslo Accords, between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the State of 
Israel led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA).   
 
The PA was created to serve as the transition government for the Palestinians and was 
perceived as a move towards the final resolution of the conflict.  Yet, the path towards 
resolution has been riddled with issues of undemocratic behaviour, corruption, and a 
neo-patrimonial governing political elite. Corruption in the PA gained the attention of 
the international community when the survival of the Middle East Peace Process 
(MEPP) was threatened particularly by opposition and Islamic groups either through 
violent acts or heavy criticism.  This was significant in principle when advancement 
towards a resolution of the protracted Palestinian-Israeli conflict was conditional and 
based on the PA’s ability to maintain a government, and adhere by the peace accord 
principles.  As the MEPP began to falter, an increasingly distinct neo-patrimonial and 
corrupt PA leadership and elites became more conspicuous. With these charges, the 
structure of the PA became increasingly scrutinised to assess why corruption was 
endemic. This thesis is an attempt to answer the following research question: What 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
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leading factors sustained and proliferated corruption in the Palestinian Authority? As 
such, was corruption inevitable in the Palestinian Authority? The thesis will try to 
decipher the complexity of the leadership political culture and their intra-relationship 
and how, if any it contributed to the rampant corruption in the PA.  The struggle 
between the PLO Outsider leadership and the co-opted Insider counter-elites, the 
notable-PLO Outsider elite/counter-elite relationship, and the role of the peace accords 
in shaping and influencing the behaviours of the leadership will also be examined. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to understand how the PA came to be corrupt, existing literatures on corruption 
were examined which led to the following theoretical framework that it cannot be 
understood by the application of one theory, or the corruption theory itself. Rather, it 
requires a number of theories in order to produce a comprehensive explanation for the 
PA’s situation as a non-state. The thesis chose theories which could be applicable to the 
Palestinian case and their ambiguous state of existence particularly as a non-state actor 
though with the characteristics of a post-colonial state and with post-colonial maladies, 
and a strong leadership and society (informal structure) but weak-state structures 
(formal structures). The theories that were chosen are thought to be the best suited for 
this thesis when applied to the PA. Therefore, the thesis commenced by first defining 
corruption due to its ambiguous definition. It utilises the work of Joseph S. Nye and 
Robert Williams on corruption.  Second, it then analyses Max Weber’s understanding 
of a traditional patriarchal and patrimonial system which consequently leads to Shmuel 
N. Eisenstadt’s construction and identification of a hybrid nature of neo-patrimonialism. 
This requires an understanding of the Arab experience therefore Hisham Sharabi’s 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
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application and understanding of neo-patriarchy which assesses the development 
particularly from a social aspect rather than the political as ascribed Eisenstadt. Third, it 
analyses post-colonial states during their formative years—which prior to colonisation 
functioned on a traditional patriarchal system— and how their political systems 
manifested various stages of patrimonial and neo-patrimonial characteristics. It also 
looks at the politics of survival, particularly the extensive work of Joel S. Midgal on 
weak-states and strong societies, used by the elites who came into power through the 
strategic allocation of position which consequently enabled them to remain in office. 
Fourth, the thesis therefore examines the work on elites by Gaetano Mosca and 
Vilfredo Pareto which is then applied to the post-colonial states and how these elites 
came to carry forth and exacerbate corruption within the political system. Fifth, Gabriel 
Almond and Sidney Verba’s work on elite political culture is analysed in order to gain 
a better understanding of how their political socialisation eventually influenced the 
decision making process and shaped the characteristics of the state.  These theoretical 
approaches are then applied to the PA in order to gain a better analysis on how the PA 
came to be corrupt. Were they inevitably constructed to be corrupt through their 
experiences which shaped their political culture as well as the compatibility between 
the traditional patriarchal system and the implicit ‘democratic’ system upon which they 
were modelled? In order to achieve this, it also requires an empirical approach. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
The thesis looks at corruption within the Palestinian Authority, the attitude of political 
elites towards its practice, and the reason for its proliferating nature within the political 
system. As aforementioned, the thesis aims to answer a pertinent question: What 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
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leading factors sustained and proliferated corruption in the Palestinian Authority? 
Finding a convincing answer to this question which is reflective of the real situation on 
the ground can shed some light on how its practice affected the state building process 
and the development of the Palestinian Authority (PA).  It can also provide an 
understanding and framework on how to tackle corruption in developing states.   
 
My textual research points to a prevailing nature of corruption in the Palestinian 
Authority. The practice of corruption is seen to influence the decisions of political 
elites within the PA subsequently affecting every aspects of society.   In order to gain 
an in-depth insight and to verify or disprove the assumption that corruption is 
institutionalised in the political system and permeates various aspects of the society, 
this thesis requires an in-depth understanding of the society, its people, its leadership 
(elites) and influencing factor to their behaviour and attitude towards sustaining or 
rejection of corruption. This necessitated a substantive and extensive fieldwork on the 
ground to gain a genuine understanding and knowledge of my subject matters in order 
to augment textual knowledge.   
 
The thesis thus draws on several theoretical approaches in order to develop a full 
comprehensive understanding of the existence of corruption in the Palestinian 
Authority.  The thesis analyses behaviour and belief which often cannot be measured 
quantitatively. As such, qualitative methodology was used to examine elite 
behaviour—indicators of their political culture—and their role in sustaining or 
eradicating corruption in the state structure—particularly in post-colonial states. The 
thesis first examines primary texts particularly different theoretical approaches towards 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
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corruption, defining elites and their behaviour in order to understand the general 
conditions and ailments of corruption in the state structure—which shall be discussed 
in detail in the following chapter. The thesis looks at different approaches to corruption 
particularly the works of Robert Williams, J.S. Nye, and Colin Leys.  It also draws on 
the works of Max Weber and S.N. Eisenstadt on (neo) patrimonialism to establish a 
foundation for understanding the behaviour and orientation of elites and leadership as 
well as the eventual construction and behaviour of the state—in this case applying it 
particularly to the Palestinian Authority.  The identification of elites is provided 
through the theoretical work of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, and Glen 
Robinson (on counter-elites).  Simultaneously, it examines the work of Joel Migdal on 
elites and their politics of survival, colonialism, and weak state and Almond Verba and 
Sidney Verba’s work on political culture to comprehend elites’ behaviour and political 
orientation in post-colonial states.  As a result, it became evident that there was evident 
inadequacy in applying only one theoretical approach to provide a general explanation 
for why corruption persisted in post-colonial states, and specifically in the PA. It 
required a conglomerate of the different theoretical approaches mentioned above.  This 
entailed theoretical approaches imbued with sociological, political, economic and 
anthropological understanding.  Secondary texts were also employed to gain a better 
contextual understanding of the political, social and economic situation in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory.  The secondary texts also provided and identified certain elites in 
the Palestinian society which were put through the process of elimination based on the 
theoretical understanding of elites.  
 
Subsequently, Palestinian elite behaviour was assessed in terms of their relational 
dynamics, their behaviour towards the political system, their influence on the PA’s 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
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political structures, and the subsequent espousal or opposition to corruption in the PA.  
This is limited in so far as behaviour is not culture per se. To counteract this weakness, 
and limitation provided by the theoretical approach pertaining to the Palestinian society, 
I conducted extensive on-ground fieldwork participant observation for three months, 
and then interviews the last five months with elites from different sectors in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory.  As such, I embarked on a qualitative research, which 
would supplement my quantitative findings of documented reports on Palestinian 
Authority financial irregularities, in the West Bank from 2007-2008 aiming to use 
methods of observation (direct/participatory), interviews, data collection, public records, 
and personal records to study the Palestinian Authority and its elites. A qualitative 
research would provide an in-depth understanding of behaviours, practices and 
decisions that are taken by individuals or institutions. It categorises findings and assists 
in identifying if there are patterns to behaviours and actions and occur within a certain 
particular context or are a general phenomena.  The aim of my qualitative research 
through observation and interviews was to provide not only an explanation of why 
there were irregularities but to also gain an in-depth understanding of why certain 
decision, practices and behaviours were espoused by Palestinian elites—which were 
considered detrimental to the state building process—while other conducive practices 
were discarded.  In the process, and in order to get a reflective result of the real 
situation on the ground, I had to immerse myself in the society in order to gain a better 
understanding of their views, value system, conception of the others, social and 
political dynamics, motivation, concerns, political understanding and aspiration, and so 
forth.  
 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
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Based on my textual research before embarking on my fieldwork, I concluded from my 
findings that political elites were concentrated or involved in three sectors (either 
simultaneously or consecutively): academia, NGOs and public sector.  As such, I aimed 
to be located in one of the three sectors to verify its accuracy which consequently 
would be conducive to my research.  Being thus located would enhance my observation, 
data collection, and access to my subject study.  My fieldwork required that I conduct 
preliminary preparation particularly in language, and knowledge of the culture and 
society in regards to behaviour, manner of attire, subject of conversation, social 
stratification rules and so forth. It also required that I identify key political elites, their 
background, education, and political affiliation/ history. Of interest to my research was 
identifying those that were politically active before, during and after the Intifada.  This 
would provide me with an initial interview and referral source.  This also required that I 
secure an on the ground sponsor who will provide me with a measure of credibility.  
 
Following the preparation stage, I went on the field to conduct my research. The reality 
on the ground often did not reflect what I had initially concluded from my textual 
research. As such, I had to adjust some of my initial understanding and assumption. For 
example, I did not fully comprehend the reference to ‘occupation’, limitation in 
movement and in particular, security, and what is truly entailed in the concept of 
checkpoints until I was on the ground. There was a stark contrast between reality and 
what is portrayed in texts, articles, and books. These were ‘concepts’ that in praxis 
would eventually greatly affect my research and access to interviewees due to 
limitation of movement and distrust of the ‘other’. The limitation in movement, the 
practice of checkpoints and the mechanisms that accompanied it, and social profiling 
and (mis)treatment according to  perceived ‘ethnicity’ were an initial cultural shock for 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
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me as a researcher particularly one who had yet to encounter such experience. It also 
initially challenged my effort to remain objective while in the process of searching for 
answers to my thesis.  Nevertheless, this was a necessary process towards 
comprehending the real situation on the ground and to understand the fear, behaviour, 
attitude, motivation, and aspiration of all parties involved.  
 
I was initially stationed in Jerusalem, however moved to Ramallah (West Bank) in 
order to have better access to and observation of my subject. Ramallah being the 
headquarter for the Palestinian Authority showcased a diverse and cosmopolitan city 
due to it being a central location for receiving international donations and housing 
international workers. It is the financial and political hub for the West Bank.  It sets 
itself off from the rest of the West Bank in that the wealth and job market was 
concentrated in Ramallah.  Even the language spoken between people (Arab-Arab, 
Arab-Foreigner) where English was predominantly the working language in Ramallah 
emphasised its ‘internationalism’, wealth, and its aim to be perceived as an 
international and cosmopolitan city.  Yet at the same time, there was an observable gap 
between the rich and the poor in regards to living quarters and access to resources 
within Ramallah as well as between Ramallah and the rest of the West Bank. This very 
distinct gap between the rich and the poor portrayed a high concentration of resources 
and jobs in Ramallah which excluded to a certain extent many other areas within the 
Palestinian Territories.  
 
I was then employed at Birzeit University Institute of Law as a researcher on a project 
on reform within the PA where it became a prime locale for accessing academics and 
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political elites considering that many of the political elites were either former students 
or affiliates of Birzeit University.  At Birzeit, and as part of the staff, I could observe 
the political and social dynamics of staff members, participate in and organise 
workshops and conferences where government officials and political elites took part.  I 
was also able to decipher the staff’s social affiliation and political conviction due to 
their political socialisation within the university sphere.  During the period I was at 
Birzeit and the having witnessed student elections, the political sphere within the 
university resonate a dominant Fatah conviction. Being thus located within Birzeit 
enabled me to have informal dialogues with youths, staff members, and people from 
different social and economic levels in society on the issue of corruption, their 
perception and attitude towards corruption, as well as their views on elites’ behaviour 
and action towards the practice of corruption. My participatory observation through 
immersion in the society enabled me to understand cultural norms, decipher implicit 
and explicit statements. The rich social contexts I acquired from being on the field 
enhanced my theoretical and textual findings.  
 
Interviewees for this thesis were first identified based on the theoretical definition of 
elites and counter-elites. Therefore, a primary list of interviewees
1
 were first identified 
which met the theoretical criteria for an elite—and what have been identified through 
compilation of secondary sources specifically dealing with Palestine—and served as 
the basis for identifying other elites for interviews. The primary list of interviewees was 
composed of identified individuals who had worked or dealt in formal capacities, both 
from within or outside of the PA, with Arafat in his capacity as the President of the PA. 
It also included those who were political activists before and during the First Intifada, 
                                                          
1
 A list of formal interviews are provided in the bibliography section 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
______________________________________________________________________ 
10 | P a g e  
 
some of which were imprisoned either during the Intifada or when Arafat was in office. 
This list took into consideration individuals who were opposing voices to Arafat from 
inside as well as those from outside the PA. Identifying elites for my interview also 
required that there would be a balance between those that were perceived (by textual 
reference) as being critical as well as those who were perceived as ‘accommodating’ to 
Arafat. This would provide a comparative analysis of the reality on the ground versus 
what has been written on Palestinian elites and their political orientation and behaviour.  
This will be tested against Mosca and Pareto’s analysis of elites, Weber and 
Eisenstadt’s patrimonialism, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s understanding of 
political culture, and Migdal’s politics of survival and weak-state, to assess the 
construction of the state, elites political orientation, behaviour, decisions taken in the 
decision-making process, and the protracted practice of corruption in the PA.  
 
Initial interview questions were open-ended and formulated to gain a general 
background of the interviewee, the extent of their political involvement during the First 
Intifada and after the establishment of the PA, their role and position during the 
formulation and establishment of the PA, their experience and perception of Insider and 
Outsider elites in the decision making process, their perception of corruption and its 
practice, their understanding of the role and function of the PA—and how they assess 
its performance, their knowledge and experience regarding issues of corruption and 
allegation charges during Arafat’s time in office,  method by which Arafat and the PA 
dealt with opposing voices, and Arafat’s (and PA’s) role and reaction  to allegations of 
corruption. In order to accommodate additional information from interviewees, which 
can be relevant to the research though not part of the original interview questions, the 
interview process was constructed in a semi-structured fashion to allow for flexibility if 
diverting from the original questions.  The interviews were conducted on a face-to-face 
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basis with my target groups both at formal settings and informal settings. The formal 
interview process, as related above, was documented both on recorder and on paper.  
 
 A result of conducting my interviews with my primary list of interviewees was a snow-
ball effect where they referred me to other potential interviewees. This method was 
highly useful particularly with the sensitivity of my research topic, and the ambiguous 
relationship between elites, which could compromise my research. As a result of the 
snow-ball process, the interviewees were from different sectors of society: Academia, 
NGO, Government, Business, Medical, Journalism, and Political. Informal interviews 
were also conducted from these different sectors and from the general public although 
not recorded. The snow-ball effect for the interview process does have its limitation 
and biases where access to elites outside of the circle of network may be excluded.  As 
a result, I used other sources such as my participatory observation and informal 
interviews, international governments, donors and organisations’ data and reports, 
academic and news articles, and interviews conducted by other researchers to augment 
this limitation. 
 
There were interesting power-dynamics involved in the interview process.  The attitude 
towards my interview played on various factors particularly: male-female relation, 
female-female relation, interviews conducted at interviewee’s office, interview 
conducted outside of interviewee’s office, and age difference (interviewer vis-à-vis 
interviewee).  The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format in English. 
As a result, interviews were limited to elites who could communicate in English. The 
interviews were conducted mainly in offices or in public places due to cultural norms 
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and respectability as a woman. There were benefits as well as challenges for 
conducting interview as a woman.  
 
During my interview process there were cases where I was met by patriarchal attitude, 
particularly when interviewing certain interviewees from particular official positions—
some in academia and others in politics. This transpired when conducted at the formal 
office, male interviewees, and/or the age difference was more pronounced. In such a 
circumstance, I received advice on the ‘appropriate’ topic I should be pursuing and 
discussing rather than the current topic of research. Discussion would therefore divert 
to another subject that the interviewee thought appropriate. As a result, this presented 
both a challenge and a contribution to my interview process.  I would gear the 
interview back to my questions however in the process, I often received information 
that were either directly or indirectly related to my topic which provided me with an 
overall view of the behaviour and attitude on the ground.  As a non-threatening woman, 
and/or the age gap was less pronounced, some interviewees were less formal and more 
willing to depart with certain information that they would otherwise refrain from 
sharing. At the same time, academics, NGO directors, former ministers, and journalists 
were often candid and frank in their responses regarding Arafat and the PA. Interviews 
conducted outside of the office space were often more relaxed and friendly, which 
allowed for a more fluid discussion. Female-female interviews were either relaxed and 
informal or maternal.  As a foreigner, some interviewees provided answers which were 
often tailored to meet the interviewer’s expectation. Others were initially suspicious of 
the intention of the thesis. However due to my primary sources’ credibility, they were 
able to accommodate my questions.  Nevertheless, there still existed an element of 
distrust and fear due to the subject of my thesis and as an outsider. This was an 
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expected challenge which was considered before embarking on my fieldwork and thus 
necessitated residing and working on the field as an observant before conducting the 
interviews.  
 
There were limitations to my fieldwork particularly due to the restriction in movement, 
volatility of the situation particularly following the post-2006 division between Fatah 
and Hamas, and restricted access to areas such as Gaza, interviewees were limited to 
the West Bank and with certain political factions or non-affiliates.  Only those who 
were able to move in and out of Gaza were interviewed. Moreover, the sensitivity of 
the issue despite Arafat’s death, the unwillingness to mar the reputation or ‘good’ name 
of others, the fear of my association with particular external actors (U.S. and Israel), 
and the fact that I could not conduct interviews in Arabic, certain individuals were 
unwilling to be interviewed. At other times, particular personalities were either 
unavailable or unwilling to provide time for researchers—especially if they were not in 
the circle of network of the snow-ball interview process. Efforts at trying to secure 
interviews with female elites, which fell under my elite definition and allocation of 
elites in the Palestinian case, were more challenging than securing male interviewees. I 
either received rejections for interviews or were passed on to male colleagues. 
Therefore, the low number of female interviewees in my samples is reflective of that 
challenge. 
 
These methodological tools set out the basis for constructing the thesis and testing my 
hypothesis. As such, the thesis is structured in a manner which presents a historical 
storyline of elite formation in the Palestinian territory, the political culture that the PLO 
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Outsider elites and the Insider counter-elites came to adhere, the formation of the PA 
under Arafat and the elites that came to power, and finally the endemic corruption in 
the PA. The thesis therefore covers the period of elite formation from 1948 until the 
death of Arafat in 2004. 
 
Chapter One lays out the theoretical tools whereby to help answer the research question 
was corruption inevitable in the PA. This chapter looks at existing theories on why 
corruption exists in the developing world particularly when analysing post-colonial 
states.  It argues that using one tool skates over the surface of the thesis and does not 
explain why this phenomenon occurred and persisted. As such, selected compound 
theories are utilised for analysing why corruption occurs and persists in post-colonial 
states. Additionally, this chapter utilises theoretical work on corruption, traditional 
patriarchal system, neo-patrimonialism, post-colonial states, elites, and political culture. 
This will provide a framework for the discussion on whether the PA was to be 
inevitably corrupt. 
 
Chapter Two examines the various stages of elite formation in the Palestinian 
Territories based on an historical analysis from the Ottoman Empire until the Oslo 
Accord. It will assess the formative years of the Palestinian political elite, its 
fragmentation during the era of occupation and exile and the development of 
accompanying differential elite political cultures—Outside informal (neo-patrimonial) 
political culture and the Inside nascent democratic political culture. It will demonstrate 
how these varying political cultures came to play a significant role in the formation and 
later functioning of the PA.  
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Chapter Three will demonstrate how the PA was created  as something closely 
resembling  a weak state structure, a set of institutions with some state attributes but 
crucially weakened  by various factors including  Israeli manipulation of the Oslo 
agreements (its foundational texts so to speak), the self-interested design of its  
institutions by Outsiders, its non-sovereign nature, lack of economic independence, 
lack of autonomy from external pressures, and the  insecure and indeterminate  nature 
of its future.  This combination of factors will demonstrate how it eventually led to the 
use of politics of survival by the Outsider elite, who were able to form the core elite, 
thus creating a division between the Outsiders and the Insiders inside the PA, the latter 
group increasingly being shunted to the sideline. 
 
 Chapter Four will assess how the incompatible political cultures of the PLO and the 
Counter elites were encouraged to compete with each other for primacy by external 
actors and how this competition was sustained by the weak institutions. It will illustrate 
how external actors (Israel and the USA) indirectly supported the informal political 
culture of the PLO through the endorsement of PLO leader and first PA President 
Yasser Arafat, and the  silent endorsement of PA practices which can be considered 
‘corrupt’ or coercive.  
 
Chapter Five argues that the set-up of the PA made it inevitable to be corrupt. It will 
demonstrate how the various peace agreements contradicted the democratic process and 
thus required the PA and external actors to endorse PLO (Arafat) practices that did not 
adhere to democratic principles.  Furthermore it will illustrate that the PA’s weak-state 
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structure had no legitimate power to enforce law & order, except through informal 
networks which consequently encouraged the use of corruption. Moreover, the PA’s 
parallel structure, the dominant neo-patrimonial culture of the PA, the general societal 
passiveness and ‘acceptance’/use of corrupt practices, lack of enforced accountability, 
and limited power prescribed to the Insiders with democratic political culture, emerging 
democratic principles were suppressed and corruption became clearly perpetual and 
institutionalised. Consequently, this chapter will conclude that corruption was used as 
the modus operandi from the inception of the PA (as the only means for survival for the 
PA regime and encouraged by external actors to maintain the Peace process); however, 
it only gained international attention and became ‘problematic’ during periods when the 
peace process was threatened. 
 
The thesis concludes that corruption in the PA was the result of various factors.  First, 
the Peace Accords impeded the ability of the PA to develop into a full-fledged 
sovereign state entity by demanding particular (often un-implementable) conditions to 
be in place before reaching a final status solution.  Second, the PLO Outsiders imported 
a particular political culture which was superimposed onto the structures of the PA. As 
a result, a perceivable struggle began to emerge between the Outsider leadership and 
Insider counter-elites. The PA leadership therefore required an alternate approach in 
order to bypass limitations, restrictions and demands prescribed by the peace accords 
throughout the different stages of the peace process. Consequently, corruption became 
an endemic part of the PA institutions.  
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CHAPTER I:  
CORRUPTION IN POST-COLONIAL STATES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The function of this chapter is to determine what constitutes corruption and why it has 
proved to be an endemic component of many post-colonial states. The chapter will use 
existing theories to define and understand corruption and to ascertain why it is 
particularly prevalent in post-colonial states. First, it will examine what constitutes 
corruption and the debate revolving the terminology and its application which draws on 
existing explanations for endemic corruption in developing states, which can be 
considered to most closely resemble the status of the Palestinian Authority.  Second, 
the concept of patriarchal system will be explored regarding its function in society and 
its influence on the state formation particularly in post-colonial states. This will 
examine the characteristics of a patriarchal system and the nature of a state that 
eventually emerges from this system. Within the context of a patriarchal system, 
patron-client relations will be addressed which are perceived as characteristics 
associated with underdevelopment and marginalised societies. The concept of 
patrimonialism will also be identified particularly its distinguishing features from a 
patriarchal system and its precursor role to a modern bureaucracy.  Also under the 
patriarchal system section, the neo-patrimonial and neo-patriarchal characteristics of a 
state will be explored in regards to their evolution and the emergence of hybrid regimes 
and drawbacks of democratic transition for post-colonial states. Third, this chapter will 
analyse the post-colonial states and its propensity to be ‘weak’ as a result of the 
CHAPTER I:  CORRUPTION IN POST-COLONIAL STATES 
 
15 | P a g e  
 
processes through which new state structures were established and their legitimacy 
relative to the societies over which they governed. The ‘Politics of survival’ will also 
be analysed within the context of weak-states to understand how the practice of 
strategic allocation of power in such arrangements contributes to the development of a 
certain political orientation which support or implicitly endorse what can be seen as 
corrupt behaviours. Fourth, within this political orientation, indeed as carriers of 
particular political cultures, the role of elites is crucial, and the chapter will therefore 
define the concept of an elite and discuss how elites can contribute to the exacerbation 
and continuance of corruption. The argument for the existence of a core elite will be 
addressed as well as to who, how, and why individuals are recruited into the elite circle 
will be examined. Lastly within this section of elite analysis, the types of elites that 
exist in post-colonial states will be assessed. Fifth, the concept of political culture will 
be accessed in order to have a better understanding of how elites’ political culture 
influences decision making processes and can sustain practices within the political 
system. It will also address the fusion and incongruent nature of political culture. 
Lastly, this section of political culture will look at the political socialisation process of 
society in regards to espousing or shunning particular political orientations.  By laying 
out these theories, the thesis aims to show how they are inter-related and how they can 
be used to establish a framework through which the thesis can explain the extent and 
nature of corruption in the Palestinian Authority.  
 
WHAT CONSTITUTES CORRUPTION? 
The concept of corruption has a wide scope of definitions which are often 
controversial. Scholars of corruption are aware of the challenges of defining a concept, 
which can be perceived as having a value-base or normative element and which can be 
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culturally specific.
2
 While a single simplified definition of the concept may be useful, 
this would unlikely capture the essence of what shall be examined in this thesis and 
would be implausible to explain the nature of corruption in different contexts.  
Therefore, two definitions shall be utilised and synthesised in order to have a more 
comprehensive understanding of corruption.  First, this thesis will use Transparency 
International’s basic definition of corruption as conscious “abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain.”3 As the leading international organisation tackling issues on corruption 
with many branches throughout the world, particularly focusing on countries 
experiencing high rates of corruption which impeded political, social and economic 
development, Transparency International’s identification of corruption is important 
because it provides a definition which can be applied in any field (political, economic 
or social) of the abuse of power for private gain.  Secondly, the definition of corruption 
by J.S. Nye, the leading scholar on power and interdependence particularly on 
corruption in the developing world, will be used to access political development in 
post-colonial states.  He identified corruption as behaviour which “deviates from the 
formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains; or violates rules against 
the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence."
4
 As such, corruption for 
the purpose of this thesis will be defined as use of an official’s public office and power 
to influence or impede public/private actions for private gain.  
 
                                                          
2
 Leys, Colin. “What Is The Problem About Corruption”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 3 
Issue 2, (Aug., 1965). See also Wraith, Ronald and Simpkins, Edgar. Corruption in Developing 
Countries. (London, 1963). pp. 12-13  
3
 Transparency International, “The global coalition against corruption”, in Global Corruption Report 
2004  (2004)  
4
 Nye, J.S. “Corruption and Political Development” in Williams, R. (ed.) Explaining Corruption, 
(Cheltenham, 2000), p. 419 
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Robert Williams, in Explaining Corruption, argues that corruption is both “ancient and 
modern”; however the academic study of corruption only gained popularity and 
prominence in the late twentieth century.
5
  In the examination of the development of 
the nation state, the existence of corruption in state institutions  has often been 
considered, even expected, to be  a necessary process and condition  of ‘initiation’ that 
each country must traverse on its way to maturity.  Underlying this notion is the 
presumption that with each epoch of state existence, state actors will be able to perfect 
the system through the development and implementation of laws and policies to weed 
out corruption. However, post-transitional state experiences have established that the 
initial policies and set-up of the state structure and political system can, and often do, 
become permanent features which are then incorporated into the political system. 
Policies, procedures, and accepted set of rules of a new state are filtered down through 
various levels and channels of the state institution and become institutionalised. 
Therefore, if corruption is part of the modus operandi during the state-building process, 
this practice becomes normalised as observed in many developing states. Williams’ 
pessimistic view about the permanency of corruption in public life argued that:  “Like 
prosperity for all, absolute integrity in public life is rhetorical or idealistic rather than 
practical and real.”6  This ominous analysis suggests that the elimination of corruption 
is an unrealistic goal overall. 
 
Nonetheless, it seems that the level of corruption and the need for measures to contain 
it are still more visible and important in developing, as opposed to developed, states. If 
the state has pervasive regulations—with no standardised processes of implementation 
as found in many developing states—at the disposal of government officials to enforce 
                                                          
5
 Williams, R. Explaining Corruption, (Cheltenham, 2000), p. ix 
6
 Williams, R. Explaining Corruption, (2000) p. ix  
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as and when they see fit, then this provides an opportunity for interested individuals in 
society to use methods of corruption to co-opt officials in order to increase their gain.
7
  
This suggests that corruption can be identified with a stage or stages of political 
development in a country’s history. J.S. Nye argued that if political development is 
defined as “rational, modern, and honest government,” then it cannot coexist with 
corruption; and if corruption is endemic in government, a politically developed society 
cannot exist.
8
   
 
In unstable and politically underdeveloped/developing societies, corruption impedes 
upon development and deters foreign investment. As found Paolo Mauro in his 
empirical study on corruption, because of its pernicious nature and need for secrecy and 
accompanied uncertainty, it reduces investment and economic growth. A small margin 
of improvement in corruption, i.e. by one standard-deviation, results in an investment 
rise by a significant 5 percent of GDP and an increase in the annual per capital GDP 
growth rate by a half percentage point.
9
  Nevertheless, in politically 
underdeveloped/developing societies where corruption is prevalent, immediate 
economic, social and political benefits from engaging in corruption far exceed adhering 
to the law. Moreover, because the political system is not well developed the 
government cannot issue and/or enforce any standardised mechanisms or incentives to 
deter people from engaging in corruption. Where state institutions are new and fragile, 
there is an absence of negative repercussions because state officials fail to implement 
accountability measures or value movements toward transparency.  It has been 
suggested that the only means to bridge the gap between association of actions and 
                                                          
7
 Mauro, P. “The Effects of Corruption on Growth and Public Expenditure” in Heidenheimer, A.J. and 
Johnston, M. (ed.) Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts, (New Brunswick, 2007), p. 341 
8
 Nye, J.S. “Corruption and Political Development”, (2000) p. 46 
9
 Mauro, P. “The Effects of Corruption on Growth and Public Expenditure”, (2000) p. 342 
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consequences is through education and social progress
10
, proposing that the relationship 
between institutions and society, the capacity of the former to assert themselves over 
the latter, is a key factor. Thus, the rationale underlying the variation between 
corruption in the developed world and in post-colonial states is the degree of political 
(im)maturity of the state institutions, and the element of ownership and investment in 
the state’s political and economic stability and progress by society as a whole.   
 
Although corruption is most commonly associated with developing states rather than 
developed states, high profile cases have attested that it is not exclusive to the 
developing world. Thus it may in fact have more to do with the type of political 
structures than their stage of development.  If states experience periods of corruption 
during their initial periods of state-building, then corruption should only be a temporary 
phenomenon and will gradually be phased out as the state progresses to conform to the 
‘universal’ prescriptions of transparency associated with developed status.  However, 
the degree of corruption in the developing world has escalated rather than declined, 
indicating a more prevalent nature. This perceived inherent disposition of corruption in 
the developing world is sometimes attributed to the merging of modern official 
(bureaucratic) and the informal (patriarchal) systems of governance within the process 
of development itself where customary law
11
 supersedes the formal legal system. The 
two systems, which are themselves at variance with one another, become integrated as 
existing social structures and serve as the “glue” which binds citizens to their more 
                                                          
10
 Williams, R. Explaining Corruption, (2000) p. ix 
11
 Customary law refers to “traditional common rule or practice that has become an intrinsic part of the 
accepted and expected conduct in a community, profession, or trade and is treated as a legal 
requirement.” See, Business Dictionary, Customary Law, (2011), 
http://businessdictionary.com/definition/customary-law.html (accessed 12 Jun. 2011) 
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formal government bureaucracies.
12
 As Robert Presthus observes, cultural parochialism 
masks the fact that “nepotism and subjectivity seen in bureaucratic systems of many 
less-developed societies are a manifestation of their pattern of family relations in which 
personal loyalties outweigh the demands of technical supremacy.”13 For example, it is a 
common understanding and practice in traditional societies—particularly in many parts 
of the developing world—that the perks given to a government official are not limited 
to him in his official capacity but are expected to extend to those under his 
responsibility i.e. members of his social group.  High profile corruption cases have 
emerged in various stages in the developed world which attests to the existence of 
corruption into the “developed” stage.  The implosion of the Italian political system 
subsequent to the tangentopoli (kickback city) revelations
14
 showed the devastating 
effect of corruption, its deep-rooted nature, and how it had penetrated all aspects of 
Italian society from judges, to politicians, and to civil society. This corruption 
undermines public trust in a range of political and economic institutions and inhibits the 
processes of further political and economic development just as it does in the 
developing world. For example, the recent $65 billion USD Ponzi-scheme case of 
Bernard Madoff had a demoralising impact on all facets of the American society, not 
just the financial institutions of Wall Street, but generating distrust of the government, 
regulators and financial institutions. The Madoff case also had far reaching 
international economic consequences which affected individuals, businesses and 
governments in both the developed and the developing worlds.
15
 
                                                          
12
 Heald, S. “Controlling Crime and Corruption from Below: Sungusungu in Kenya”, International 
Relations, Vol. 21, no. 2 (2007), pp. 183-199 
13
 Presthus, R.V. “Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, 
No. 1 (Winter, 1959), p. 27 
14
 Williams, R. Explaining Corruption, (2000) p. ix.  Also see:  Trudell, M. “From Tangentopoli to 
Genoa”, International Socialism Journal, no. 95 (Summer, 2002).  
15
 McCool, G and Graybow, M. “Madoff gets 150 years for massive investment fraud”, Reuters, (29 Jun. 
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSTRE55P60520090629 (accessed 14 Aug. 2009) 
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Other recent cases of corruption in developed states also challenge Nye’s hypothesis.  
Since 1985, the British government’s fraud investigation and prosecution unit, the 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO), has investigated suspected accounting irregularities of 
Europe’s biggest defence contractor, the British arms manufacturer BAE Systems, in a 
£43billion ($66 billion USD) Al-Yamamah oil-for-arms deal with Saudi Arabia. The 
contract was a government-to-government deal, with BAE being the main contractor 
involved in the sale of 120 Tornado aircraft, Hawk trainer jets and other military 
equipment.
16
 The National Audit office launched an investigation to probe allegations 
that BAE was running a slush-fund where they bribed Saudi Arabia royals and 
intermediaries to secure the Al-Yamamah deal.  However the enquiry was eventually 
suppressed by the British government citing demands to safeguard British national 
security. It soon became public knowledge that the reason behind the British 
government’s intervention was Saudi Arabia’s ultimatum: halt the SFO enquiry within 
10 days or lose the contract issued for 72 Eurofighter Typhoon combat jets—which was 
being developed in collaboration with the BAE Systems.
17
 The British government’s 
role in condoning corruption, for the benefit of the home state and economy, illustrates 
that corruption is not confined to the developing world.  
 
But if corruption can be found in all types of political system, its effects are not 
universally the same. There is of course a generalised assumption of negative effects 
                                                          
16
 Bagh, C. and Cutler, D. “Allegations of Corruption at BAE Systems”, Reuters, (2009), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/01/us-baesystems-timeline-sb-idUSTRE5904OW20091001 
17
 Bagh, C. and Cutler, D. “Allegations of Corruption at BAE Systems”, (2009). In February 2010, BAE 
had to pay the US government £250m for “wilfully misleading” the government over payments in order 
to secure contracts. They also had to pay a separate fine of £30m corporate fine in the UK stemming 
from a £25.2 radar system project in Tanzania which bribed a senior Tanzanian official to guarantee the 
contract. See  BBC News, “BAE Systems handed £286m criminal fines in UK and US,” BBC News (5 
Feb., 2010). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8500535.stm (accessed 10 Mar. 2010) 
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(one of the reasons by the continual existence of corruption in political systems 
continues to baffle analysts, scholars and students alike). Apart from a general tendency 
to subvert the distribution of state resources, corruption dis-incentivises investment. 
Arguably it has a far more negative impact on less developed states because it is more 
likely to penetrate all aspects of society, to divert resources to informal channels at the 
expense of formal procedures, and to further undermine the structures and capacities of 
the state.  How then can the continued existence of corruption be explained other than 
as some deficiency in the moral or ethical understandings of political actors in 
developing states? Field analysts acknowledge that  populations are aware of the 
negative effects of corruption on the development of the state and critical of the 
officials who  practice it,
18
 and  although there is general understanding of what 
corruption entails and the harm that it might inflict on the social and political structure, 
in many cases corruption can be tolerated and sanctioned when filtered through cultural 
lenses, used as a method for survival, seen as an economic necessity to fulfil one’s 
familial obligations, or viewed as essential to counter a bureaucratic or inefficient 
governing institution.  In an environment where state institutions are either ineffective 
or inept, corruption can assist in accessing limited resources, facilitate transactions and 
speed up procedures that would otherwise prove difficult.
19
 Thus, whilst the damage 
caused by corruption can be identified in both the developing and developed world, in 
some instances in the developing world cultural/traditional practices can legitimise 
corruption as a necessary and even beneficial evil. For example, in a tribal or traditional 
society certain practices—which may be defined as corruption—are a fundamental part 
                                                          
18
 Bukovansky, M. “The hollowness of anti-corruption discourse,” Review of International Political 
Economy, Vol. 13. No. 2 (May, 2006),  p. 183 
19
 Cuervo-Cazurra, A. “Who Cares About Corruption?,” Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 
37  (Nov., 2006), p. 808 
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of familial (immediate and extended) responsibilities necessary for the continuation and 
preservation of particular traditions and way of life.  
 
In studying corruption, we therefore come to the question of traditional endorsement—
often identified as cultural—of practices which may be in dissonance with the 
‘universal’ comprehension of corruption.  A concept of socio-cultural relativity is 
necessary to explain  why entrenched ‘traditional’ practices, otherwise identified as 
corruption, are to an extent ‘morally’ and ‘ethically’ acceptable in certain societies, 
while considered anomalies in others.  Since the contradiction lies between the norms 
by which formal ‘modern’ institutions are expected to function and the norms by which 
society assesses them ‘informally’, it is useful to turn to the work of authors like Max 
Weber, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Walter Rosenbaum and Joel Migdal. They 
argue that societal ‘normalisation’ of corruption is found in more traditional cultures 
where familial, tribal and clan duties are the fabric of society.  In this type of social 
structure, the indistinct line between public and private duties often intrudes upon and 
supersedes formal responsibilities.   As a result, the transition from a patriarchal (pre-
colonial) political system into a modern (post-colonial) and even ‘democratic’ political 
system is argued to be a process full of contradictions. The newly constructed political 
structures of the post-colonial era reflected both patriarchal and patrimonial political 
norms, leading to hybrid entities with parallel governing structures. The new states, 
whilst being established on formal ‘democratic’ structures, were infused with 
patriarchal and patrimonial practices, behaviours and expectations designed to appease 
and resist change and challenges. Corruption was fostered as an elite tool to bridge the 
gap between the two incongruent political systems (formal and informal) and acquire 
power and influence for their own political survival. Consequently, it became 
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embedded within and sustained by the political system. In order to understand the 
correlation between binary formal and informal governing and power structure, we first 
need go back to the work of Max Weber on power, authority and legitimacy. 
 
 
THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF A PATRIARCHAL SYSTEM  
The concepts of power, dominance, and legitimacy are at the core of understanding 
political systems that emerge during the state building process. Max Weber’s 
understanding of these three concepts can provide an insight to the political systems 
that emerged following the post-colonial era.  These three forms of legitimate authority 
described by Weber are an important initial point for the systematic analysis of 
government structures and leadership accession into power in post-colonial states, in 
particular the Palestinian Authority.  Max Weber identified three forms of pure 
legitimate authority which he classified as Legal, Traditional and Charismatic 
authorities. In his definition of Legal Authority, he identifies this with persons who 
exercise the authority of his office by “virtue of the formal legality of their commands 
and only within the scope of authority of his office.”20 Moreover, their maintenance of 
power is based on a rational belief in normative rules where those who are elevated to 
positions of power have the rights to issue commands. Traditional Authority on the 
other hand is based on traditional grounds particularly on the conventional belief in the 
“sanctity of immemorial traditional and legitimacy of the status” of those in positions 
of power over them. In this case, it usually refers to a chief or lord who occupies a 
socially sanctioned position of authority and bound by tradition and can be found in 
traditional societies. Obedience is thus based on personal loyalty within the realm of 
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 Weber, M. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (Glencoe, 1947), p. 328 
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habitual obligations. Finally, Charismatic Authority is founded on the devotion to the 
exceptional exemplary characteristics, attributes, and heroism of an individual.  
Obedience is based on trust and belief in the charismatic leader’s exceptional abilities, 
heroism, and his revelations; however only as long as he can maintain and make 
individuals believe in his charisma. Ideally, these three forms were perceived to exist 
independently of a particular government or governing structure and are mutually 
exclusive. Yet, when applied to post-colonial states, particularly the Palestinian 
Authority, all three legitimate authorities exist simultaneously in the state structure.  
 
In Traditional legitimacy, we find the concept of patriarchy. According to Weber, 
patriarchalism is the purest form of traditional domination.
21
 It is the “core of all 
traditional system and is generally confined to household kinship groups.”22 In this 
framework, patriarchy is a social system which focuses on social structure and 
relationships within a traditional ‘familial’ environment and where ‘authority relation’ 
binds the patriarch (head of household) to the family.
23
  The formation of a patriarchal 
group is founded on an economic and kinship basis where solidarity of the group is 
attributed to its familial component where members are mutually dependent, sharing 
lodging, food, and live in close proximity.
24
 This is based on the belief that the given 
rights and duty to obey is consecrated (and continued) by tradition, superstition, fear of 
God, or apprehension at being ostracised by society for deviant behaviours.
25
 As such, 
patriarchalism in this sense is an inherent and inherited right of authority legitimised by 
tradition. 
 
                                                          
21
 Weber, M. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (1947), p. 346 
22
 Bill J. A. and Springborg, R. Politics in the Middle East, 3
rd
 Edition (New York, 1990), p. 152 
23
 Bill J. A. and Springborg, R. Politics in the Middle East, (1990), p. 152 
24
 Bendix, R. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. 2
nd
 Edition (Berkeley, 1977), p. 330  
25
 Bill J. A. and Springborg, R. Politics in the Middle East, (1990), p. 152 
CHAPTER I:  CORRUPTION IN POST-COLONIAL STATES 
 
26 | P a g e  
 
When applied to the state structure, Weber’s forms of legitimate authority provide a 
framework for the legitimisation of dominance. Although domination is not always 
initially perceived in every social action, it does play a significant role where it 
profoundly influences and shapes actions—whether political economic or social. 26 
According to Weber, Power (Macht) is the probability that an individual, within a 
“social relationship” can enforce his will despite resistance and regardless of the basis 
of this probability.  Domination (Herrschaft) on the other hand is defined in relation to 
power as “the possibility of imposing one’s own will upon the behaviour of other 
persons.” 27  The more sophisticated and modern organisations reveal structures of 
dominancy. This entails obedience to a chain of commands/orders given through the 
hierarchy. Weber identified two completely contrasting forms of domination. The first 
type he classified as domination based on interests—particularly if in a “position of 
monopoly.” The second he categorised as domination based on authority—where there 
is an unquestioned power to command and duty to obey. Whereas the first can be short-
lived—based on the individual’s popularity, the latter is continuous and sustainable in 
their ability and means to hold on to power. Domination based on interests or authority 
can be found in governing structures of post-colonial states.  
 
As recognised by Weber, a ruling organisation can only exist as long as its constituents 
are “subject to domination by virtue of the established order”28 whether in a formal 
order (state structure) or informal order (familial domain). In a patriarchal system, a 
patron can exercise his rules and order on the members of the household, and those 
under his patronage (even over those outside of the household), only as long as he has a 
following who can act, when needed, in the capacity of an informal ‘administrative 
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staff’ to enforce his rules and orders.  This informal relationship between these groups 
can viewed through the lenses of patron-client relations where those under his 
patronage, clients (administrative staff), rely on the patron (head of household or ruler) 
to provide benefaction and he relies on his ‘staff’ to enforce his orders. The 
administrative staff serving as “clients” in many cases pertaining to the developing 
world, are bound to obedience by “custom, by affected ties, by a purely material 
complex of interests, or by ideal (wertrationale) motives” which can normally be 
trusted by their superior(s), ruler or head of household to enforce his policies or orders 
over a number of persons.
29
  
 
This relation between the patron and the administrative staff/clients often influences the 
structure of the organisation. However, the operational character of a ruling 
organisation is determined by such factors as the “mode in which the administration is 
carried out, the character of the personnel, the objects over which it exercises control, 
and the extent of effective jurisdiction.” 30  Weber’s analysis helps clarify that the 
manner by which a ruling organisation operates, and how its personnel (officials) 
behave is determined by the approach by which domination is legitimised. If we extend 
this understanding to a political organisation as in a state structure, where the character 
of the personnel (elites or officials) is based on a patron-client approach, and their 
jurisdiction questionable and illegitimate then the operational nature of the state will 
reflect those they exercise.  
 
The enforcement therefore of the regime’s authority through dominance (whether 
passive, acceptance, or by force) is based on loyalty and legitimacy prescribed by 
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particular motives. In any governing system or social order, obedience to dominance 
can be based on various motives, ranging from “acceptance” founded on traditional 
custom to calculated rewards. Therefore, a genuine form of domination in this sense 
involves a minimum of voluntary compliance based on a personal interest in obedience 
(material/power based or genuine acquiescence). Moreover, the type of motives will 
also determine the type of domination. If the motive is based purely on economic 
advantages, then the relationship between the ruler and the administrative staff is 
founded on unstable ground. As with Weber’s understanding of order, while motives 
for obedience based on ‘disinterest’ (religious beliefs, rational belief in the validity of 
the order, or affectual attitudes i.e. emotional)
31
 or habituation can be sustainable due to 
more substantial connections such as tribal affiliation, blood relation, and religious 
beliefs etc., obedience based purely on self-interest as in material gain can be 
unpredictable as a result of no other legitimising factor for the ruler besides what he can 
provide material-based for his staff.  In the latter case, if the ruler fails in his capacity to 
satisfy the motives of the staff, then he will be most vulnerable to lose his legitimacy 
and/or his followers, and will either be eliminated or replaced.  However, in the former, 
the ruler’s legitimacy is based on a check-and-balance relationship where the ruler is 
accountable to his tribe, familial or social obligation and the followers are obliged to 
‘obey’ and/or protect the ruler, based on the same concepts of loyalty, from outside 
infiltration.  
 
Of most importance to Weber’s analysis is his understanding of the role of legitimacy, 
and how it is viewed by the populace will determine the type of political structure, how 
its governing system functions, and the behaviour of its administrators and staff. 
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Moreover, it will define the relationship between the administrator and its staff with its 
governing populace.  Weber’s theory thus can be applied to understanding the political 
structures in post-colonial states, and their governing systems of incongruent modern 
and traditional governing components which can found in the Weberian legal 
authorities.  
 
PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS 
In order to understand the political structure of post-colonial states, there needs to be a 
comprehensive grasp of the concept of patron-client relations which was perceived as a 
principle attributed to marginalised societies.
32
 Patron-clients relations, according to 
S.N. Eisenstadt, are not only an indication of underdevelopment but also of special 
types of social configuration epitomising particular forms of cultural orientations.
33
 
“The distinguishing feature of archetypal patron-client relationships is a broad but 
imprecise spectrum of mutual obligations consistent with the belief that the patron 
should display an almost parental concern for and responsiveness to the needs of his 
client, and that the latter should display almost filial loyalty to his patron—beliefs 
reflected by the tendency for familial appellations to be employed in the relationship.”34 
 
This relational structure also illustrates a close correlation with the composition of trust 
in society. While friendship is based on trust and equal relations, patron-client relations 
are hierarchical in structure where clients are subordinate to the patron, and thus are 
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often in competition for his approval, benefaction, and ear. Regardless of the 
hierarchical appearance between the patron and client to suggest a ruler and ruled, there 
is interdependency between the two parties as mechanism for survival. The patron 
would assure the clients’ political, social and/or economic needs while the clients in 
turn would pledge their loyalty and support to the patron which ensures his maintaining 
power. There are degrees wherewith the influence of patron-client relation functions 
depending on the clients’ level of dependence vis-à-vis the patron and the clients’ 
access to particular valued resources outside of the patron’s network. In many cases, by 
securing a client’s position or elevation in society, the patron creates an indebted ally. 
This relational structure is reproduced throughout the society in pyramidical structures 
where each client, often the elites in society when take in the broader societal context, 
from the main ‘patron’—whether king or ruler—becomes a patron in his own rights 
within his own network.  
 
Like Weber’s two forms of contrasting domination, Oliver Roy identified three types of 
patronage. The first is a network set up around one particular individual endowed with 
certain power and prestige. However, this type is temporary and instrumental because it 
does not survive after the individual is removed from office. The second type is a 
traditional group, or what he refers to as a ‘solidarity group’ composed of their village, 
tribe, extended family, clan etc. whose existence preceded the establishment of the state 
and subsequently defines and dominates the political sphere. It manages the state for its 
own advantage. This group often superimposed their model of governance (i.e. tribal) 
and power-structure onto the new state structure which they created and governed by 
their own elites. The third type of patronage is a ‘modern solidarity group’ created 
following the establishment of the modern state. They have common interest in the 
existence of the state and are based on ‘inter-personal’ relations similar to the 
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traditional solidarity group and manage the state for its benefit and often against the 
traditional solidarity group.
35
 In the last two cases, their power is expanded through the 
state structure. Contrary to an early anthropological argument that patron-client 
relations will disappear with democratic development and/or authoritarian rule or 
modernisation, evolving forms of patron-client relations survive past political, 
economic and social transformations.
36
 As seen by similarity in function between the 
last two groups proposed by Roy, it questions whether the modern solidarity group is in 
actuality a manifestation of the traditional solidarity group but restructured for its own 
survival in a modern setting.
37
 Within this paradigm is found the concept of 
patrimonialism—where the ruler espouses patron-client relation by utilising formal 
office to maintain informal clientele network thus assuring his retaining power—to 
dominate not only the social and economic structure of society but also to define the 
political organisational structure and power relations.  
PATRIMONIALISM 
The term patrimonialism was first introduced by Carl Ludwig von Haller in the early 
19
th
 century, however it was Max Weber’s study of dominance and legitimacy that 
gave it its recognition and still remains the core source for analysing political 
development. Patrimonialism, which Weber distinguished from patriarchy, was the 
most important form of government before modern bureaucracy. He defined 
patrimonialism as a “political domination of a ruler with the help of his personal 
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apparatus (consisting of slave, retainers, ministeriales).” 38  Reinhard Bendix further 
provides an understanding of patrimonial rule by asserting that it is “an extension of the 
ruler’s household in which the relation between the ruler and his officials remains on 
the basis of paternal authority and filial dependence.”39 Patrimonial system of rule as 
such was seen as an extension and expansion of the traditional patriarchal system in a 
more systemic framework of governance where a loyal administrative bureaucracy and 
military personnel answer only to the ruler.
40
 As such, the patrimonial ruler—like the 
patriarchal ruler—develops an interdependent patron-client relationship with his 
administrative bureaucracy and military personnel where he as a patron depends on 
their loyalty and enforcement of his will and orders to sustain his power; and the 
administrative bureaucracy and military personnel (clients) depend on the patrimonial 
ruler to provide state resources and position for their personal gain. The use of the term 
patrimonialism was in response to the problematic study of modernisation because it 
indicated the transitory nature of a government on the path to modernisation. It also 
implied that a state will either take one path or another.  As such, patrimonialism takes 
a critical view at basic conclusions and suppositions of the initial studies of 
modernisation and political development.
41
 Unlike patriarchalism, where it focuses on 
the family and extended social structure, the term patrimonialism is always applied to 
political regimes or systems.  
 
Patrimonialism illustrates a “noncomplex, nondifferentiated historical, traditional, 
political regimes.”42 Nevertheless, the term, as argued Eisenstadt, should not be limited 
to such a framework as first proposed Weber. If patrimonialism defines noncomplex 
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societies with ailments found also in more contemporary complex political regimes 
“characterized by such organizational forms of political life as bureaucracies, parties of 
popular movements—however weak they may be—which clearly are beyond the scope 
of relatively noncomplex and traditional polities” 43 , why not apply patrimonial 
assessment to the more complex political regimes?  
 
Authors like Guenther Roth perceive patrimonialism as one of the pre-modern forms of 
social organization which survived into the modern period however but has lost its 
“traditionalist legitimation” which once provided it support and reinforcement. Roth 
argued that the survival and pervasive nature of patrimonialism in the developing world 
is attributed to the “cultural and political heterogeneity of the new states—a 
heterogeneity that confronts their governments with the task of welding diverse social 
units into a nation.” 44   Roth identified two forms of patrimonialism. The first he 
classified as the traditionalist patrimonial regimes whose legitimacy is largely based on 
traditional basis—often in the form of inherited monarchy or chiefdom.  The second 
type of patrimonialism, and the most commonly found, is that based on personal 
rulership where Roth argued loyalty is not based on the belief of the ruler’s personal 
qualifications but rather on material incentives and rewards. The latter claim Roth is the 
most ineradicable element of public and private bureaucracies of highly industrialised 
countries.
45
 Nevertheless, the second type of patrimonialism can also be perceived in 
post-colonial states and not limited to the Developed World as Roth argued due to 
incongruent political and traditional governing systems. 
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The process of political modernisation experienced by post-colonial states was seen as 
a process whereby it would lead to an eradication of, if not replace, the traditional 
patriarchal system. Despite the modernisation process to the political system, the old 
structures still remained though in a distorted form in the new system, in what can be 
perceived as patrimonial political system. In a patrimonial state, the practice of patron-
client is often perceived as a fundamental part of the system where the formal 
governing structure is a continuation of the patriarchy system. State resources and 
formal network are secured for the development of the informal network and familial 
(patriarchal) responsibilities. As such, issues defined as corruption become 
synonymous with the state structure practiced by state officials—elites. This is 
particularly applicable when analysing the political apparatus in the Developing World, 
and in particular for this thesis the Palestinian Authority, which emphasises the inherent 
patriarchal nature of the neo-patrimonial political system. 
 
SYSTEMS OF NEO-PATRIMONIALISM AND NEO-PATRIARCHY 
The term neo-patrimonialism was first coined by S.N. Eisenstadt which was used to 
assess the post-colonial/traditional states transition into bureaucratic states. Eisenstadt’s 
usage of neo-patrimonialism emphasised its modern aspect during post-colonial phases 
which differentiated it from traditional patrimonialism found in colonial eras.
46
 Neo-
patrimonialism as a term was employed by Eisenstadt and later scholars to understand 
the emergence of hybrid regimes and drawbacks of democratic transitions and 
development in post-colonialism.
47
 This was observable in the unrealised 
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modernisation transition for post-colonial states. The characteristics of neo-patrimonial 
regimes became more distinguished from the traditional patrimonial regimes during 
post-colonial phases with the breakdown of the institutional and ideological models of 
modernisation that had been in existence during the colonial period.
48
 Another defining 
characteristic was that power became more observably concentrated at the centre. Any 
independent movements, which might have been seen as a challenge to the centre, by 
different groups of strata in society towards access to formation of the symbols of 
social and moral order, were continuously undermined. The thwarting of autonomous 
movements existed in parallel, and gave credence to the belief, that the centre is the 
sole issuer, if not the symbol, of social and moral order.
49
 By impeding and 
discouraging investment in the development of civil society, the creation of a social 
order or national identity, the society was left dependent on the neo-patrimonial regime. 
Despite efforts towards political modernisation of the political structures, democratic 
overtones, elections and so forth, the political system in post-colonial states still 
retained and resembled the traditional patriarchal system. 
 
As with Hisham Sharabi’s work on Neo-patriarchy, he perceives the patriarchal 
structures in the Arab society as far from being abandoned or truly modernised. Rather 
it has gone through a process of metamorphosis as it became integrated into the new 
political system. Sharabi views neopatriarchy as processes of “social, political, and 
moral decay.”  Sharabi identifies the term neopatriarchy as a composition of two 
concepts, a universal form of traditional society and a ‘unique’ historical development 
originating in Western Europe which signified the first historical rupture from 
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traditionality.
50
 The merging of the two concepts of traditional patriarchy and modern 
patriarchy yielded a form of European hegemonic ‘modernization’; however, this 
modernization, as an outcome of patriarchal and dependent conditions, did not result in 
modernity but rather in a “modernized” patriarchy, or neopatriarchy. As such, 
neopatriarchy cannot be seen as either modern or patriarchal because according to 
Sharabi, it entails neither characteristics of Gemeinschaft—social cohesion based on 
family and kinship which is based on belief, or modern aspects of Gesellschaft—
deriving from individuals acting on self-interest which precedes the larger communal 
association.
51
 Rather, it is a mixed and disordered system of highly unstable social 
formation prone to conflicts; and its society is a “dependent, nonmodern socio-
economic structure” characteristic of an underdeveloped society. 52  Moreover, a 
prevailing characteristic of a neopatriarchal state is that it entails (and functions) 
simultaneously a military-bureaucratic and a security apparatus structure where the 
latter governs day-to-day activities, and serves as the ultimate regulator of political and 
civil life. In conclusion, Sharabi argued that a neopatriarchal state, despite its trappings 
of modern institutional-building with legal and political structures as with a legislature 
and court system, it is no more than a modernised version of a traditional patriarchal 
sultanate.
53
  
 
As Christopher Clapham identifies, in The Nature of the Third World State, neo-
patrimonialism is a “form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly 
patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally 
constructed on rational-legal lines.”54 Of particular defining factor for this system is the 
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use of state resources by the ‘patron’ to secure loyalty from this clientele (political, 
social and economic elites within the patron’s network)—reminiscent of the patron-
client relationship. Despite its obvious flaws, proper identification of neo-
patrimonialism can provide us with an understanding of the mechanism of post-colonial 
states.  
 
In neo-patrimonial societies, there is a discernible paternalistic orientation towards 
“distributive, accumulative and extractive policies,” reflective of colonial regimes, 
whereby the centre controlled key resources and apparatus for development, co-opted 
and influenced important segments of society or the government, and took 
responsibility for policies of welfare and distribution.
55
 Political struggle was 
increasing on the basis of “cooption, change or extension of clientele and factional 
networks often coupled with general populistic appeals made mostly in terms of 
ascriptive symbols or values representing different ethnic, religious, or national 
communities.”56 Consequently, the independence of the legislative body was comprised 
and captured by either bureaucratic, cliques or army.  Eisenstadt’s analysis came to the 
conclusion that parliaments increasingly acted as “additional arenas of symbolic 
representation of the polity, of political socialisation and... arenas of struggle between 
various cliques much more than of independent representation of independent 
leadership of different groups and strata.” Subsequently, parties in neo-patrimonial 
regimes conceded representation of their various ideological values and independence 
for “extensions or changes of networks of patronage.”57 Neo-patrimonialism came to 
epitomise the bureaucratic and leadership structure of governments in post-colonial 
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states.  Its function and influence on the political structure particularly during the state 
formation period in the post-colonial era shall be explored.  
 
POST-COLONIAL STATES AND WEAK STATES 
 
Max Weber argues that regime legitimacy depends upon the relative strength or 
weakness of the state itself.
58
 Strong states are believed by the population to have the 
legitimate monopoly over the use of physical force over the territories of which they 
are sovereign.  Strong states, those accepted by the masses as the legitimate governing 
entity, are able to formalise political processes and reduce the scope for individuals to 
use informal means for achieving desired ends. On the other hand, weak states—
usually the product of colonial history—have little institutional capacity and little or no 
legitimacy and are therefore unable to enforce laws or to hold officials or individuals 
accountable, widening the scope for individuals to manipulate the system through 
informal channels. A weak state therefore can be identified as a “spectrum of 
conventional bureaucratic state capabilities that exists alongside (generally very strong) 
informal political networks.”59 
 
Consequently, many of the post-colonial states came to be weak states, with weak 
institutions, and wherein elites instead relied on the assistance of the informal structures 
which bound them to fragmented but nonetheless traditional society, in order to 
function and enforce (their) order. Corruption became a necessary mode of securing the 
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state, albeit a dysfunctional and progressively less democratic state.  According to 
Weber, weak states lack one or more of the four basic requirements associated with a 
strong state i.e. security, legitimate political institutions, economic management and 
social welfare.
60
  The weak state faces challenges in providing security for its citizens 
where it is unable to control its own borders and territory, loses control over the means 
of violence, and is unable to enforce public order.
61
 A weak state does not possess  
legitimate governing institutions able to provide and enforce inter alia the checks and 
balances of power, hold officials accountable for actions or behaviours, an efficient 
administration, an independent judicial system or inclusive citizen political 
participation.
62
 It also lacks the capacity to carry out fundamental fiscal policies or 
establish a “legal and regulatory” atmosphere which will generate a climate suitable 
and encouraging of foreign investment, entrepreneurship, and management of the 
country’s natural resources or private enterprise necessary for the economic 
development of the state.
63
 Finally, a weak state refrains from investing in society 
particularly in areas that are pertinent to the basic needs of its citizens i.e. education, 
health care and other social services, because there is no incentive for the development 
of the society.  Ultimately the agents of a weak state fall back on informal networks and 
resort to methods of patronage, bribery, torture, intimidation, harassment, coercion, 
nepotism, etc., to ascertain that law and order are enforced and that the regime remains 
in power. The significance of a weak state’s actions is that it coerces the compliance of 
opposition groups—with assurance of perks and positions in the government. On the 
other hand, groups resistant to co-optation are subjected to political and/or physical 
elimination. Regimes in weak states use such informal approaches to reach 
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arrangements (alongside formal agreements) with local power holders and to gain 
support.
64
  
 
Why this type of dual or co-existing governing structure is inherent in post-colonial 
states can be better understood through Joel Migdal’s pioneering work on post-colonial 
states.  Migdal explains how, following colonial withdrawal from Africa, the post-
colonial states that were established had just such parallel incongruent governing 
systems — a formal structure established by the colonial regime and an informal 
structure reflecting the traditional governing structure of the indigenous population. 
Prior to colonial unification in the developing world, particularly in Africa and in the 
Middle East, the regions were composed of different dialects, cultures, tribes and 
ethnicities. In order to establish their own domination, colonial administrations created 
new territorial demarcations, forcibly merged at-odds ethnic groups, and created 
chiefdoms, chiefs, muftis and strongmen where none previously existed. Ignoring the 
accepted boundaries of existing social groups, the colonial regimes placed competing 
and hostile groups—lacking common tradition, language or history—into single 
‘enclosed’ territories with boundaries establishing them as ‘one’ nation to conveniently 
map onto these new geographical boundaries.
65
 Thus, they constructed artificial 
alliances, nations and groups which were internally conflictual and disharmonious, and 
where tribal, ethnic, and group loyalty and alliances preceded territorial or national 
alliances.  As with any new reallocation of power, some groups benefitted while others 
were subordinated or disempowered, depending on their degree of interaction, loyalty 
and proximity to the colonial administration.  
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For a while, these disparate heterogeneous groups, otherwise at odds with each other 
but similarly discontented with colonial regulations and power, were unified in the 
common struggle against colonial rule. However, this adhesive mechanism of colonial 
struggle that held these distinct groups en bloc began to collapse as soon as the colonial 
powers themselves departed. Nevertheless, the disappearance of the colonial regimes as 
the entities of control was not accompanied by the eradication of the structures and 
institutions of these new territorial entities. ‘Modern’ bureaucracies and political 
structures (such as parliaments, and parties) remained and the newly emerging nation-
states were infused with colonial interests that did not precisely coincide with 
indigenous agendas, needs and social structures.  Identities and alliances remained 
within the province of traditional social structures (such as tribe or ethnic grouping) and 
did not map onto the artificial constructs of the post-colonial state, expediting the 
proliferation of political and social fragmentations, irredentist wars and secessionist 
movements.
66
   
 
For Migdal, colonialism had itself affected and altered indigenous social structures. 
Colonialism was a consequence of the expansion of the world economy
67
, as the 
European powers sought out material and human resources to feed their own trade 
regimes. European colonial exploitation of the resources of Africa and Asia not only 
necessitated the imposition of colonial control over demarcated territories but also 
required changes to existing social structures. Accommodating local elites were 
empowered, labour markets were interrupted, and local resource distribution was 
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reorganised to the colonial powers’ interests.68  As a result, a distinctive fragmentation 
in the social and political fabric of the traditional society became visible, making 
society susceptible to the creation of a new social, economic and political order and the 
manipulation of its structures by the colonial regimes. The demands imposed by the 
global market transformed the societal structure with the relocation of populations from 
the villages to cities for work, and with the change from subsistence to cash crops. The 
market revolution moved members of the family into wage labour, while private 
ownership of land resulted in dwindling land holdings and growing rural indebtedness.  
These social disruptions shaped the political acumen of the population. For newly 
urban populations, the situation provided daily interaction with the colonial regime 
which increased their political awareness.  Some social groups were empowered while 
others saw their relative influence decrease. The global market affected colonial states 
in ways which created new identities, new social distributions and new political 
alignment.   
 
When the colonial powers retreated, the political vacuum left was soon filled by 
altering authorities in a volatile and insecure atmosphere.  The legacy of political 
institutions did not reflect the fragmented and complex but nonetheless traditional 
society. The state was therefore weak, unable to secure its legitimacy. For those who 
seized power, short term objectives of their own survival took precedence over long 
term sustainable goals. Those in power sought to use their office to amass resources for 
themselves. Unsure of their continued hold on power, the pretence of serving the public 
and state ‘interests’ was often abandoned as rulers openly pursued private interests.69 
The lack of state legitimacy made their offices weak and they drew instead upon 
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informal political, economic and social networks to co-opt and control, substituting 
personal traditional legitimacy for formal state ‘legitimacy’.70 
 
The fragmentation in society worked in favour of the political leaders of post-colonial 
states by weakening opposition and preventing coalitions of resistance to them. Thus 
the elites were better able to keep the ‘status quo’ and their own position in office.  No 
social framework existed in which there was a sufficiently common identity broad 
enough to be the bases for strong social classes to emerge which could challenge the 
regime elite’s grip over the state.   With no imminent threat to their control over the 
state, the priorities of the new state leaders were not the political, social and economic 
viability of the state but rather their personal survival and enrichment. Government 
institutions lacked the authority to implement rule of law, accountability, transparency, 
and good governance, among other essential elements so there was little state ability to 
contain misappropriation of power, office, and state resources and officials took 
advantage of the opportunity to accumulate private gains. Thus corruption became 
endemic. 
 
POLITICS OF SURVIVAL 
Corruption in this sense is not simply about financial abuse but about the distribution 
and exercise of power. In explaining the politics of survival in weak post-colonial 
states, Migdal discusses in particular the impact of familial responsibilities on official 
duties and positions. He identifies the Politics of Survival as a fusing of the old and the 
new political cultures that ultimately blur the line between familial and official duties.  
The Politics of survival, associated with weak states, it is argued, involves the 
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allocation (or non-allocation) of posts in government, and positioning of these posts 
according to an individual’s degree of loyalty, or threat, to existing state leaders (power 
elites).  In accordance with this practice, it emphasises the particular importance of 
certain state agencies.  Political elites allocate the most loyal groups (i.e. their tribe, 
relatives, and cronies) to agencies posing the most threat to the leadership’s position of 
exercising social control and retaining power.  Agencies with low priorities or with 
marginal power are staffed with groups that are either least trustworthy, need placating 
or essential to be co-opted into the system.  This type of distribution, Migdal argues, 
lessens and eliminates threat to state leaders.
71
  Social control is exercised through the 
manoeuvring of state agencies and the strategic placement of key groups and 
individuals in the state infrastructure.   
 
In the Politics of Survival the regime leadership seeks to eliminate major power centres 
inside as well as outside the state’s organisations.  Agencies within the state apparatus 
are controlled and eliminated if they become a threat to leaders; however, organisations 
not directly tied to state institutions such as  Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
or charity groups cannot be easily eliminated.  Therefore by allocating certain resources 
(or posts) to pertinent non-institution groups and individuals while simultaneously 
withholding them from non-cooperative entities, the regime can ensure placation or 
concession by otherwise dissident groups. Organisations that are not readily co-opted 
present a predicament for leaders for they can not be ‘conveniently’ manipulated.  One 
of the main reasons for the strength behind non-cooperative organisations (i.e. charity 
groups, NGOs, etc.) and the inability of the state to remove them from the political and 
social sphere is that they (unlike the state) are seen as legitimate entities because they 
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render pertinent social services that the regime fails to provide.  Those in power must 
find means to either ‘work’ with or to gradually eliminate such bodies.  One of the 
methods employed to remove rival is the use of state resources to withhold or divert 
funds, to provide alternative organisations or cheaper labour, to secure a state 
monopoly in certain sectors or simply to drive opponents out of business.  The 
manipulation of a state budget and the putting up of barriers to non-state agencies can 
prevent these NGO organisations from performing their duties.  
 
Migdal maintained that through these mechanisms of weakening state agencies and 
institutions and eliminating competitors and rival organisations, elites in weak, post-
colonial states have been able to stay afloat.
72
   Indeed, rather than pursuing the 
economic and political development of the state, elites prevented state institutions from 
enhancing their capabilities by means of hindering the development of complex 
organisations within their system which eventually placed state institutions in a 
stagnant state of  non-development.   Critics within the state institutions are limited in 
their ability to challenge the policy imposed by state leaders (elites) for fear of 
reprisals, removal, impoverishment of his family, and imprisonment.
73
  Officials are 
forced to choose either to adhere to democratic principles or to abide by the elite’s 
modus operandi.  
 
Elites are not, however, all powerful. Indeed elites live in a perpetual state of fear and 
insecurity because of their lack of legitimacy attributable to their formal status and their 
inability to secure the confidence of the mass or opposition except through co-optation, 
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or the non-legitimate use of violence and intimidation. With no particular attachment to 
or understanding of the masses, elites are incapable of relating to their particular 
society, of implementing relevant social policies or mobilising the masses.
74
  As such, 
the elite is unable to a large degree to achieve “predominance” because its formal state 
capacities are weak. They are subjected to continual challenges posed by alternative 
local leaders (such as clan leaders, landlords, land-notables, or strongmen).
75
 Each 
component of the fragmented society has its own ideas on how the society should be 
controlled and maintained, and its own “legitimate” representatives, who challenge the 
(non) vision of the weak, ‘non-legitimate’, and incapable state. In the face of these 
constant challenges, the state elites seek only survive, to maintain the status quo, and 
assure their position of power.  
 
Crucial to this system is the dependence of the individual on the income associated 
with office. Migdal explains the importance of an individual’s familial responsibility in 
terms of the lack of a social security system to support the individual and his family in 
the developing world. Terms in office can become ‘hereditary’ where election or 
appointment is only a ‘formalised’ process to sustain the ruling regime or ‘family’.  
Elites therefore engage in strategic political games of alliance, bargaining, appearance 
of conformity, and collaboration in order to secure and maintain their post for as long 
as possible. In contrast, in a strong state system, a strong institutional structure exists 
where leadership positions have defined terms and subject to constitutional amendment 
if changes are to be made requiring the approval of the mass. The survival of the state 
official, as can be observed in strong states, is therefore contingent upon his ability to 
satisfy his constituency.  
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In the weak state, the official’s fear of being destitute or being unable to maintain an 
income if they are removed from office, provides a receptive structure for alternative 
methods of maintaining state leaders’ tenureship.76  Pressure can be placed on officials 
through informal means which produced a higher outcome of obedience and 
acquiescence.  In a formal legal political setting, subordinate officials could be 
dismissed but would still retain benefits acquired throughout years of service. However, 
in a weak state structure where the informal structure is used to maintain the formal, a 
dismissed non-compliant official can have his assets and wealth seized and confiscated 
as a form of punishment.
77
 Therefore it is to the benefit of the official—and to his 
familial responsibilities—that he is acquiescent in the dominant elite political mode of 
behaviour within the formal structure regardless if it is in dissonance with his own 
political values. Thus conforming to corrupt practice, or at least tolerating and 
implicitly endorsing it, is suffused through the entire state apparatus and wider society.  
 
If Migdal understands the politics of survival as an extension of the traditional familial 
responsibility in weak states, M. McMullan in his study of West African societies, 
understands it as it the discord between old customs and attitudes, and the new forms of 
government giving rise to corruption.
78
   Whereas Almond and Verba’s work on civic 
culture conveyed a ‘nuclear’ definition of family, as one of the factors for a political 
elite’s engagement in the politics of survival, McMullan includes the extended family 
and related cultural understandings of  how an individual functions and justifies his/her 
actions within the socio-political realm. In much of the developing world, familial and 
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social pressure placed on the official inhibit his ability to “cultivate aloofness”. His 
failure to form a distinction between his role as a clan member and that of a state 
official is again attributed to the weak state structure which fails to provide basic social 
security for state employees. Moreover the scarcity in resources and uneven 
distribution in society produces a competitive environment where those closest (be it 
individuals or tribes) to the power source stand to gain the most. As a result, the 
discrepancy between needs and availability can influence an official’s decision 
making.
79
   
 
In post-colonial societies, attachment to the collectivity, (i.e. tribe, extended family, 
etc) can maximise an individual’s survival chances and advancement (political, 
economic, or social). As a result, his resources or networks are to be “accessed” by the 
aggregate whole of his network. Lucian Pye in his study of Asian nations found there 
was a common tendency to emphasize loyalty to the collective over individual freedom 
and needs. An individual often favoured “paternalistic authority relations” in the form 
of clans or tribes which provided support and satisfied psychological security and 
needs.
80
 This system of paternalistic authority personified political power. Established 
relationships provided order and discouraged conflict, concentrated on and empowered 
internal relations, curtailed criticism of authority and thus ultimately provided leaders 
with unrestrained use of power.
81
  It is a system applicable to many states in the 
developing world especially those that have transitioned from a colonial experience. In 
these societies, there is no clear distinction between the public and private life of an 
official and, as observed by McMullan, when dissonance occurs between the 
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government and the traditional society while trying to change the society through 
imposition of laws and regulations, corruption (in the form of officials favouring their 
kinship collectives) functions as an emollient alleviating the conflict and decreasing 
hostility and tension.
82
 
 
In another  culturally-based explanation for corruption, Colin Leys in his assessment of 
traditional gift giving society argued that bribery (corruption) is not easily discernible 
because the line between tradition (which is socially acceptable) and bribery can blur 
and  become normalised when applied in the political sphere. This custom of 
‘traditional’ gift giving, as in the form of grains or animals, has taken on a more 
tangible nature in the contemporary era in the form of money in exchange for favour 
and/or power within the political system.  This practice I define as corruption, though 
cloaked in the name of “tradition.”  Leys labelled this as “rule-infringement…partially 
concealed by continuity with an older custom.”83  The significance is that there is an 
underlying rationale indicating that corruption is culturally normative.  If dressed as 
part of an older custom and accepted by the particular society as customary behaviours, 
then those customs are normalised based on the society’s value or traditional system.  
Joseph S. Nye identified these pertinent customary behaviours which can affect the role 
of an official as bribery—using reward to alter the decision of an official, nepotism—
allocating benefaction based on personal relationship rather than on merit, and 
misappropriation—exploiting state resources for private use.84  The exercise of power 
and application of these behaviours perpetuates a governing system which penetrates 
all aspects of society and emphasises the disparity between the leadership (particularly 
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the governing political elites) and the mass.  For the integration of oppositional 
components in society, corruption served as an emollient to bridge the gap between the 
mass and the officials/elites.
85
  In this regard, we can observe the necessity for elites to 
practice the politics of survival in order to balance their formal and informal 
responsibilities where ultimately the informal had a more important role in society.  
 
Migdal et al’s discussion of weak, post-colonial states has thus far introduced us to two 
further key concepts. The notion that corruption is a manifestation of the Politics of 
Survival, whereby political elites strategise to retain power, suggests we need to 
determine more closely who comprises the political elite and what characteristics such 
an elite might display. Secondly, we have been introduced to the idea that weak post-
colonial states exhibit a dual system of formal and informal political structures which 
themselves exhibit contrasting political cultures, the first informed by a rational 
bureaucratic culture (and one usually nominally informed by democratic norms) and 
the second a traditional political culture which reflects family-based or collectivist 
norms. Regime elites draw their legitimacy from their conformity with the latter 
political culture, reflecting the lack of legitimacy of the formal structures and the 
socially-ungrounded nature of the formal political culture. 
 
Corruption occurs when regime elites use their official positions to manoeuvre to retain 
power by personally controlling, amassing and distributing the resources of the state, 
drawing on informal structures and legitimising this through traditional cultural norms. 
The gift giving culture identified by Colin Leys suggests that ‘corruption’ often 
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accompanying traditional political cultures can even become part of the formal culture 
when cloaked under ‘tradition’.  Therefore, in order to understand corruption better we 
need to look at these two factors. First, we need to examine political elites to 
understand who comprise the regime elites and how they operate, what is their 
relationship with the wider population, and from where do they draw their authority. 
Secondly, we need to consider political culture more closely, to consider what 
constitutes political culture, and how it manifests itself in the political behaviour of 
elites in both formal and informal politics. 
 
ELITES: KEY AGENTS IN CORRUPTION 
Aristotle’s aristocracy, a precursor to ‘elite’, introduced the concept of men in office 
who stood out from the masses due to their exceptional merit or wealth, though may 
not necessarily descend from ancestors with equal prominence.
86
 The study of elites did 
not gain recognition or importance until the late 19
th
 century with the theorist Gaetano 
Mosca’s work Elementi Di Scienza Politica (The Ruling Class), first published in 1896, 
which analysed the characteristics and organisational superiority of the elite. Vilfredo 
Pareto followed suit with his comprehensive analysis of the elite which emphasised its 
intellectual and psychological supremacy vis-à-vis the masses.  For the purpose of this 
work, I will be using the term elite as it was used by Harold D. Lasswell to refer those 
in “possession of influence or power, or who participate in the formation and execution 
of policy.”87 
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Following Mosca and Pareto’s school of thought, Lasswell argued that regardless of the 
form of government structure, a minority group will always hold real power. Politics 
therefore, maintains Lasswell, is the study of two types of group in society that make 
up the political system, the influenced and the influential. Lasswell identified the 
influential as those, “who get the most of what there is to get… [and] [t]hose who get 
the most are elite; the rest are mass.”88  Mosca saw these two classes as complementary 
and mutually-dependent. Although the ruling class will be less numerous they hold and 
exercise power. Mosca perceived elites as those who execute all political task and 
decision making, monopolise power, and benefit from the rewards that accompany 
power. On the other hand, the second group comprised of the mass, will be more 
numerous and controlled and guided by the first.  As a result, the ruling class will 
always be in possession of the material means and tools to remain in power.
89
  Pareto 
also conceived of society as being composed of only two strata: a lower stratum of non-
elite and a higher stratum of elite, itself divided into governing elite and non-governing 
elite.
90
 Pareto maintained that those who belong to the elite class have either reached 
the pinnacle of their achievements and wealth or were born into this privilege. As with 
Mosca, Pareto alluded to an unequal distribution of wealth—and station—in society91 
championing the position of ingrained forms of stratification existing in every society. 
Equally claimed by Aristotle, Mosca, Pareto, Lasswell and Mills is the view that there 
will always be those who govern and others who are governed. As such, the behaviour, 
attitude, values and belief of those that govern are a reflection of the social-political 
milieu that they administer.  
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Mosca and Pareto’s work on the elite influenced many other thinkers, notably Karl 
Mannheim. Mannheim’s work on political elite offered a causal relationship between 
elite changes and underlying social structural changes.
92
 In his work on Man and 
Society, Mannheim identified two different types of elites and their particular function 
that exist in each society.  He identified the first group as an integrative elite consisting 
of political and organisation leaders. The second group he labelled the sublimative elite 
comprised of intellectuals, and moral-religious and aesthetic leaders.
93
  While 
Mannheim’s integrative elite worked through formal political structures such as the 
political and governmental sphere, his sublimative elite operated through more informal 
channels such as cliques and groupings.  Their aim was to encourage dialogue and 
stimulate the social, political and aesthetic aspirations of society.  Although Mannheim 
negated the existence of a core elite in favour of the idea of cooperative and equal 
sublimative and integrative elites—due to their working towards a similar goal though 
from different angles—he gave insight into the types of elites that emerged.   
Mannheim’s important contribution to the study of elite, for this thesis, is his argument 
that it is the nature of the functions of elites rather than their motives which give them 
form and shape.  For instance, if an elite individual has personal motives but the 
governing system does not allow him to pursue those motives, then there is less (or no) 
room for the elite individual to manipulate or exploit the system. However, if the elite 
individual is given a significant function within a government, his particular position 
can allow him certain freedom. Therefore, if the elite individual is placed in a key 
position within a weak-state, where state institutions are incapable of monitoring or 
restricting certain corrupt behaviours, then the elite figure will have no impeding 
boundaries or accountability measures to limit his pursuit of personal advantage. In this 
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case, the elite have within their means the ability to manipulate or exploit the system. 
As such, it is essential to examine the functions of the elites in the political system and 
how their roles contribute to sustaining corruption. Hence, an astute comprehension of 
who comprise the core of the governing political elites (core elite) and their functions 
in the system and in society is an important aspect. 
 
THE EXISTENCE OF CORE ELITES  
The debate over the existence of a core elite versus staggered groups of elites that 
governs society is central to this study and to understanding the recruitment and 
distribution of elites within strategic positions around the leadership. The debate 
centres on whether there is a hierarchy of order within elite structure which allows the 
researcher to identify a single group of core elites who hold and exercise true power; or 
whether there is no hierarchy in the elite structure but rather staggered elites who work 
within an egalitarian power-sharing structure where all have equal influence and rights 
on the decision making process. The idea that there exists a group of core elite suggests 
the existence of a main singular group of ruling elite in central power (though there 
may be subsidiary or counter-elite groups) who are the decision makers and are able to 
influence the decision making process, unlike staggered elites where all have an equal 
saying in the decision making process. Moreover, the presence of a core elite group 
implies that there is a form of cohesive and exclusive nature to their existence. 
C. Wright Mills, in his study of power and class structure in the U.S. in The Power 
Elite, provides us with the idea that the government is controlled by a small group of 
power elite. He introduced the concept of an ‘inner core’ and ‘outer fringes’ of what he 
calls the power elite, but what is identified here as core elites. Mills asserted that the 
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inner core is comprised of those who “interchange commanding roles at the top of one 
dominant institutional order with those in another.” 94   Moreover, they actively 
participate in the final stage of major decision making process. Those who are in the 
outer fringes, on the other hand, have no direct involvement, or active participation in 
the decision making process, and that their interests and views are considered by the 
inner core group.
95
  However, those that fall within the definition of ‘inner core’ 
participate in the direct decision making process, hold great influence and can 
indirectly manipulate the decision making process.  Pareto’s work on elites, proposes 
the existence of two groups of elites—within the elite structure—made up of 
“governing” elite and “non-governing” elite.  While governing elite serves the same 
capacity as a core elite by “directly or indirectly play[ing] a significant part in 
government and political life,”96 the non-governing elite have no authoritative role vis-
à-vis the core elite in government and politics. Pareto’s perception of the elite implied 
the existence of a core group within the elite structure as power-holders and actively 
involved in the decision making process. On the hand, the non-governing elite, like 
Mill’s outer fringes, play no significant role in the decision making process.  This 
thesis’ definition of core elites needs to be made clear, therefore we will borrow from 
Mills to identify core elites as those who are “in positions to make decisions [or refrain 
from making decisions] having major [political, social and economic] consequences.”97  
As we can observe in the developing world, the core elite were concentrated in the 
governing regime with counter-elites strategically placed within the state institution and 
its supporting agencies. However, unlike Mill’s and Pareto’s perceptions of the outer 
fringes which have no direct participation or influence on the decision making process, 
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this thesis proposes counter-elites who actively participate in the decision making 
process and do have some form of influence to a certain degree as long as it falls in line 
with the agenda of the core elite or do not challenge the survival or status quo of the 
regime.  
 
This follows from Mills, who in a Weberian approach of power distribution within the 
political community,
98
 also argued for the existence of a core elite where power is 
concentrated composed of three elite groups: individuals that occupy ‘command’ 
positions i.e. the political (members of the political directorate), military (elite soldier-
statesmen who surround the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the top echelon), and economic 
(corporate rich i.e. chief executives) elites. Mills argued that even though these three 
groups have formed a powerful but uneasy alliance, they understand the 
interdependence nature of the institutional orders and therefore not only share but 
pursue common goals.  In a similar finding of the role that elites play in the political 
sphere, James Bill and Carl Leiden’s study of systems and processes in Middle East 
politics argued that though “societies are composed of an interrelated network of 
groups and classes, there is always one group of individuals who have a 
disproportionate amount of power and influence on decision making.”99 This group of 
powerful individuals, they argued, functions as the core elite who influences and 
shapes the political style and political system of a society. This resonates with Mosca’s 
idea of a closed and exclusive circle of a small ruling class behind the governing 
institution that wield true political power in the society. In an analogous analysis, 
Robert Presthus supports the existence of behind-the-scene individuals who act as 
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actual power-holders and ‘influentials’ in the decision making process.  Presthus’s 
concept of influentials claimed that they may, or may not directly involve themselves 
with the decision making process, however, they can employ “leg-men” within the 
decision-making circles as proxies and mouthpiece on their behalf. Presthus’ 
proposition therefore sees core elites existing either in or out of the public eyes, holding 
critical positions, working behind the scenes (though not necessarily a criteria), 
coordinating policies of public affairs and imposing their will on community affairs.   
 
While scholars like Mills, Pareto, Mosca and Presthus argued for a hierarchical elite 
group, suggesting the existence of the core elite as a single body of influencers,
100
 
others have argued that there are overlap groups of elites with equal influence on the 
political system. Elite theorists such as Robert Dahl, Suzanne Keller, Frank Tachau, 
and Karl Mannheim rejected the idea of a core elite group. Rather, they believed that 
the ruling elite was not a homogeneous and unified group but rather a compilation of 
straggling groups vying for power.  They concluded that the existence of a core elite 
group was unattainable and unrealistic. This school of straggling elite groups saw 
various elites co-existing, sharing power, decision-making, responsibilities and 
rewards. Robert Dahl in his work Who Governs? a study of power structures in New 
Haven, Connecticut, insisted that his finding denoted democratic pluralism in the top 
one percent of policy/decision-makers (the power elite) which he argued indicated that 
in advanced democratic  societies, political decisions are influenced by many elites and 
not limited to one selective group of elites.
101
 These theorists on pluralistic-elite draw 
attention to important points for the existence of multiple-egalitarian elite groups 
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sharing power which shall be tested against the Palestinian Authority in the framework 
of a post-colonial state. Nevertheless, in the Palestinian case, the existence of equal 
plural elites presupposes an existing democratic political structure. Whether this is 
relevant to the Palestinian authority depends on how democratic the political structures 
prove to be. A pluralistic top echelon within the framework of democratic political 
structures can also negate the existence of a core-elite.  
  
Nevertheless, many theorists who argued for the existence of a core elite found that in a 
pyramidal form of government, the core elite compose the apex of the pyramid that 
governs and rules society. However, in order for the elite structure to survive, it 
requires incoming people with new ideas in order to replenish and sustain it. The core 
elite therefore function as an entity that filters who can be admitted into its circles, but 
it is important to consider whether  the new elites that are recruited to revitalise the elite 
group change its fundamental composition and objectives,  of whether the core remain 
impervious and static.  Hence, it is important to consider what types of individuals or 
groups are recruited into the elite circle, the recruitment process through which they are 
selected, and what functions they are allocated.  
 
RECRUITMENT TO THE CORE ELITE STRUCTURE 
Selective recruitment is an important component in maintaining the core elements of 
the elite structure and its survival. In order to understand how the core elite replenishes 
itself, and with what objectives, it is important to understand why, how and who are the 
elites recruited into the core. Theorists like Parry attribute the downfall or replacement 
of elites to two factors, structural and socio-psychological changes. Structural changes 
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in the society can bring about changes in the dominant minority of the society. On the 
other hand, socio-psychological changes displace the elite as a consequence of some 
changes in the elite’s attitude and abilities.102  While Karl Marx predicted the sure 
demise of elites with the onslaught of development, Mosca argued that elites are 
adaptable and flexible to a new environment and new pressures due to recruitment of 
new elites who are well versed in new developments.  However, Mosca predicted an 
inevitable decline of the elites (ruling class) if they ceased to produce necessarily skills 
or resources which contributed to their rise to power.  He argued that when elites can 
no longer render the social services which they once provided, their talents lose in 
importance and society no longer value those talents, or become stagnant and sterile in 
productivity and ideas, then the elite will inescapably decline in power and influence.
103
 
Mosca’s solution was to gradually incorporate (recruit/introduce) new elements of 
moral fibre and new blood.  Moreover, Mosca argued, in order for elites to survive, 
they need to control the social forces—human activity with social significance—and 
adjust their policies to meet the demands of the new social forces. Consequently, the 
co-optation of new elites from the rising social forces and their being placed on the 
lower rung of the ruling class was an essential component of elite survival.  Hence, the 
continuous internal replenishment through co-optation and policy change, sustains an 
overarching or core elite class. 
 
Pareto equally proposes the necessity of elite recruitment as an element of elite survival 
where core elites would draw from leaders of the mass to generate a circulation of new 
blood and ideas into the ruling class. When elites fail to recruit or rejuvenate the old 
elite class from leaders of the masses, then the governing class will either collapse or be 
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overthrown.
104
 Pareto’s Machiavellian conviction about the circulation of elites and the 
relationship between the masses and the elite suggested a pyramidal relationship 
between the elite and the mass. He prescribed certain functions for each entity. Pareto 
ascribed current elites the apex (A). Elites (A), he found, were always challenged by 
strong upcoming leaders which he called (B). At the bottom of his pyramid he allocated 
the mass (C).  B would rally the support of C in order to replace A.  Once A is replaced 
by B, a new set of leaders (D) will emerge to challenge or replace (B) again using C.  
Consequently, C remained constant—with no mobility—acting as pawns to be 
manoeuvred for the gratification and successful bid for power by A and B.
105
  Pareto 
argued that those who were weak or refused to defend themselves would ultimately 
find themselves victims or pawns of those who are more superior in power, strength 
and intellect. This type of weak and pusillanimous individuals should not hold anyone 
responsible but themselves for their removal or gradual descent from office. “Any elite 
which is not prepared to join in battle to defend its position,” wrote Pareto, “is in full 
decadence, and all that is left to it is to give way to another elite having the virile 
quality it lacks.”106  If elites want to establish institutions or introduce sets of ideas and 
value system, they should possess the power to inflict them on those who do not desire 
them.
107
 Consequently, Pareto’s Machiavelian conception of power-structure and 
circulation of elites assigned particular functions to the elite and mass which led to the 
supposition that power (elite) can shift and change hand, and will only be attained, and 
sustained, by force.   
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Many contemporary authors on elites claim that elite recruitment in modern societies 
has become more open. Modern elite recruitment emphasises the diversity of 
recruitment where elites are chosen based on individual meritocracy and achievement 
allowing for elites to emerge from various social classes, and from all strata of 
society.
108
 Suzanne Keller’s strategic elites theory, like Tachau, argued that access to 
the elite class can be accomplished through individual motivation and capacity and is 
consequently open to all groups in society.
109
 An idea challenged by Allen Potter in his 
work The American Governing Class, in which he identifies the American governing 
class as comprised of the Preparatory school and Ivy League educated, upper social 
class of inherited wealth.
110
 Tom Bottomore’s study of French higher civil service 
recruits also found a significant percentage of imperative level positions occupied by 
members of the higher rung of society. Of the top level (les grands corps de l’Etat), 
Bottomore’s finding indicated that 84 percent of the state officials derived from the 
upper and upper middle class families while only less than 1 percent were from 
families of agricultural labourers or industrial workers.
111
  In elite recruitment, an 
individual’s social and economic background defined what positions they will hold in 
that political climate, and their susceptibility to be manoeuvred in order to advance or 
thwart a political agenda. As a result, counter-elites recruited to the core elites have to 
adapt to the political culture and behaviour of the core elites in order to survive. Goals 
and policy pursued by elites were seen by outside observers as harmonious (factual or 
imagined), thus the elite were perceived as a homogenous group. 
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The pool where the elites are selected will in general share similar views, education and 
social background as the selectors.
112
 As Robert Putnam observed, “the narrower and 
more unified the selectorate that reviews the credentials of prospective recruits, the 
more likely those recruits are to share perspectives and loyalties with one another and 
with the selectorate.”113  Value consensus, according to Putnam is one of the most 
important and fundamental element of integrating elites. When the political elite are 
substantially integrated, then there will be an observable strong cohesiveness on the 
essential factors of the political formula.
114
 The grooming of the incoming elite 
therefore is to a large degree an assurance that the values, beliefs and morals of the core 
elites are maintained. Thus, it became essential that the old core elites protect their 
interest and power by limiting their selection of new elites to specific circles/groups, 
and strategically allocate the new recruits to preserve their status quo. Furthermore it 
was important that the old elites coerce the new elites to adopt their moral stance and 
values to maximize their survival. As such, the beliefs, morals, attitudes, behaviours of 
the old/core elites are maintained and continued because new  elites are carefully 
chosen to resemble the ideals, ‘virtues’, values and beliefs of those whom they would 
replace or work alongside.   The exclusive social-economic background of the core is 
conserved through new recruits—who not only adopt the ideas, practices and goals of 
the core elite but would ultimately be trained and primed to maintain the status quo, 
reputation, beliefs and exclusivity of the elite class. At the same time, they are 
encouraged to exhibit pertinent characteristics and skills which are valued in society 
and which the mass can ‘identify’ with and perceive as necessary for the progression of 
society.  This ultimately legitimises the power and position held by the self-interested 
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core elite group. Consequently, the aim of the recruitment of new elites is to ensure the 
survival and impenetrability of the core elite from outside forces where the counter-
elite (often the new elites) are strategically posted for the maximisation of political 
objectives and to appraise their commitment and capability. Consequently, the function 
of the counter-elite is to serve as a cushion between the mass and the core, and to 
guarantee the primacy and interest of the core elite.  
 
This is a delicate balance to achieve. New elites are often viewed as innovators, risk 
takers, and self-motivators striving for change, ascent in status, and recognition. New 
recruits are required to possess the knowledge and skills that are valued by society and 
which will be fundamental to sustaining the group. On the other hand, as Mannheim 
noted, groups or individuals that have maintained wealth from what others have 
accomplished are less prone to yield to individuals who are open to new ideas and are 
prepared to take risks. Mannheim asserted that the self-help man often “develops a 
keenness” that is valued in society. However, if these “mental traits are discouraged or 
neutralized by over-assimilation, society loses resources for change and adaptation.”115  
Like Mannheim’s self-made men, the newly recruited elites bring with them certain 
enthusiasm, strength, characteristics, and political orientations that are valued by the 
society. As such, these idealistic new recruits become a commodity for the self-
interested old elites.  However, as observed by Mannheim, if these valued traits, which 
made the recruits distinctive, become less valuable inside the elite circle or are rejected 
by the core elites, it suggests an absorption or adaptation to the political culture or 
values of the core elite.   Therefore, the solidarity or cohesion of the elites is 
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fundamental for the survival of the core elite and is a process that is accomplished over 
a span of time through a period of further socialisation and political accommodation.
116
  
 
However when a new elite’s political orientation is incongruent with those of the core 
group, there is a propensity for tension and conflict. As Pareto recognised, elite 
circulation into the core elite is in a “state of continuous and slow transformation.”  But 
if there is significant and sufficient incongruency between the new elites and the old, 
then violence between the two can break out.
117
  How old core elites absorb the new 
incoming elites into their own political culture is a matter of co-optation and possibly a 
venue for corruption. Pareto viewed elites as capable and skilled individuals who have 
reached this pinnacle in society through various means and therefore would do all that 
is necessary to secure that position, even becoming proficient agents of corruption. In a 
Machiavellian approach, Pareto argued that in the long run, those best equipped for 
government are the foxes, because they “are most adept in the art of undermining 
opponents by bribery and corruption and of regaining by fraud and deception what 
appeared to have been conceded under the threat of force.”118  They need dominant 
influence to balance and achieve goals and aims and only the foxes could provide such 
characteristics. The lions on the other hand were seen as too ‘noble’ and therefore 
‘weak’ and consequently will not survive in the political realm. Those who were 
resistant to corruption or bribery survived in the political arena and maintained their 
membership only if they possessed indispensable skills or outstanding qualities.  
Personal gain and immediate gratification and interests procured precedence over the 
state or communal interest.  Therefore short-term goals were often pursued over long-
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term oriented goals toward the improvement of the society. Furthermore, incumbency 
in high positions yield more rewards therefore competition is high and once such a post 
is secured, it will be difficult to rescind.
119
  Pareto identified and categorised different 
types of elites who claim such roles. He identified a Type A and B elite as those that 
exploited their official role and the effect on the government. Type A elite, he allocated 
to those who “aim resolutely at ideal ends, adopting and strictly following certain rules 
of conduct.”120 Type B elite on the other hand consisted of individuals whose aim is to 
“promote the well being of themselves, and their dependants or henchmen.” Pareto 
divided the two sets of elites into two categories with the first type (B-a) being those 
“who are content with the enjoyment of power and honours, leaving the material 
benefits to their associates.” This type of men and women are oftentimes considered as 
‘honest’ by those “well disposed to the party, and are viewed with indifference in 
regard to honesty by its opponents.”121 The last of subtype B is B-b composed of those 
who seek “material benefits—generally money—both for themselves and for their 
adherents.”  When these types of people are discovered, they are labelled as 
‘dishonest’, but are ‘protected’ by fellow members or friends. However Pareto 
observed, the B-a subtype is considerably more costly to a country because their 
appearance of honesty allows them to use different forms of deception and cajole to 
turn over people’s property into the clutch of their political cohorts. Even though those 
categorised as B-a do not reap the benefits for themselves, however, they go to great 
lengths to ensure that their families and friends are enriched. As observed by Pareto, 
“the more—or less—honest the general population of a country, the more—or less—
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honest its government.”122 The government is a mirror of the ailments in the society 
and its propensity towards a certain political culture and vice-versa. 
 
Pareto’s idea of the circulation of elites indicated the inevitability of all foxes being 
overthrown by the lions, and all lions becoming foxes.   Robert Michels perceived the 
same pattern in the corrosive effects of power within the socialist movement. He 
observed that the men who first joined the socialist movement were idealists who had a 
strong belief in the movement which was in contrast to their later counterparts who 
joined for power and personal gain. “The original movement, initially small and 
dedicated to the cause, attracts opportunists of every stripe as it expands and these 
extend their immoral influence at the expense of the original leaders.”123 This was also 
a prevalent phenomenon in  colonial resistance movements, the established post-
colonial states  soon being  governed by leaderships who had not themselves been 
involved in the initial anti-colonial struggles and consequently who lacked the 
associated legitimacy in the eyes of the populations. The new ruling leaderships 
therefore established new governing structures in which they institutionalised their 
political culture, values and behaviours.  
 
 
ELITE IN POST-COLONIAL STATES 
The colonial powers were eager to ‘create’ local leaderships – new core elites – to 
bridge and govern the increasingly fractured societies of states formed from 
conglomerates of different ethnicity and social groups as they themselves retreated. 
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Creating political institutions that mirrored their own, they effectively installed new 
core elites which had within their capacity the mechanisms to manipulate power and 
resources. As seen in many countries under colonial rule, the regime would select 
“elites,” who were not often recognised by the mass as legitimate, to serve as their 
representatives. In a tribal or ethnically divided society, each district representative 
often sought the agenda of their tribe/ethnic group while ignoring the need of other 
groups within their constituencies. The colonial administrations  encouraged rivalry and 
competition between groups, and both left intact patterns of traditional social 
organisations (i.e. British regime) or attacked the very core of the traditional social 
institution (i.e. French regime) which created a structural re-configuration of elite and 
ethnic groups in the society.
124
 As such, they created further disruption to the traditional 
social and political structure. 
 
Pareto asserts that corruption was institutionalised by new core elites in post-colonial 
states, whoever they were, and used as an informal method to co-opt new recruits, 
exploit the masses and reign in dissident voices.
125
 Having been installed by colonial 
powers, they had little local legitimacy and needed alternative means of establishing 
their control. The incongruency between the political system instituted by the colonial 
regime and the traditional governing system established a weak state structure which 
enabled corruption to flourish in order for the merging political system to survive. 
Through the co-optational possibilities of corrupt behaviour, counter-elites who may 
originally have different views, or political orientation, were recruited and in a span of 
time came to adopt the ideals of the core elites. With the neutralisation of the qualities 
                                                          
124
 Blanton, R,T., David Mason, and Brian Athow. "Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in 
Africa," (Jul., 2001), p. 475 
125
 Pareto, V. Sociological Writing, (1966), p. 163 
CHAPTER I:  CORRUPTION IN POST-COLONIAL STATES 
 
68 | P a g e  
 
first possessed by the new recruits and their assimilation into the political orientation of 
the core elite, constant elite replenish was possible.  
 
One form of such behaviour was the maintenance of traditional patron-client 
relationships alongside formal political structures. Although the ruling elite can employ 
force or deception to appropriate other people’s goods and property to fill their coffers, 
they may simultaneously reward the loyal subjects within their network in such a 
Weberian patron-client relationship, especially where state structures are weak state 
structure.  The argument against such rationality, particularly if the effect on the society 
and state is negative, is often moral laden. However, as argued Pareto, “neither patrons 
nor clients are fully aware that their conduct transgresses the moral norms prevailing in 
their society, and even when they are aware they readily find excuses either by arguing 
that, when all is said and done, other people would do just the same, or else by recourse 
to the convenient pretext that the end justifies the means—and for them there can be no 
more excellent end than maintaining themselves in power.”126  This sense of 
justification contributed to the endemic and permanent nature of patron-client relations 
in weak states. 
 
One significant phenomenon which led to the disintegration of social structure in post-
colonial states and the institutionalised use of corruption was the method of out-going 
colonial regimes selecting unrecognised ‘elites’ as leaders and representatives at the 
expense of traditional local elites. Each colonial regime had a particular system of 
stratification (tribe or ethnic) that left contrasting legacies.
127
 However, with each 
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colonial administration, there was a general trend of selecting local “chiefs” (existing or 
newly created)—based on loyalties and accommodation disposition—over elites who 
had received formal Western education.  Oftentimes many of these chosen leadership 
were not accepted as legitimate ‘leaders’ or representatives by the community at large. 
However, in time this makeshift leadership became the core elites. They therefore 
needed to co-opt and recruit traditional elites or legitimate elites in order to legitimise 
their position and to assure their survival against outside threat.  
 
In Nigeria, Tom Bottomore found a prevalent number of Western-educated and self-
made men who supplanted the old elite of the traditional ruling families. However, he 
observes an overlap between the new and old elites for the old elite families had the 
most means to supply their children with a Western education.
128
 Though kinship ties, 
wealth and professional skills were necessary ‘tools’ to be considered for the elite 
circle, however, education played a significant role in the developing world. Education 
was viewed as the primary entrance prerequisite into the top echelon/elite group in 
post-colonial states such as the West Indies, Senegal, Nigeria, India, and the Gold 
Coast among others.
129
  Western education was a symbol of elite status reserved for 
those who could be the heir of colonial power. As such Western educated elites were a 
substantial emerging leadership that increasingly challenged the colonial regime’s 
legitimacy, due to their contact and familiarity with the Western world and ideology. 
Consequently, they became a threat to the power and authority of the colonial 
administrations. Therefore the colonial regime used the local chiefs, who were either 
chosen by the colonial powers themselves to head the new nation-states or were the 
traditional elites, to compete with and control the Western-educated elite, ultimately 
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fragmenting society and suppressing any movement towards the consolidation of power 
within the state apparatus.   
 
The elites in the newly emergent nation-states who had been educated in the West 
(often in Europe and the United States) adopted some Western perspectives and were 
willing to participate in the political system established by the colonial power, which 
they believed would lead to a modern political, economic and social society in 
comparison to their existing political system—viewed as a traditional ‘political system’ 
(based on patron-client relations).
130
 But such Western educated elites were criticised 
and resented by their local counterparts, for embracing the imported culture “in dress, 
in recreations, in tastes in food and drink, and, much more importantly, in their attitude 
toward what is valuable in life.”131  As Keller observed, Western educated elites would 
meanwhile  “often disagree violently with older, traditional elites about the process of 
industrialization, strong central government, the development of science, and universal 
education”132 because they perceived the Western political system, culture, ideal and 
progress as a way forward to development.  In contrast, the traditional elites saw it as a 
disruption to the social fabric of society.   
 
Because of their beliefs and role in challenging the colonial regime and traditional 
leadership in power, espousing Western ideals and values of democracy, political 
participation, and modernisation, and promoting social and political structural change, 
these educated Westernised elite (inclusive also of those that embraced the same ideals 
though not educated in the West) shall be identified here as counter-elites.  In their 
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search for ‘modernisation’, the counter-elites became political threats (imagined or 
real)—and a point of insecurity—for local appointed chiefs and the colonial 
administrations—over power and social control.133 The conflict between the traditional 
elite and the counter-elites brought about a re-evaluation and re-conceptualisation of 
the social and power structure with an increasingly political conscious elite. Migdal in 
his study of colonial regimes and elites in the developing world found Western-
educated elites to be a threat to the colonial regime, while Walter Rosenbaum on the 
other hand perceived counter-elites as recruitable material for the colonial 
administration.  Migdal and Rosenbaum both touched on the roles of counter-elites in 
the colonial state-formation years in that, although they were often exploited by the 
colonial regime to sustain their authority, the counter-elites also took advantage of their 
new position in the administrations to expand their own political power.  The outcome 
of this political game of manipulation was, as both Rosenbaum and Migdal concluded, 
that counter-elites, whether co-opted into the newly created state or excluded from its 
organizing process, became the spearhead of insurrection against the colonial regime.  
The colonial regime’s policy of excluding counter-elites from the political process 
became counterproductive for it eventually paved the way towards contest between 
newly arising counter-elites and appointed elites/local chiefs for power and social 
control.  
 
The legacy of colonisation was therefore a set of states with not only weak institutions 
but also hybrid political cultures, represented by political elites which included 
traditional and modern, indigenous and counter-elites who were themselves a result of 
the social fragmentation wrought by colonial power. The intersection of these elite 
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political cultures within the state itself, was visible in an ‘adopted’ political and 
bureaucratic system infused with traditional cultural traditions creating not necessarily 
a comprehensive but rather a ‘culturally normalised’ system relevant to the societal 
composition. Practices that did not fall in line with the conceptions of democratic 
principles supposedly embodied in the new state apparatus were more in accordance 
with traditional customs served as an emollient for the conflicting governing systems. 
As Staffan Lindberg’s study of post-colonial states in Africa illustrated, when a new 
state structure could not perform its formal duties, it used the informal “patronage, 
corruption, tribute-taking and coercive extraction of resources” as a means to achieve 
its goals and duties.
134
 Although Lindberg’s research was based on African post-
colonial states, the incompetent and incompatible pattern of governance and spoliation 
is one of the identifiable features associated with post-colonial state experience.  
 
In post-colonial states, ultimate authority came to rest with the elite group—or military 
group—that took over from the colonial administration. They adopted and maintained 
behaviours and activities found in the colonial political system (which lacked 
legitimacy and was constantly weak and institutionally unembedded) as well as the 
customs of their traditional governing structures (from which they could extract social 
legitimacy and which offered normative codes for patron-client relations). As a result 
of the incongruency between the two governing systems various methods of informal 
practices perceived as corruption were employed and sustained to stabilise the new 
political situation, to ameliorate the often fragmented social structure and to recruit and 
‘convert’ new elite recruits.  
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THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CULTURE 
The term political culture itself needs a little unravelling. The value system and norms 
of behaviour in society are understood as a by-product of culture. The 19
th
 century 
anthropologist Edward B. Tylor argued that culture is a “complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and 
habits acquired by man as a member of society.”135 If culture is a composition of the 
values, behaviours, morals, law, etc. then political culture is thus a reflection of those 
complex orientations towards the political process.  The study of political culture 
begins with the axiom “political behaviour is learned behaviour.”  Gabriel Almond and 
Sidney Verba’s ground breaking work, Civic Culture, offers the following definition of 
political culture as: “political orientations—attitudes toward the political system and its 
various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.” 136   It is a 
definition that asserts an awareness of the role of the individual in the political system.  
Lucian Pye developed Almond and Verba’s definition to assert that political culture is 
not only concerned with attitudes, it also focuses on “the sum of the fundamental 
values, sentiments and knowledge [which] give form and substance to political 
process.”137  Political culture can thus be considered a reflection of the complex whole 
towards the political process.  However, fundamental to the study of political culture 
are the actors who not only espouse it but act according to the political culture in the 
political sphere. As Harold D. Lasswell observed in the opening of his World Politics 
and Personal Insecurity, “Political analysis is the study of changes in the shape and 
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composition of the value patterns of society.”138  To study political culture hence is to 
“hold up a mirror to ourselves for we (individually and collectively) are the carriers of 
the culture, who not only observe it in others but also express it in our own 
behaviour.”139 Therefore, this thesis defines political culture as a composition of the 
values, behaviours, morals, and law of a society—particularly its elites—which are 
adopted by the masses and which are reflected in the political system.  Understanding 
the concept of political culture can facilitate in providing insight not only as to the 
reason underlying the general ‘acceptance’ of the behaviour of governing elites within 
a particular system but also as to why that political system functions in a particular 
way.   
 
Almond and Verba’s five-country study (America, Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico) 
attempted to understand the role of political culture within each society in relation to 
individuals’ political orientations. As such, three distinct classifications of political 
cultures were identified which they observed existed within societies: Parochial, 
Subject and Participant political cultures.  Almond and Verba first introduced the 
Parochial political culture associated with African tribal societies and autonomous 
local communities.   They maintained that these societies do not have specialized 
political roles but rather fused political, economic and religious roles in the form of 
headmanship, chieftainship, and ‘shamanship’, among other functions. The lack of 
distinction between the various roles and responsibilities, therefore, excluded 
challenges to the political system.
140
  The deep-rooted traditional orientation in this 
political culture renders it particularly resistant to change and entrenched practices are 
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thus difficult to discard.  Hence, Almond and Verba’s Parochial societies can be 
compared to an infantile state of political development where mass participation is near 
absent and subject to the discretion of the leadership as head of the ‘familial’ societal 
unit.   
 
Almond and Verba’s second classification is their Subject political culture where 
individuals (mass) are “aware of specialized governmental authority,” and are 
“affectively” oriented to the political, which they may or may not like, and which 
provides them with the ability to assess the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of their 
government.
141
   Individuals in this type of political culture exhibit a re-active rather 
than pro-active attitude, having no effective contribution to policy input and outputs. It 
is in essence a passive relationship where a “limited form of competence” is 
demonstrated.  In all events, it could be deduced that individuals within this form of 
political culture, which is non-participatory, are “actively” aware of the political system 
but “choose” not to be politically active.    
 
Lastly, Almond and Verba introduced the Participant political culture, identified with 
democratic forms of government where members of society were “explicitly oriented,” 
involved and aware of every aspect of the political system, both administrative and 
political.
142
  Participant societies tend to be more pro-active, freely expressing their 
views and opinions towards policy inputs, outputs and any form of political issues. This 
type of political atmosphere encourages individualism in the context of actively 
evaluating and rejecting or accepting any issues seen (in)appropriate or (un)desirable.  
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FUSION AND (IN)CONGRUENCY OF POLITICAL CULTURES  
Although Almond and Verba classify political culture in a manner which leads one to 
believe it is straightforward and easily compartmentalised, in practice political cultures 
are not often pure and static but rather are fused, integrated, and fluid.  The fusion of 
political cultures in the developing world was attributed to colonial experience, 
imported political ideas and values combined with the traditional political culture 
inherent in the society. As such, a Subject political culture could be fused with a 
Participant orientation changing the nature of their former characteristics.  
Consequently, earlier mass orientation had to adapt, accommodate, and incorporate the 
“new” orientations.  In circumstances in which two competing political cultures exist 
within a single political system, the dominant political culture absorbs or incorporates 
the weaker political culture(s) but where norms and values directly clash such fused 
political cultures are bound to produce “inevitable strains between culture and 
structure, and a characteristic tendency toward structural instability.”143  Inevitably, the 
fusional or resistant nature of political cultures will determine the stability and 
legitimacy of the political system. If the merging is successful, the political system 
changes in order to accommodate the newly-acquired or fused political orientations.  If 
the political culture is congruent with the structures of the political system, it produces 
high and positive levels of orientation by its constituencies. Furthermore, it allows for 
an efficient transaction where policy input and output are participatory. However, if the 
differing political cultures are resistant to fusing, it produces incongruity between the 
structure of the political system and the new ‘specialised’ orientations resulting in 
tension and conflict. How far these can tensions can be resolved depends in large part 
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on how far core elites can co-opt new elite recruits who bring with them alternative 
political cultures and infuse them with their own political culture, such that it is then 
diffused to the wider population through the structures and institutions of the state and 
its socialisation processes. 
 
POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIALISATION 
Developing states might be thought to share common political cultures that differ from 
those in the Developed World where they have shared similar patterns of political 
undertakings (i.e. colonialism and the post-colonial experience). Nonetheless, Larry 
Diamond asserts in his study of political cultures in developing countries that 
“countries do differ significantly in their patterns of politically relevant beliefs, values, 
and attitudes, and [that] within countries these elements of the political are clearly 
shaped by life experiences, education, and social class.”144  The life-long process of 
political socialisation is credited with ameliorating cultural, ethnic, social, economic 
and political discrepancies within society. While societies include diverse social, class, 
ethnic and other groups, the  image of a singular body of political ‘citizenship’ emerges 
based on the norms through which all citizens are socialised by the institutions of 
statehood (such as education systems). Such a state-fostered socialisation process is the 
design of elites.  As observes Mosca, a system of ideas can only take effect in the 
political realm if it obtains “a strong hold on the minds of at least a majority in the 
ruling class.”145  That is not to assert a complete instrumentalism: values within a 
culture develop over time and become deep-rooted in the society thus becoming 
resistant to significant change. As such, change in political culture can occur after 
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cultural change, and cultural change, argues Woshinsky, occurs at a gruelling pace.
146
 
Values therefore maintain traditional political patterns and evolve to incorporate and 
maintain the psychological and philosophical perspective of the society.
147
 Political 
culture consequently can and must be the result of years of political socialisation.  
 
Walter A. Rosenbaum’s understanding of the influencing mechanism of political 
socialisation, to sustain a political culture, categorised political culture into an 
individual and a collective analysis.  On the individual level, political culture is 
principally a psychological focus on the individual.  The collective analysis, on the 
other hand, is a “system level” approach where the mass evaluate their political 
institutions and officials.
148
   Rosenbaum argued that by and large people within the 
political system have similar or compatible political culture orientations, which are in 
accordance to the political institutions within which they live.
149
 The socialisation 
process therefore encourages the ‘sanctioning’ or ‘rejection’ of a certain political 
culture, sustaining certain values and functions of the institution in a top-down 
approach—top-down in this configuration refers to mass adoption of elite values and 
norms. Most scholars agree then that it is elite values—and not the values of the 
mass—that define the political culture.150 Hence, the values and norms—signifying 
elite political culture—become normalised and a measurement for modes of conduct in 
the political realm. Therefore, in examining the nature of political culture, it is the 
‘elites’, particularly the core elites, who are the holders, enforcers, and proprietors of 
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the political culture and can influence the function and the type of political system that 
survives in each society and to whom we must turn our attention.   
 
Overall, state structures act according to the political culture which dominates the 
political system.  If the structure of the ‘old’ political system is not able to adapt or 
adjust to the new changes, then the new ‘specialised’ political culture will either 
eliminate or absorb the old political system consequently displacing certain groups and 
creating a new ‘status quo’.  The marginalisation and inclusion of groups also 
determines the distribution of power and allocation of resource. Therefore a group most 
favoured by the system has greater access to resources and the power source. However, 
marginalised groups and those least favoured by the political system have few, or no, 
channel of access to resources and decision makers and will feel the most impact of the 
discrepancy in the system. Subsequently, this sense of power, or powerlessness, in an 
incongruous system can affect the participatory or non-participatory nature of groups 
and individuals within their political system. Those with access to power can often be 
found in decision making and political active positions whereas those who feel a sense 
of despondency and disillusionment refrain from participating. Pessimism towards 
reform in the system and the improbability of being included are frequently cited as 
reasons for political abstention. When the margin of disparity between the mass and the 
elite is considerable, then society is particularly resistant to an imposed political culture 
from above, therefore methods of ‘persuasion’ are taken by the regime in power to 
enforce embracement of the political culture. As observed in post-colonial states, this is 
achieved through various forms of corruption and/or intimidation. These means of 
‘persuasion’ whether through soft-power with promises of economic gain or hard-
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power through harassment and imprisonment can have latitude of success in societies 
with a weak state.
151
   
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As theories and examples have sought to demonstrate, the existence of corruption in 
political systems is not confined to the developing world. However, the extent of 
corruption and the influence which it exerts on political and economic development is 
more significant than in the developed world. The political structure and regimes that 
emerged in post-colonial states attest to a system which is a product of incongruent 
political orientations.  The post-colonial state encompassed an entrenched patriarchal 
system with patron-client relations though functions in a modern bureaucratic system, 
defined as neo-patrimonialism. This was the result of a process of transition from a 
traditional to a modern bureaucratic system which due to the incongruency of the two 
governing system, a neo-patrimonial governing system and regimes emerged which 
fused and harmonised the two system.  As a result, post-colonial states sustained certain 
practices during its state-building formative years which incorporated corruption as a 
means to harmonise the vying system and elites.  This perception adheres to the 
argument that corruption occurs in the stages of development.  Far from being simply a 
“stage” through which political systems must pass en route to developed status, 
corruption can become endemic to a political system.  This is particularly true of post-
colonial states, whose historical experiences and process of political transition have left 
them with weak state structures and institutions. Weak states have little legitimacy in 
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themselves, and the grasp of officials on power is tenuous, encouraging an engagement 
in the politics of survival.    
 
The practice of corruption is exacerbated by social structures which were fragmented 
by the colonial experience and offer no social forces which in themselves can unify the 
citizenship around shared objectives or identities. In order to retain power, state 
officials rely not on their formal positions (which offer no real power or legitimacy) but 
instead on their extended family, tribe or ethnic group structures for support and 
legitimacy. In return they must themselves behave in ways which endorse and promote 
the interests of these structures. They therefore behave in ways which enable them to 
accrue personal wealth (security for the future), and wealth and status for members of 
their group. By utilising informal networks and channels in this way, and by blurring 
their official and unofficial characters and responsibilities, they behave in ways which 
are identified as corrupt. 
 
In order to study this corruption, the researcher must identify the core elite of officials, 
as well as other sublimative elites or would-be core elite recruits. The political culture 
of such elites must be understood – that is the norms and values for political behaviour 
which they espouse, which they seek to reproduce through recruitment into their circle, 
and which they then pass down to the masses through the processes of political 
socialisation. This culture legitimises their behaviour and accustomises the masses to 
think it ‘normal’—however it does not denote an acceptance or alter perception of the 
practice as being corrupt.  However, the possibility of multiple elite political cultures 
must be considered, since the colonisation and de-colonisation processes (or those of 
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developing countries historical and specific experiences in general), and accompanying 
social fragmentation, led to contradictory elite political cultures, within and outside of 
state structures and institutions. How these political cultures have fused, or proved 
incongruous, and what impact they have can help us understand the normative and 
cultural context within which corruption becomes more or less endemic. 
 
As such, Chapter Two will look at elite formation in the Palestinian territories and the 
political culture they came to espouse during each epoch of their history. The chapter 
will analyse the elite’s formative years from Ottoman period to the Intifada and the 
historical events that shaped their perceptions and their political and social ideology. 
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CHAPTER II:  
PALESTINIAN ELITE FORMATION AND DIVERGENT 
POLITICAL CULTURES 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Identifying Palestinian political elites can be a complex task because what can be 
identified as Palestinian ‘elites’ in Western eyes may not be viewed as such within the 
Palestinian community.  In order to locate the true elites within the society and the 
political culture they have come to enact, one needs to understand and assess the 
formative years of the Palestinian elites through their historical, social and political 
experiences.  The period from the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1914, the European 
encroachment and rule, until the late 1950s laid the basic framework for the political 
structure, the function of its elites, and the unsolved religious, ethnic, political and 
territorial problems of Middle East states.
152
 This chapter will set out the various stages 
of elite formation in (and outside) the Palestinian Territories based on an historical 
analysis from the Ottoman Empire until the Oslo Accords. It will provide an 
examination of the elites’ formative years and the development of contrasting political 
cultures: the ‘Outside’ informal (neo-patrimonial) political culture and the ‘Inside’ 
nascent democratic political culture. It will demonstrate how these varying political 
cultures came to play a significant role in the formation and early functioning of the 
Palestinian Authority. This chapter will first assess the Ottoman and Mandate periods 
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and the early Palestinian elite formation which displayed what we can term a 
patrimonial political culture. Second, it will examine the period of 1948 until the 1967 
war during which time the Palestinian population was fragmented into differential 
experiences. By looking at the PLO as an Outside influence in the resistance movement, 
we can identify the emergence of a diaspora elite with a neo-patrimonial political 
culture. Alternatively, assessing the experiences of the Palestinians who remained in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) under Israeli occupation up until the 1988 
Intifada and the resistance movement inside the OPT until the development of the 
Palestinian Authority we can identify an alternative elite with a nascent democratic 
political culture. Thus the varying experiences of these elites accounts for the evolution 
of two distinct political cultures, one neo-patrimonial and one nascently democratic, the 
struggle between them later coming to characterise the Palestinian Authority. 
 
 
ELITES DURING THE OTTOMAN AND BRITISH MANDATORY ERAS 
During the era of Ottoman rule, Palestinian society was undeveloped and traditional. 
The majority of Palestinians lived pastoral lives in rural areas, engaged in subsistence 
agriculture. Although the Ottoman Empire had ruled the Levant region since the 16
th
 
century, it was not until the introduction of the 1858 Land Code and Registration Act, 
and the Vilayets Law of 1864, that Palestine experienced an emerging distinctive class 
system based on landownership and ascension to senior administrative position in the 
Porte (the Ottoman administration in Istanbul).
153
  The Land Code required land owners 
to register their lands, providing the Empire with the opportunity to increase tax 
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revenues and conscription. Peasants sought to register the land in the name of local 
leading families to evade conscription of their own sons, but as a consequence, the 
Land Code produced a powerful class of (absentee) landlords, a minority group who 
lived increasingly in urban areas but who owned the majority of the lands in rural 
areas.
154
 These traditional notable elites included prominent local figures who acted as 
intermediaries between the Porte and the local community.
155
  This notable class 
became a powerful political and economic class acquiring ever more wealth and power 
and ultimately becoming the local governing class, or effendi
156
   as they were recruited 
by the Ottoman Empire to serve as local proxy rulers.  Some were given custodianship 
over state lands, or were endowed with lands as rewards for services rendered. As such, 
the proxy rulers’ ultimate loyalty was to the Administration in Istanbul. The 
privatisation of state lands, particularly with the 1861 tabu land registration law, gave 
foreigners the opportunity to own properties in the Ottoman territory where Christians 
and Jews took advantage of this opportunity. Moreover, cash-crops and tax revenues 
from land-ownership were becoming profitable for the Porte.
157
  However, the Porte 
intention among other things to enable peasants to purchase land gave big landowners 
the opportunity to take advantage of the various loopholes within the law. With corrupt 
local administration, heavy taxation, rising debt, and intimidation by landowners, 
peasants and small and medium landowners were often impelled to sign over or register 
their land under the name of either notable elites or their dead relatives—where big 
landowners were able to secure under their ownership.
158
  The shift from subsistence 
farming to cash-crop produced a new basis for social stratification where peasants were 
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subjected to the demands of the central government, the big landowners, and the 
volatile world market.
159
 The peasants who lost their rights to the land were reduced to 
the status of mere landless tenant farmers and sharecroppers, and landless wage 
labourers.
160
  
 
The rise of Turkish nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century threatened to 
alienate Arab partners from their Turkish rulers.
161
  Concurrently, Arab feeling towards 
a common Muslim identity within the Ottoman Empire began to dissipate while Arab 
nationalism emerged—replacing a collective Muslim identity—with a vision of pan-
Arabism, Arab identity, and greater rights and political independence for Arabs.
162
  
However, the sentiment was arguably mainly confined to the top of the Arab, largely 
urban, echelon and did not develop into a shared Arab identity approach until World 
War I. Until this point, cohesiveness of the notable elites as a political entity was 
hindered by their traditional tribal rivalries.
163
 
 
World War I saw the Ottoman Empire allying itself with Germany, only to see post-war 
victors carve the empire into League of Nations-endorsed mandates. The Western allies’ 
promises of a unified independent Arab state were replaced by British and French 
occupation.
164
 Consequently, the British came to govern the areas that would be 
divided into Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine.
165
 From the implementation of the British 
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Mandate, land settlement policy was one of its priorities, paving a way for Jewish 
settlement in Palestine.
166
 Policies implemented emphasised the necessity to allocate 
lands, whether state ‘owned’ or unused lands, to accommodate the Jewish settlement 
policy.
167
 Land/property ownership was a frequently debated issue particularly 
concerning lands held by absentee landlords and land that were not in use by the 
landlords, which were subject to confiscation and land-transfer, eventually becoming 
one of the major issues of conflict and loss of power for the Palestinian notable elites.  
 
As with the Ottoman Empire’s policy that gave rise to the notables’ power by 
simultaneously supporting the notables and encouraging intra-rivalry, the British 
mandate policy aimed to maintain this elite power-dynamic and relationship.
168
 As with 
any colonial power, government institutions set up in colonies were often used for the 
colonial regime’s own purpose—whether for power, resources etc.—which not only 
neglected to take into consideration the local population’s needs but played upon local 
notable or group rivalry for greater control. In the case of Palestine, the British regime 
sought to control Palestinian society through the distribution of posts, resources and 
privileges among the notable families.
169
  The policy and pattern of resource 
distribution, and political positions vis-à-vis the British regime and Zionist settlement 
in Palestine prompted internecine feuding between interest groups and notable elites, 
which intensified in the 1920s. In particular the internecine factor soon fuelled a 
division into two rival clan groups, the al-Husseini and the al-Nashashibi camp, each 
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fighting for Arab political primacy in Palestine.
170
  The British initially allocated 
resources and positions equally to both tribes but came to favour the al-Nashashibi tribe 
due to the anti-colonial and anti-Zionist position that the al-Husseinis came to harbour. 
The al-Husseini’s rural-based Arab Party—consisting of land-owning families and rural 
muktars (head of local government in towns or villages)—adopted a hard-line stance 
against the British regime and the Jewish yishuv (community) and encouraged ties with 
Arab nationalist movements, while the al-Nashashibi’s urban-based Defence Party—
composed of prominent urban families—was more moderate and promoted 
compromise with the British regime.
171
   
 
Dissatisfaction with the political situation, lack of national independence from the 
colonial regime (also seen with their Arab counterparts i.e. in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq), 
confiscation of land for Zionist settlers, economic downturn, and fear of increasing 
Jewish settlement at the expense of the Arabs generated general strikes which soon 
erupted into an Arab revolt in 1936 lasting until 1939.
172
 During the Arab-revolt the 
Palestinian notables set aside their differences in order to ‘jump on the band-wagon’ 
and take credit for the revolt.  In April 1936 they formed the Arab Higher Committee 
(AHC) and ‘contributed’ to the Arab-revolt by organising a six-month commercial 
strike.  The founding members of the AHC included thirty-two men, of whom 87.5 
percent (twenty-eight members) belonged to the upper stratum of society. The 
remaining 12.5 percent belonged to the bourgeoisie, with no representations from the 
lower stratum of society.
173
  In addition, the majority of the AHC were from wealthy 
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agricultural families, who lived in urban areas as “absentee landlords, as professionals 
of one sort or another, as merchants, or by choice.” 174   Not only were they not 
concerned with the welfare of the general population but they were in principle 
physically and emotionally unattached to the land or the difficulties faced by the 
peasantry and working classes. Land for them was leverage to political power and 
wealth. Power and wealth were neither filtered down nor accessible to the mass. As 
Taysir Nashif commented, “Political power was largely concentrated at the upper tip of 
the socioeconomic pyramid composed of a small group of heads of old and influential 
clans, other members of the landowning aristocracy, wealthy merchants and traders, 
and some professionals.”175 Peasants and rural dwellers’ interaction with the ruling 
regime or proxies was often limited to the appropriation of taxes; therefore the seat of 
power was a distant and a foreign entity without any real association. The same 
sentiment of detachment was applied to those in power vis-à-vis the mass. The mass 
did not present a threat to their power nor were the power-holders concerned with the 
activities or needs of the mass except that they pay their due. Even with the ‘unification’ 
and concentration of power at the top, inner rivalries between elites persisted and 
intensified. As a result of the internal fragmentation, lack of cohesive and inclusive 
measures for both the mass and the notable elite, a distinctive division began to occur 
between those who sought to gain power through nationalistic rhetoric and those who 
desired to maintain the political and social status quo.
176
  The British regime was able 
to use this cleavage to manipulate the notable elites where the al-Nashashibi tribe 
became an instrumental ally and asset to the regime during the Arab revolt.
177
 The al-
                                                          
174
 Nashif, T. "Palestinian Arab and Jewish Leadership in the Mandate Period," (Summer 1977), p. 115 
175
 Nashif, T. "Palestinian Arab and Jewish Leadership in the Mandate Period," (Summer 1977), p. 114 
176
 Robinson, G. Building a Palestinian State, (1997), p. 2 
177
 Robinson, G. Building a Palestinian State, (1997), p. 6 
CHAPTER II: PALESTINIAN ELITE FORMATION AND DIVERGENT 
POLITICAL CULTURES 
 
90 | P a g e  
 
Husseinis on the other hand chose to join the militants in retaliation against colonial 
regime domination, the suppression of Palestinian rights, and Zionist penetration.
178
 
 
Although the political agendas of the al-Husseinis and al-Nashashibis were at odds, 
both believed in the natural order of an overall notable hegemony. They wanted to 
assure that the social status quo remained intact and their power over society 
unchallenged.  As Glenn E. Robinson argues, this was “truly an intraelite conflict, not a 
struggle between socially distinctive rival groups or classes.” 179   The two notable 
groups were arguably two sides of the same coin.  As leading families in the Palestinian 
milieu, they inhibited the development of alternative Palestinian leaderships. The only 
group that seemed to emerge with a legitimate ideology and leadership quality was the 
Istiqlal Party.  Due to the party’s isolated location in Gaza, it was more nationalistic 
and militant in nature.  It sought for “independence from Britain, for an end to Zionist 
settlement, for pan-Arabism, and for greater democratization within Palestinian 
politics.” 180   The membership of the party was sons of notables, intelligentsias, 
technocrats, bureaucrats and non-notable professionals.  They expressed violent 
rhetoric against the politics of Palestinian notables, although many of them were also 
from notable families.  The rivalry between notables was argued by Robinson to be the 
stumbling block to the Palestinian quest for independence from Britain and resisting 
Zionist encroachment. It diverted and nullified collective resistance. Moreover, the 
non-cohesive nature of the society, with its various interests and class distinctions, 
contributed to the Arab revolt’s “unsystematic, undisciplined, and unstable insurgency” 
                                                          
178
 Farsoun, S.K. and Zacharia, C.E. Palestine and the Palestinians. (1997), p. 106 
179
 Robinson, G. Building a Palestinian State, (1997), p. 7 
180
 Robinson, G. Building a Palestinian State, (1997), p. 8 
CHAPTER II: PALESTINIAN ELITE FORMATION AND DIVERGENT 
POLITICAL CULTURES 
 
91 | P a g e  
 
resulting in chaotic gaffes.
181
 In effect, the elite rivalry and dysfunction sabotaged their 
own revolt.  
 
British colonisation played an important role in the Palestinian elite formation, societal 
fragmentation, and intra-notable rivalry. Like other colonial regimes, the British used 
their authority to distribute posts in the Administration to consolidate Palestinian 
political elites’ power over Palestinian society. But uniquely, the British also 
undermined this consolidation of power by sponsoring Zionist competitors to the very 
base of Palestinian notable power—the ownership of land. Moreover, the British 
developed a communication infrastructure, and invested (minimally) in education, 
which encouraged the spread of new political ideas more broadly among Palestinians; 
yet at the same time, their act of conferring power on the notable families enabled 
notable elites to maintain the traditional political culture. The colonial political 
orientation towards acquiescence in exchange for survival and political, social and 
economic gain came to be adopted, adapted and reproduced by the notable elites 
towards rivals and the masses. This political orientation of the elites was essentially 
patrimonial in nature. The traditional patriarchal structure of governance and authority 
became apparent in the function and operation of the formal governing institutions. The 
formal governing system was essentially a patrimonial system and an extension of the 
patriarchal system, which thereby incorporated, consolidated and legitimised informal 
relationships in the formal system.   
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PALESTINIAN ELITES 1948—1967  
 
In the wake of World War II, on the 29
th
 of November 1947, the United Nations 
General Assembly proposed and approved a UN Partition Plan (UN Resolution 181)
182
 
which would divide greater Palestine into an Independent Arab and Jewish State, with a 
Special International Regime (Corpus Separatum) for the City of Jerusalem.
183
 The 
plan would provide the Arabs (who composed approximately 66 percent of the 
population) with 42 percent of the territory; and the Jews, with a population (escalated 
by the number of escapees from the holocaust and its aftermath) of 34 percent, with 56 
percent of the land.
184
  
 
The partition plan angered Palestinians, who argued that it would not only dismember 
their home, severing them from their lands, but it would also nullify Arab aspiration for 
self-determination.
185
 They believed it an injustice to ignore the rights of the majority 
over the minority; however the political environment and state of affairs in Europe 
influenced the decision making process. The expedited departure of the British colonial 
regime on 14 May 1948 created a climate of unrest culminating in the 1948/49 Arab-
Israeli War.  Palestinians (with the help of Arab neighbours) sought to wrestle land 
from the Israelis; however the military prowess of Israel outstripped the Arab forces, 
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and in the process dispossessed
186
 approximately 750,000 Palestinians, in what is 
known as al-Nakba (the cataclysm) mass exodus.
187
 A new State of Israel was thus 
proclaimed on 78 percent of historic Palestine
188
, finalising the partition of Palestine.
189
 
A new political reality was now established on the ground which came to significantly 
influence the future power structure of Palestinian elite formation.   
 
In a unique colonial experience, the “settlers” (Jewish immigrants) had taken over 
political power rather than local elites seizing power and creating a post-colonial state 
structure of their own.  This dispossession of the Palestinian elites contributed to a still 
more fragmented society and a disruption to the power dynamic of a land-based elite 
structure.  The establishment of the State of Israel as a national entity on Arab 
territories, resulting in their loss of lands, challenged Arab consciousness and Arab 
perceptions of themselves vis-à-vis the land.  
 
The forced dispersion of the pre-1948 Palestinian leaders, many of whom were now 
refugees in exile, led to a state of political stagnation in Palestinian discourse.  The 
period following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War was associated with the breakdown of 
Palestinian cohesiveness and a lack of collective consciousness as a single people. The 
wake of the war saw the emergence of separate Palestinian identities in accordance 
with their experiences of living either in refugee camps, or under different authoritarian 
Arab regimes, or as Palestinians in Israel. As Don Peretz observed, the defeat of the 
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war silenced the discussion of Palestinians as one unified society and replaced it with 
the image of a dispersed refugee group.
190
  The collapse of an albeit weak Palestinian 
national movement, impelled many Palestinians to adopt other ideological discourses 
such as President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism or Communism. Nevertheless 
this did not signify an abandonment of a Palestinian national aspiration and identity. 
Rather, it led to its ‘reconstruction’.191 Palestinians reconstructed a political schema that 
was unique to the situation of their mass dispersal and co-existence with Israel.   
 
Palestinian national consciousness as a single people based on a collective identity with 
the state did not fully develop in Palestine and expand on a societal level until the 
aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.  Prior to this, loyalty was towards an 
individual’s tribe, landlord or village and not towards the state; and given the lack of 
genuinely cohesive interaction between the rural and the urban populations, it is fair to 
claim that there was no genuine developed Palestinian consciousness. There had been 
no identification with the (British) rulers or with their fellow Palestinians as one entity: 
the remote and distant physical location of the rural dwellers from, and their lack of 
interaction with, the city and the ruling administration had prevented such a single 
consciousness from emerging.  In contrast urban dwellers (middle classes and notable 
elites) faced daily reminders of the presence of the foreign regime therefore the rhetoric 
of national aspiration was much more pronounced.  However, the 1948 war and the 
establishment of Israel brought about a collective political consciousness regarding the 
significance, and loss, of Palestine.
192
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The post-1948 period therefore marked the emergence of new elites in the Palestinian 
Territories, and in the diaspora, that were not based on traditional patronage exercised 
by landed aristocracy but rather founded on resistance to the occupation.  The land-
owning notable elites had been weakened by their loss of land and their political 
failures to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel.
193
 But a new class of 
nationalist elite was emerging, including middle classes who had been educated 
through the Mandatory educational system, and who reflected the broader nationalist 
aspirations of society. The new political reality opened a door for a more class-mobile 
society and formation of new elites not restricted to the ownership of land or of notable 
background. As Elia Zureik remarked, although they were the “sons and daughters of 
yesterday’s peasants,” they have become “today’s school teachers, bureaucrats and 
professionals.” 194  Propelled by the establishment of a Jewish State on captured 
Palestinian territories, the uncertain future for refugee dwellers, and the lack of 
confidence in the Arab regime, a renewed drive emerged to consolidate Palestinian 
national consciousness and unity, and to reclaim lands that were lost during the war.  
 
Among the diaspora Palestinians, the political and social orientation of elites under 
each of the ruling authorities (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Israel, and Lebanon) differed due to 
the nature of the regimes under which they were governed. Elites who fled Palestine 
and Israel to neighbouring states particularly as refugees also lived under harsh 
authoritarian regimes. Those that were refugees in Gaza were also under difficult 
Egyptian administration. However, those in the West Bank fared better to some degree 
in comparison to their Gazan counterpart. Conforming to the depictions of post-
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colonial states provided in the previous chapter, the majority if not all of the 
neighbouring states were weak states in which the formal governing structures were 
subordinated to traditional, patriarchal political cultures which subverted the 
democratic potential of the institutions left by colonial regimes.   
 
Sharabi argues that the patriarchal structures of Arab society which are thought to be in 
a process of modernisation have neither been truly modernised nor displaced but rather 
have been strengthened and reinforced in a distorted or warped modernised form. This 
eventually produced a neopatriarchal society and culture that essentially transferred the 
old society and culture (and all its mechanisms) into a new hybrid form.
195
 This can be 
witnessed in its different forms in post-colonial Arab states. While Sharabi’s 
neopatriarchal concept has a socio-cultural application which emphasises the social 
structure of Arab society, it however also stresses the institutional structure. Thus, the 
terminology and its application are fundamentally similar, but with a different focus i.e. 
social as opposed to political, to the term neo-patrimonialism used by Eisenstadt to 
apply to political structures in post colonial states retaining and reinforcing patriarchal 
elements in its governing structure. In the patrimonial system in Palestine, the colonial 
rule of the Ottoman Empire and then the British colonial regime legislated and 
implemented laws that were to their benefit which did not take into account the 
traditions and values of the local community, the local population was nevertheless left 
to their own devices to deal with local issues. As a result, customary law
196
 existed in 
parallel to the colonial court system.
197
 As such, the existence of the dual system which 
gave precedence to customary law (informal) reflecting the patriarchal system’s 
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traditions and values was often in contradiction to the formal legal system. However, 
merging the two systems of modernity and patriarchy, as Sharabi concluded, produced 
a hybrid formal system of governance.  The system that emerged from the colonial 
regime and post-colonial states challenged the patriarchal structure of the society where 
the family was the basic socio-economic unit.  
 
Halim Barakat’s work on Arab society perceives the emergence of new bourgeois 
social classes and cultures, as a result of industrialisation and urbanisation, changed the 
structure of the society and undermined the traditional patriarchal culture as with 
traditions, values and roles within the Arab family.  Sharabi like Barakat identified this 
class as, not just a bourgeois class but rather as a hybrid neopatriarchy petty bourgeois 
with neopatriarchal consciousness which he attributed to capitalism.
198
 Sharabi argued 
that although this new social class dominated the social and economic sphere, it was an 
ineffective social force which lacked internal unity and ultimately was incapable of 
achieving either “revolutionary social transformation” or “capitalist economic 
development.” 199  As a result of this hybrid class’ incompetence and disunity, an 
ideological reorientation emerged, epitomised in the militant and politicised Islamic 
fundamentalism that gained popular support among the Arab masses as an alternative 
to unrealised social and economic revolution. The divergent truths between 
fundamental secularism—which took the model of the West implicitly or explicitly—
and Islamism—which held Islam as its basis of truth and legitimacy—dominated the 
phases of neopatriarchy which eventually can be seen played out in the formation of 
post-colonial states.
200
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In post-colonial Arab states—whose experience was similar to that of other formal 
colonial states where the culture of a patriarchal society was transferred and 
superimposed onto the state structure to become patrimonial—they were progressively 
encountering a transformation into a neo-patrimonial governing system.  The 
incongruency in the political system of the colonial regime and the patriarchal 
governing system of the local entities enabled the establishment of the patrimonial 
system in order to bridge the contradictions between the two systems. If we maintain 
Weber’s claim and definition of patrimonialism, then it is as described in the previous 
chapter that the administrative and military personnel’s allegiance are only accountable 
to the ruler within the framework of a legal-rational governing structure.  As such, the 
emergence of neo-patrimonial systems can be found throughout post-colonial states in 
the Arab world. In Egypt, for example, following the overthrow of King Farouk I, 
James A. Bill and Robert Springborg argue that Nasser’s style of governing was not 
opposed to patrimonialism—which shall be defined here as neo-patrimonialism 
because of their method of utilisation of Western models of modernisation and 
governance with bureaucratic institutions; however, Nasser emphasised many 
programmes of social change and class transformation which were institutional 
revolutionary changes rather than expanding the traditional patriarchal informal 
network. Consequently, Egypt’s traditional patriarchal power structure was 
disempowered and eventually lost influence and supremacy in the political sphere.
201
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In contrast, Nasser’s successor, President Anwar Sadat, was an emblem of traditional 
patrimonial rule. Sadat sought to ‘perfect’ the neo-patrimonial structure that Nasser 
established. As such, Sadat reinstated the patriarchal traditional power structure that 
was corroded during Nasser’s reign by “lengthening and strengthening the patrimonial 
strands that would recapture the traditional power structure of Egypt” rather than 
invoking a liberal democratic state system.
202
 Sadat encompassed the very features of a 
neo-patrimonial leader where he developed his informal network by increasing the 
number of (useful) individuals in the formal decision making process.  He also 
consolidated his power and expanded his informal network by using his position of 
power to arrange marriages for his daughters with key wealthy and powerful elite 
families thereby gaining alliances and keeping political oppositions and rivals at bay.
203
 
Sadat’s espousal of neo-patrimonial rule was to assure his survival and expansion of his 
power by either holding many indebted to him or by being aligned with powerful 
individuals, groups and families. He successfully merged the private and public sector 
by using his formal position in order to reinstate the patriarchal structure. It in turn 
supported and assured the success of his formal rule. 
 
Palestinians living in the diaspora were socialised towards the political orientation of 
the Arab-regimes under which they were governed.  The Arab culture, tradition, and 
patriarchal system play a major role in leadership arrangements and power dynamics as 
seen with Sadat’s Egypt, or with the al-Husseini and al-Nashashibi clans in Palestine. 
Diaspora notable and emerging elites were now re-socialised into a neo-patrimonial 
political culture that valued the informal network over the formal process as a means 
towards power, influence and survival.  Since this was not dissimilar or alien from their 
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own, intrinsic patrimonial political culture during the colonial regimes, they were soon 
accommodated within broader Arab elites (albeit largely unable to access the core elites 
as opposed to counter-elites).  
 
Ian Lustick argues that the Palestinian experience under Israeli rule, for those who 
remained in Israel after 1948, was in some ways similar: the Israeli regime sought to 
co-opt them by distributing resources through them rather than through state offices.
204
 
In 1951, the patron-client relations between Israel and the Palestinian elites were quite 
pronounced. Co-opting and supporting the notable Palestinian families ensured security 
and social control from an Israeli perspective and perceived accession to power on the 
part of the Palestinians.  Lustick remarks that the co-optation of the Palestinian elites 
through “material inducements, threats of material deprivation, and individual self-
interest [were] the keys to successful manipulation of Arab elites.”205  The co-optation 
of Palestinian elites became normalised and elites became ‘dependent’ on these 
‘favours’.  Palestinian clans were pitted against each other as they sought to exclude 
rival tribes from positions of power maintaining the traditional patrimonial culture 
among Palestinians in Israel and keeping them, for a while at least, politically 
quiescent.
206
   
 
The Palestinians in the West Bank came under Jordanian rule after 1948 and here 
Palestinian landowners retained much of their land. They therefore had an established 
power source and network with which they were able to bargain with the Jordanian 
regime. The Jordanian regime reluctantly included and co-opted Palestinian notables 
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into its own political processes. However, there was a clear discrepancy between the 
status of the Palestinians and positions they held in the government vis-à-vis local 
Jordanians. The Palestinians’ precarious identity as both Jordanians and Palestinians 
became a source of tension that came into play as Palestinian elites began to dominate 
some economic sectors and to become a wealthy class in their own right within Jordan. 
The relationship between the Jordanian regime and the Palestinian elites in the 
administration reflected Migdal’s politics of survival, with Palestinian elites being co-
opted into the administration but only to peripheral positions, reducing any threat they 
might pose to the Jordanian regime. However, top government positions and important 
government agencies pertinent to the survival of the regime were reserved and 
occupied by ‘native’ Jordanians particularly family and tribal members of the Jordanian 
leadership.
207
  
 
However, with the progressive and mass (re)construction of Palestinian national 
aspirations, a gap began to emerge in the political rhetoric of traditional Palestinian 
elites cop-opted into the Jordanian body politic, and the broader population of West 
Bankers who sought social transformation as a means of advancing their political 
aspirations.  The Jordanian government supported and maintained the notable elites in 
power playing on the rivalry between the two still influential and powerful tribes, the 
al-Nashashibis and al-Husseinis, as Britain had done.  Its own authoritarianism refused 
to allow genuine challengers to those traditional elites to emerge. Like Britain, King 
Abdullah favoured the al-Nashashibis over the more “rebellious” and stronger al-
Husseini tribe.  The al-Nashashibi tribe was easier to manage and King Abdullah 
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assigned strategic Jordanian positions to his al-Nashashibi ally.
208
 Thus he ensured the 
legitimacy and survival of the occupying Jordanian regime and its ability to exert social 
control. This is what C. Wright Mills describes in his explanation of the function of 
counter-elites, where regime leaderships use government positions to keep elites who 
may pose a threat to their power within a safe distance of control, while simultaneously 
using them as proxy rulers within their own constituencies.
209
 As a further means of 
containing popular challenges to this system of rule, many refugees who were situated 
in camps and had least to gain from the new arrangements—were not extended the 
same rights (citizenship) as the more conservative Palestinian middle class and elites.  
 
The Gazan experience, which was under the Egyptian administration, was quite 
different. Following the 1948 war, the narrow Gaza Strip experienced a rapid 
population growth where originally Gaza had been between 60,000—70,000; by 1948 
it had increased to an estimated 200,000. By 1966, the Gazan population had reached 
454,960—according to Egyptian figures—though only 354,900 were registered under 
the 1967 Israeli census.
210
 This made the Gaza Strip one of the most densely populated 
areas in the world. The population was predominantly refugees, whose social networks 
and structures had been disrupted by war and flight, and who were poverty-stricken and 
dependent on international assistance.   
 
Unlike the Palestinians in the West Bank and Israel, where the majority still held their 
land, the refugee population in Gaza was composed of landless and impoverished 
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families.  There were no traditional landowning elites with whom the Egyptian regime 
could negotiate, who could be co-opted, or to whom the refugees owed loyalty. Thus, 
the Egyptian military administration sought the allegiance of ‘strongmen’ within the 
refugee population and elites originating from within Gaza itself, who came to serve as 
agents of control, mediators and distributors of resources. Although this move was to 
unify and provide forms of structure among the Gazan population, it largely ended the 
role of the traditional elites. Some local Gazan elites were able to prosper – they were 
able to buy the trinkets and heirlooms of refugees for sub-market price for example,
211
 
and as a result, many in the refugee population were getting poorer while the richer got 
richer. But overall, the way was clear for new elites to emerge in the Gaza Strip out of 
the refugee population itself and reflecting its experiences and more radical aspirations. 
In the West Bank and in Israel, the traditional political culture could be sustained 
because the host’s political culture was familiar—which meant that the Palestinian 
traditional social structure remained largely intact. But in the Gaza Strip the population 
were cut off from their traditional social roots and were susceptible to new political 
cultures.  
 
This displacement of traditional social structure could be said to be of greater extent in 
Palestinian refugee communities in the diaspora.  In the British government’s 1949 
estimation, they placed refugee numbers in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan at approximately 
280,000. This combined estimation was much lower than the Gaza estimation at 
210,000 and West Bank at 320,000.
212
  While some Palestinian refugee populations 
were initially received with welcome and given an allowable level of freedom and 
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political activity, particularly in Lebanon,
213
 it was not long before the Lebanese and 
Syrian regimes, like the Jordanian regime, recognised the potential threat to their own 
security from this traumatised population, both in terms of demographic balance 
(Lebanon) and their increasingly radical Arab and Palestinian nationalist aspirations. 
Thus the regimes began to retract rights, and confine the refugee populations to limit 
their local impact.
214
 The emergence of new elites that might challenge the prevailing 
patrimonial political culture, which sustained the Arab regime elites, was 
systematically suppressed. One result of this repression was that political activities 
became increasingly clandestine and even subversive. Palestinian national aspirations 
had to be advanced through struggle as much against Arab regimes as against Israeli 
occupation, setting traditional and co-opted elites against the increasingly radicalised 
new elites. One site within which this struggle was to be played out was the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), the political culture of which was to be defined by its 
uncomfortable effort to reconcile dependence on the support of patrimonial 
authoritarian Arab regimes with the radical, even revolutionary aspirations of the 
developing mass Palestinian national consciousness. 
 
 
THE PLO AS AN ‘OUTSIDE’ FORCE 
At Egypt’s behest, the Arab League commissioned Ahmad Shuqeiri (an Acre born 
Palestinian lawyer) to follow up on an Arab League Council initiative which sought to 
organise the Palestinian people into a unified and representative identity, and to 
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establish a Palestinian army located in host Arab countries.
215
 This was realised on 28 
May 1964 with the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—
Munazzimat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya. At the opening of the first session of the PLO’s 
Palestinian National Council (PLO’s legislative arm), its members—recruited by 
Shuqeiri—were composed of bourgeois and upper-class Palestinians as well as 
representatives from the Palestinian middle-class and professional trades.
216
 As a result 
of its creation outside of Palestine, the PLO was considered neither autonomous nor 
grassroots but rather a product of pan-Arabism and Arab regimes.
217
  As such it did not 
gain widespread Palestinian support until after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Although the 
Arab states were defeated (again), one Palestinian group (Fatah) made a heroic stand in 
the West Bank, its leader –Yasser Arafat – subsequently being able to take control of 
the PLO in February 1969.   
 
The Fatah movement (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini) was founded by Abu 
Jihad, Saleh Khalef, and Yasser Arafat in Cairo.
218
  It first achieved recognition in 1959 
through an underground leaflet, Our Palestine, which reflected the founders’ refugee 
status and experience. Its popularity derived from its grassroots nature and from its 
fierce nationalist position, which rejected pan-Arabism and focused specifically on 
Palestinian aspirations. Having taken control of the PLO, Fatah sought to transform it 
into a legitimate
219
 Palestinian political voice.  The 1967 defeat propelled Fatah to 
remove the PLO from the control of repressive Arab regimes and initiate a direct 
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Palestinian struggle to retrieve their homeland.
220
 The Arab regimes, embarrassed by 
their defeat, reluctantly endorsed this, as well as Fatah’s calls for a democratic, secular, 
unitary Palestinian state open to, and inclusive of, all people. Fatah represented the 
“arrival” of new Palestinian political elites, committed to anti-colonial struggle and 
social transformation, apparently a direct challenge to the traditional political elites that 
had failed to achieve this for the Palestinians. It also sought to unify Palestinians 
regardless of status, occupation, or location.
221
   
  
Michael Hudson observes that this new elite developed “leadership, organization, and 
mass support quite superior to earlier efforts during the British Palestine Mandate and 
to those of other political movements in the Arab world.”222 Its revolutionary rhetoric 
against Israel gained support from both those inside the Palestinian Territories as well 
as those in the diaspora. The PLO filled the political vacuum following the 1967 
disillusionment with the Arab Regime ultimately becoming a mobilising agent for the 
young, educated, intellectual, political activists.
223
  The PLO’s struggle to gain political 
rights for Palestinians as well as its function as a ‘government’ structure—which 
provided various cultural, social and economic services to Palestinians in the 
diaspora—provided it with popular support and legitimacy.224   
 
However, it remained financially dependent on donations from wealthy Arab countries. 
Moreover, while its claim to be the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people became 
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official when it was recognised as such in the mid-1970s by the Arab states, many 
Third World countries and its future ally, the Soviet Union,
225
 the PLO was crucially 
weakened by its lack of a permanent territorial base. Expelled from Jordan in 1970, and 
again from Lebanon in 1982, it was forced to remove to Tunis, far from its front lines 
and demilitarised.  
 
Thus, despite its radical ideology and rhetoric, the PLO under Fatah developed a 
political culture that was based on necessity and pragmatism rather than democratic 
principles. Having to operate under the eyes and controlling hands of repressive Arab 
regimes, the PLO apparatus developed clandestine ways of working, and informal 
networks which enabled it to be flexible and responsive to events. At the same time, 
regimes had to be appeased, not least in order to extract resources. Double-speak and 
compromise became key assets, and “under-the-table” transactions were frequent in 
order to protect the leadership, the movement, and their assets as well as to expand and 
co-opt new partnership and members.  
 
There was no accountability because there was no state structure to hold them 
accountable. Although the Palestinian constituency was geographically dispersed and 
was unable to contribute to the internal policy debates of the PLO organisation, the 
leadership set itself up as a state apparatus to represent—as well as serve as a voice for 
the Palestinian population. By securing financial backing, the PLO leadership was able 
as to sustain its legitimacy and influence over its constituency through patron-client 
relations with its subsidiaries and partners rather than through accountability and due 
process. This resulted in the PLO developing a political culture that was, as Pareto has 
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argued, an outcome of the flaws and qualities of people in society
226
, which it 
internalised and reproduced to reflect its role and attitude towards the political 
system.
227
 The PLO as an institution reflected a neo-patrimonial culture where the 
formal and the informal system were simultaneously used to maintain the survival of 
the regime and to gain legitimacy from its supporters—through financial and political 
co-optation.  As is characteristic of a neo-patrimonial ruler, Arafat strengthened and 
expanded the traditional patriarchal network through the PLO’s formal system.  
However, the PLO also presented an image of a modern institutional structure (with 
statal capacity that adheres to the international governing ‘norm’) to gain legitimacy 
from the international community. Moreover, the Palestinians accepted the PLO as 
their ‘state’ in function although in exile.228 
 
The PLO has been described as having para-statal formation encompassing many 
characteristics of a government. It has a bureaucracy in the form of the Palestinian 
National Council (PNC) and an Executive Committee, an army and financial 
resources.
229
 However, both the main institutions of the Palestinian ‘government’ under 
the PLO, the PNC—which acted as the parliament in exile—and the Executive 
Committee—government in exile—were located outside of the OPT.  Neither of these 
main bodies had “direct and sovereign access” to Palestinian communities in Jordan, 
and Syria nor to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which were under Israeli 
occupation.
230
   As such, the PLO as a ‘governing’ body had to perform within the 
framework of a non-state and non-status entity, which was not always in their favour. 
The only connection this “government” in exile had to the Palestinian Territories was 
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through the Palestinian elites and political parties inside the territories, to whom this 
thesis will refer as ‘Insiders’. 
 
Many scholars have argued that the Outsiders (PLO in Tunis) and the Insiders (those 
who were inside the OPT) were politically at odds, each competing for power and 
influence. Contrary to this perception, neither party differed politically from the other 
because each served a complementary role. Rather, what was at odds was their political 
priority to reach their objectives.
231
 The Insiders needed the Outsiders for financial 
support and connection. In turn, the Outsiders needed the Insiders to legitimise their 
position as leaders and rightful representatives of the Palestinians. The Insiders 
managed daily affairs and provided the leg-work from inside the OPT, while the PLO 
developed themselves from the outside fighting along the borders of the OPT. In order 
to further the movement and aid the Insider leadership, the PLO raised funds which 
were fed into the OPT providing scholarships and medical services for the Insiders and 
for refugees in the surrounding countries. Though priorities between the Insiders and 
the PLO differed, their unified political goal for an end to the Israeli occupation, later 
modified to Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 border, outweighed the need to stipulate who 
accomplished which goal, and who performed what task. They filled the particular 
roles that the other could not perform. In an interview with Ghassan Khatib, one of the 
leading prominent political figures and activist in the Palestinian Territories, he argued 
that the PLO Outsiders and the Insiders worked alongside each other and profited from 
the success of the other.  The Insiders pushed for one set of priorities due to their daily 
interaction and experience with the military occupation while the Outsiders pursued 
                                                          
231
  Al-Khatib, G. The Impact of the Composition and Behaviour of the Palestinian Leadership on the 
Outcome of the Madrid and Washington Negotiations 1991-1997. PhD Thesis, Durham: University of 
Durham School of Government and International Affairs, 2007. p. 12 
CHAPTER II: PALESTINIAN ELITE FORMATION AND DIVERGENT 
POLITICAL CULTURES 
 
110 | P a g e  
 
another course of priorities which they saw as necessary for their survival and their 
broader agenda.
232
  The discrepancy in priorities would later play a significant role in 
the competition between elites in post-Oslo OPT.  As such, it is of significance for us to 
now identify the elites that developed inside the Palestinian Territories, their 
composition and how they evolved.  
 
 
PALESTINIAN ELITES 1967—1993  
 
The 1967 Arab defeat led to a reassessment by Palestinians of their position and 
strategies. The successes of emerging Palestinian guerrilla groups contrasted sharply 
with the powerlessness of Arab regimes relative to Israel, the failure of the international 
community to provide a just end to the conflict, and the failures of traditional 
Palestinian elites to successfully mobilise either.
233
  The ideologies that emerged as a 
result of the new political reality reinforced the overall cohesion of the Palestinian 
national movement but did not eliminate intra-elite rivalry.
234
 Many of the more secular 
and liberal emerging Palestinian elites, believed that the defeat suffered by the Arab 
regimes during the 1967 War was a result of the old elites being held bondage to 
tradition and backwardness, arguing that the only way forward was through 
modernisation—with modern leadership not necessarily deriving from the notable class 
(which reflected an increasing social mobile society and the Fatah leadership 
composition) and with specific focus on the Palestinian issue. On the other hand, 
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religious leaderships contended that the defeat was a result of people deviating from the 
true path of Islam, embracing foreign ideologies, and therefore were being punished. 
As such, the religious sector advocated a return to a truly Islamic path.
235
 The 
emergence of such new, popular-based leaderships was a challenge to the traditional 
notable elites, not least since their progression into positions of influence both within 
the PLO and in local political institutions under occupation meant they were holding 
more significant and strategic positions of power, bringing with them new or alternative 
political cultures which arose from popular rather than elite experiences and interests. 
 
The legitimacy of traditional notable elites’ legitimacy was questioned as they appeared 
self-serving and in collaboration with the Israeli regime.  According to Reuven 
Pedatzur, the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and his cabinet proposed a return of 
captured lands, Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, to Egypt and Syria respectively 
in exchange for peace, however, only political autonomy for the Palestinians of the 
West Bank.
236
 Subsequently meetings took place between Palestinian notable elites and 
the Israeli administration in November 1967, but these quickly revealed that the 
Palestinian constituencies did not have a singular leadership and no one was willing to 
take on such a leadership role. Eshkol claimed that the Palestinian elite’s refusal was 
due to fear that reaching a separate settlement with Israel would place them in a 
precarious situation within the Arab world.
237
 Due to tribal division, political factions, 
and the lack of a cohesive leadership there was no singular representative that could 
credibly speak on the behalf of the Palestinians. Moreover, the Palestinian traditional 
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notable elites were not overtly enthusiastic about Palestinian autonomy. In a September 
1968 meeting with Anwar Nuseibeh, a prominent lawyer from Jerusalem and one of the 
representatives for the Palestinians, he proposed a plan to Eshkol which had no 
reference to an autonomous Palestinian territory but rather the return of the territories to 
the Jordanian regime.
238
 It appeared that prominent figures and notables in the West 
Bank were not entertaining the idea of a Palestinian national identity or independence, 
nor was it in their rhetoric because maintaining ties with Jordan was far more 
advantageous than the option of an uncertain autonomous Palestinian territory 
surrounded by/under Israel. 
 
The Gaza Strip had neither been annexed (as had the West Bank by Jordan) nor had its 
traditional elites been included in the political process by the Egyptian regime. It was 
managed by a separate administration comprised of the Egyptian army and intelligence 
forces who sought to discourage the development of conglomerate elite formation and 
interdependence. After the administrative transfer to the Israeli administration 
following the 1967 War, the Gaza Strip still occupied a precarious position. The lack of 
resolution for the refugee state of affairs, the unstable political situation, the lack of 
inclusion into either the Egyptian or Israeli administration and the non-integration of 
the refugees into the indigenous Gazan ‘political’ and social structure contributed to a 
radicalisation of the refugee population. Consequently, tension and conflict also 
emerged here between Gazan traditional elites and the radicalised refugee population. 
The refugee population and the traditional elites were compelled to compete for 
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resources, which often required accommodation towards the regimes allowing for co-
optation.
239
  
 
Israeli occupation of both the West Bank and Gaza strip soon resulted in a dramatic 
increase in Palestinian wage labour into Israel, Jordan and the Gulf States due to lack of 
economic opportunities inside the territories, a proliferation of university educated 
Palestinians without employment opportunities, and on-going confiscation of 
Palestinian lands. This further changed the social and power structure in Palestine. The 
loss of land, the means of influence and the source of power for the notables, provided 
the well-educated and the non-traditional notables with the opportunity to establish a 
new power structure based on institutional opportunities rather than through the 
traditional patronage relations.
240
 The wage labourers in Israel and abroad earned more 
than their Palestinian counterparts who depended on the land. The establishment of a 
Palestinian university system in 1972 further ‘improved’ the opportunities for upward 
mobility.  Prior to the existence of a Palestinian university system, those who acquired 
university degrees were predominantly confined to the offspring of notable Palestinian 
elites who were sent to study abroad.
241
 However, following the establishment of the 
university system in Palestine, higher education was accessible to all. With the open-
door policy, non represented areas—villages, small towns and refugee camps—took 
advantage of the opportunity where it was estimated that they composed about 70 
percent of the university student body.
242
 Therefore, what emerged from this university 
setting was a significant number of politicised educated non-notables who became civil 
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society leaders and political activists, a new form of political elite, as part of the broad 
resistance movement. Critical of the traditional elites, this young educated and 
politicised leadership reflected their experiences of life under occupation and their 
exposure to the democratic orientation of the colonisers’ own political system.  
 
All these factors, migrant wage labour, land confiscation and the establishment of an 
university system, served to sever the patron-client relations which had underpinned the 
traditional elites’ and to legitimise new elites made up of better educated, non-landed, 
individuals.
243
 The new institutions which they established, including the universities, 
unions, civil society organisations and resistance movements created new identities, 
loyalties, affiliations, and social groupings whose socialisation and political orientation 
differed in many respect from those of the traditional notable elites. As a result, the new 
elites—what is identified here as counter-elites—that emerged from this era were 
nationalistic in nature yet also came to espouse a nascent democratic political culture 
that was particular to their own experience under the Israeli occupation. It was a 
political culture which recognised new social mobilities, an equitably shared 
Palestinian national identity, inclusive role and civic participation in the political 
process and leadership positions, distribution of power, and the support for developing 
grass-roots institutions which served as a driving force in mobilising the population in 
their resistance. 
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1970s AND THE RISE OF RADICAL LEADERS 
 
The principal determining factor for political legitimacy was now an individual’s 
involvement in national resistance against the occupation, including for example prison 
experience, rather than on patron-client relations.  Even those leaders who derived from 
notable families had to demonstrate such credentials. Nonetheless, the traditional 
Palestinian notables’ wealth, education and social affluence in the West Bank helped 
preserve some of their influence and authority during the Israeli occupation.
244
  Thus to 
some extent, and although the 1970s ushered in social and political change, a large part 
of the core social elite remained intact, fusing with the new, radical socially-mobile 
elites.  
 
In 1972 the Israeli occupying forces allowed municipal elections to take place within 
the Palestinian Territories, which were supported by Fatah as well as the Jordanian 
government. The elections witnessed these new, young, nationalist leaders apparently 
replacing older more conservative traditional notables. But, neither Israel nor Jordan 
opposed the election of young radicalised leaders for they were from the same stock of 
the key traditional elite hamulas (families) whom they had already co-opted. Over 85 
percent of the electorate participated in the election, which suggested various factors as 
in an increasingly politically conscious population and/or an open and inclusive 
political process.
245
 As Moshe Ma’oz observed, in the changing political climate of the 
Palestinian Territories, the wealthy and larger landowning and traditional families 
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encouraged their younger and politically radical sons to run for municipal office in 
order to maintain and sustain the family’s socio-political power.246  Therefore, the “new” 
rhetoric of political and social reform presented by young leaders did not initially 
present any threat to the governing regime.  However, the elections marked a move 
towards democratic processes and the political culture of these emerging young 
counter-elites was significantly different from the older generation. It was not only 
nationalistic but also democratic and inclusive. Although they endorsed the PLO—
which they deemed the only alternative entity accepted as a legitimate voice and 
representative for Palestinians that can negotiate effectively with the Israeli regime and 
gain the attention of the international community towards their cause—and considered 
themselves a part of it, their own political culture was not neo-patrimonial but populist 
and democratic.   
 
The 1976 election in the West Bank on the other hand, in contrast to the 1972 election, 
had a leadership that was anti-Israeli and anti-Jordanian. They outright rejected Israel 
and Jordan and declared the PLO as the true authority of the Palestinians which 
resulted in a PLO 1976 electoral landslide.
247
 The Israelis soon recognised their mistake. 
In order to counter this increasingly outspoken and pro-PLO leadership, the Likud-led 
government implemented the systematic Sharon-Milton crack-down policy on PLO-
affiliated institutions, the universities, the press and the newly elected mayors, 
replacing the latter with Israel-sponsored local citizens/rural mukhtars whom they 
hoped would challenge the PLO’s power base in the West Bank.248  Years of Israeli 
policies intended to control the Palestinians through support and co-optation of 
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Palestinian traditional elites were destroyed by the new Sharon-Milton ‘anti-notable’ 
policies.  These cut off financial support to organisations controlled by the notables 
(mainly under PLO control in the West Bank), further confiscated lands from them, and 
installed quasi-‘elites’ under the ‘label’ of Village Leagues who were not recognised or 
respected by the Palestinian society. As had colonial states before them, the Israelis had 
installed their own proxies who had no legitimacy within society into leadership 
positions, although this backfired on the Israeli regime as the quasi-‘elites’ fought 
among themselves for leadership and for resources, further destabilising the territories. 
Moreover the strategy further promoted internal Palestinian political mobilisation and 
pro-Palestinian nationalism sentiments.  Israel’s failure to allow Palestinians to develop 
their own political structures radicalised the population further and reinforced the 
legitimacy of the new counter-elites.   
 
 
THE 1980s AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
 
If the 1970s saw the new counter-elites demonstrating a hybrid political culture which 
included features of both traditional notable elite culture and the developing radical, 
nationalist and democratic political culture, the 1980s saw a further decline in the 
political influence of the Palestinian traditional notables which could be attributed to 
three major structural changes under Israeli rule: the on-going confiscation of 
Palestinian lands
249
, the associated virtual elimination of the Palestinian peasantry, and 
the expansion of the Palestinian university system.
250
 The resulting shifts in social 
structure reinforced the counter-elites despite “the Israeli onslaught against radical 
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political forces of Palestinian nationalism (elected mayors, activist, trade unionists, and 
students)…”251 Nevertheless, the Israeli crackdown did not dampen the emergence of 
‘traditionalism’ that became a “cultural core” and the foundation of Palestinian 
nationalism. As argued by Salim Tamari, this is a case whereby “conservative national 
forces played a role in defeating a reactionary (collaborative) political movement.”252 It 
was not traditionalism in a sense of regressing to the old way of life but rather 
preserving the traditions which comprised Palestinian communal identity whilst 
simultaneously incorporating modern ideas and ways of accomplishing tasks.  
 
Moreover, whilst the traditional patriarchal system and associated patron-client 
relations was declining in terms of determining power holding, it still retained an 
important role in the university setting. In many aspects, the early political recruitment 
process was still based on social identity rather than exclusively on political platforms. 
University students were recruited into political activism based on the recommendation 
of friends or family ties to ensure loyalty and trust. Recruitment into a faction was a 
life-long commitment which required dedication. It dictated to a high degree a 
member’s public and private space i.e. whom they should associate with, events and 
parties to attend, restaurants and stores to frequent, the type and characteristic of 
resistance to embark upon. As such “personal ties” were fostered, maintained and 
pursued even after university.
253
   
 
One significant change in this new counter-elite political culture, which differed from 
their notable predecessors, was the recruitment of women, from various sectors of 
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society but particularly from the university setting, into active leadership roles in the 
resistance movement. Women represented a valuable resource for the counter-elites and 
one neglected and excluded by the traditional notables. Women were incorporated into 
all aspects of the political and social movement, both in the society and in the 
university setting. The life of a Palestinian student was politically infused where 
political socialisation and recruitment was an ‘innate’ part of the educational 
experience.
254
 The university setting was a breeding ground for political activity which 
required active participation from every member (ardent or disinclined) of the student 
body.  Because the university experience was politically vibrant “reluctant students 
often felt compelled to participate in protests to avoid criticism of their fellow 
students.”255   
 
Israel’s fear of political unrest and anti-Israeli sentiments prompted actions which 
placed many Palestinian student activists, later to become lawyers, doctors, 
professionals, and professors in Israeli prison.  The ‘placement’ of these political 
prisoners in the same prisons or “people’s schools,” as referred to by the Palestinians, 
became a political socialisation mechanism.  Israeli jails came to symbolise an alternate 
‘educational’ ground for current and future Palestinian political activists and leaders. 
By placing Palestinian political prisoners in the same detention centre it not only 
enabled the detainees to develop comradeship but it also provided the perfect milieu for 
political socialisation and strategy building. The prison experience carried more 
solidarity and consanguinity than any other form of experience during the Intifada 
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which continued into the post-prison era and did much to reinforce the importance of 
equality among the new counter-elites.
256
   
 
The activism that was nurtured during the university years was translated into 
grassroots organisations and projects undertaken by university graduates.  These 
brought about much needed social welfare and economic development.  The Israelis 
recognised the political implication of these projects and sought to sabotage them 
through indirect means by appealing to the mukhtars.  However, when that approach 
failed to produce the desired outcome, they persisted by more direct means.
257
 Curfews, 
house demolitions, travel restrictions, economic closures, and neglected social and 
health services were all policies used to obstruct and immobilise the growing resistance 
movement. Nevertheless, the social and political outcome of these Palestinian 
generated projects was that it not only stimulated the physical environment of the local 
communities, it also built up the morale of the society and mobilised the population. 
What emerged was a population with a strong “national Palestinian consciousness” 
kindled by urban sprawl which allowed them to become more politically active and 
involved with the political reality. Thus with the dawning of the First Intifada, what 
emerged was a mobilised and seemingly cohesive force.   
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THE INTIFADA 
The festering grievances, dissatisfaction, and entrenched social and political changes in 
the Palestinian society made the OPT a ticking time bomb waiting to be set off.
258
 On 
the 8
th
 of December 1987, a motor accident between a vehicle carrying Palestinian 
workers and an Israeli truck served as that catalyst that triggered the mass uprising 
throughout the OPT.
259
  The Intifada was a collective uprising against Israeli 
occupation and policies towards the Palestinian people. It was an indigenous grassroots 
movement which renewed the sympathy of the international community for the plight 
of the Palestinians.
260
 The Intifada emerged during a critical period for the PLO which 
– following a decade of violent and ultimately unproductive acts of international 
terrorism, civil war, and rejection and expulsion from Arab states - was in need of 
rejuvenating its power, authority and legitimacy for its survival as an organisation.  The 
U.S. had outlawed support for the PLO and sought to close down PLO information 
offices in Washington and at the UN through the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987. The Arab 
summit held in Amman in November 1987 had received Arafat with contempt and 
prioritised the Iran-Iraq war over Palestinian issues.
261
 It demonstrated a decline in the 
status of the PLO as well as in the importance of the Palestinian issue. In such 
circumstances, and recognising the growing legitimacy of the Insider elite, the PLO and 
Arafat were under pressure to develop a more salient political strategy.  
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The Intifada, which occurred a few weeks following this PLO diplomatic humiliation 
and a grassroots movement, was only possible because of the emergence of the new 
counter-elite in the OPT.
262
 But it also served to unite society in collective action, 
transforming the political structure through mass participation.  It not only encouraged 
self-sustainability in the society’s basic human needs but also the diffusion of power. 
The emergence of the counter-elites had allowed for the devolvement of authority such 
that it was diffused throughout all levels of society. It was a phenomenon not 
experienced or in existence previously
263
 and the process was vastly enhanced by the 
participation of grassroots organisations and institutions in the Intifada. The resistant 
movement was not limited to particular individuals, groups, or tribes but rather required 
and encouraged the involvement of all: the masses, NGOs, intellectuals, old/new elites, 
organisations, students, police, professionals, institutions, and local communities.  
 
Although the counter-elites served as agents of change, without the support of the 
masses, they could not implement any real or significant political and social structural 
changes.  As classical theorists like Mosca and Pareto had observed, only when the 
mass is mobilised and included are new elites able to set in motion structural changes to 
the existing system, or to remove ineffective and/or despised leaders/regimes from 
power.  One of the structural changes observed during the Intifada was the decreasing 
role of the traditional notable elites in the decision making process and their 
replacement with counter-elites. Because power was diffused to all levels, the 
traditional notable elites’ influence via patron-client networks declined. Conversely, the 
counter-elite were empowered as their status in grassroots organisations became more 
important for the wider society and the resistance movement.  
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The new emerging counter-elites mobilised the society through local organisations, 
NGOs, and popular (underground) committees which could not be easily eliminated by 
the Israeli regime, in the process enhancing their own legitimacy. Lacking formal 
political institutions, the counter-elites organised informal structures of power 
including grassroots organisations and popular committees which served as substitute 
‘governmental’ institutions. The underground PLO-affiliated structures not only 
organised demonstrations, timed commercial strikes, and established backyard 
agricultural projects, but also provided emergency medical services, and distributed 
money and food, and other social services on a local level.
264
  Through these, the 
counter-elites were able to retain social control and encourage cooperation between 
groups which allowed for successful coordinated political activities. This collaboration 
conferred legitimacy on the PLO, which the counter-elites attributed as the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians and as their governing entity, thus portraying a central 
authority role. Moreover, it depicted an image of cooperative interaction between the 
PLO in Tunis and the political, social and civil society groups in the OPT. 
 
The resilience of the Intifada in the face of brutal Israeli efforts to suppress it, increased 
support for Yasser Arafat and the PLO as symbols of Palestinian nationalism, and 
revived the PLO’s legitimacy as representative of the Palestinian people. 265 
Nonetheless, the counter-elites leadership roles during the Intifada marked a discernible 
shift in political decision-making power from the PLO Outsiders in Tunis to the 
Insiders in the OPT particularly for internal activities and actions. Nevertheless, this did 
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not declare or signify a competition between the two entities but rather portrayed as a 
collective effort under the auspices of the PLO.  Israeli efforts to politically annihilate 
the counter-elites through coercive measures proved counterproductive, only enhancing 
their nationalist credentials and strengthening mass solidarity. However, this did not 
stop Israel trying: they imposed harsh measures including the closure of borders, of all 
educational, health, and economic systems; and inflicted curfews to limit mobility, and 
restriction of mass gatherings. This served only to motivate the resistance further, 
provoking widespread civil disobedience. This took the shape of alternative 
‘underground’ social provision in the forms of a collective establishment of temporary 
schools and mobile medical clinics, tax boycott, general strikes, and Israeli product 
embargoes.  The Intifada mobilised all sections of the population particularly women, 
youth (shebab), professionals, and wage labourers. Everyone could and were 
encouraged to participate which reinforced the relevance of the counter-elites’ nascent 
democratic political culture. The work of grassroots organisations was crucial to this 
effort, and to consolidating the political influence of the new counter-elites.  
 
As the impact of the boycott of already insufficient Israeli services and the embargo of 
Israeli goods and jobs was increasingly felt by the Palestinian society, grassroots 
organisations were ever more heavily drawn upon to fill the gaps. Thus, in time they 
came to serve as informal institutions that gave coherence to the fragmented society 
and enhanced effective autonomy from Israeli military rule.
266
 They were not perfect – 
at times the Intifada was still plagued by internal leadership rivalries between notable 
elites and counter-elites, and among counter-elites themselves.  Leadership rivalry led 
to duplication of services which wasted resources and ultimately became a stumbling 
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block to the cohesiveness of the resistance movement.
267
  But they served ultimately to 
establish the supremacy of the new Insider counter-elite over traditional notable 
competitors. 
 
THE GOVERNING COMMITTEE 
 
The occupation had prevented the establishment of a Palestinian civic administration, 
and thus the counter-elites formed popular committees as informal substitutes to find 
ways to counter the social, political and economic hardship encountered under the 
occupation.
 268
 In the wake of the Intifada, the Israeli regime deemed all grassroots 
committees affiliated with any PLO party illegal, their members subject to a ten-year 
imprisonment sentence.
269
 Popular Committees therefore came to symbolise popular 
civic resistance. The Popular Committees provided the organisational and leadership 
structures during the Intifada, organising inter alia political activities, social welfare, 
and economic support. They operated on liberal-democratic principles
270
, the most 
significant group being the popularly-based Unified National Leadership of the 
Uprising (UNLU).
271
  The UNLU was formed in December 1987 by four leading PLO 
factions: Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Palestine Communist 
Party (PCP)
272
. According to an interview with Dr. Mamdouh Aker, one of the political 
personalities of the Intifada, he also confirmed the clandestine nature of the UNLU and 
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its unified leadership that represented all the main factions, the exception being the still 
very new Islamist Hamas movement.
273
   
 
The emergence of the UNLU as a leadership organisation institutionalised the Intifada. 
The UNLU consisted of the brightest and most talented individuals from each faction. 
Each faction nominated an individual as a representative of their party to become the 
‘leaders’ of the UNLU.  In reality, the four elected individuals were just symbolic 
delegates of their parties- the real leaders remaining in hiding to protect themselves and 
the movement from the Israeli intelligence.  As the decoy leaders were arrested, 
imprisoned or killed, others would immediately emerge as replacements. This set-up 
prevented the Israeli military regime from completely eliminating the movement since 
the true sources of the leadership were protected and unidentified.  As one scholar 
explained, the inchoate and decentralised nature of the UNLU leadership reflected the 
grassroots nature of the movement.
274
 It differed in many aspects from both traditional 
leaderships and from the Outside resistance movement. The resistance movement in the 
OPT consisted of young and educated political activists, labour unions, women’s 
organisations, youth organisations, community groups, medical and agricultural groups 
with leaders being elected from among their ranks on the basis of merit rather than 
family connections.
275
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The decision making executed by the UNLU reflected the need to distribute power 
amongst the various political factions and to coordinate their activities,
276
 reflecting a 
profound cultural change from the intra-elite competition of the traditional notable 
elites and better enabling them to mobilise the wider population behind their efforts.  
Their decisions were diffused through the network of subordinate popular committees 
which reproduced their principles of broad and equitable representation of diverse 
political factions. 
 
Between April and June 1988, the UNLU called for Palestinians to resign from their 
posts as tax collectors, police officers, appointed civil servants etc. which brought 
disarray to Israel’s governing structure in the OPT.  By mid-1988, the Israeli military 
regime had lost control of the OPT.  Removing Israel’s information power-base in the 
OPT, i.e. the collaborators, made it more difficult for the military regime to track 
political activities. By November 1988, during the PNC’s nineteenth session in Algiers, 
a declaration was issued by Yasser Arafat calling for an independent Palestinian state in 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank alongside Israel.
277
 This was a significant political 
stance by the PLO because it indicated recognition of Israel’s right to exist, a 
renouncement of Palestinian claim to 78 percent of Palestine,
278
 advocacy of a two-
state solution, rejection of terrorism as a method to resolve conflict, and negotiations 
based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.
279
 Despite the compromising 
message entailed in the PLO’s announcement, the declaration indicated that the PLO 
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favoured a diplomatic solution to the conflict, which initiated a political breakthrough 
with the United States and opened a channel for dialogue between the PLO, the U.S. 
and Israel.
280
  However, of utmost significance to the PLO’s call for a Palestinian 
independent state based on the 1947 UN Resolution, though not much discussed, is that 
it was a proposition put forward by the UNLU Intifada leadership. Although Insider 
counter-elites from the Gaza Strip and West Bank were not present at the PNC meeting, 
their adamant insistence that the PLO make a declaration of a two-state solution to co-
exist with Israel forced the Outsiders’ hands. However this idea was not altogether 
alien to Arafat’s aim as in the 1974 PNC meeting which called for the establishment of 
a national authority.
281
  The Insider counter-elites were realistic in their approach in 
that they recognised that a major breakthrough on the diplomatic front was needed in 
order to end the Israeli occupation and that the catalyst would be the U.S.
282
 Although 
there were critics of the PLO’s political move, there was a general acceptance of this 
declaration as a product of the Intifada: and even though Arafat’s hand had been forced, 
he was equally eager to reassert the PLO (in Tunis) as the legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people which should lead the diplomatic process thus. 
 
The Israelis were not only unprepared but failed to respond to this initiative. They 
chose instead to focus their military efforts on containing the resistance movement.
283
 
They resorted to organising, recruiting, entrapping, and blackmailing Palestinian 
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prisoners in Israeli prisons to serve as collaborators.
284
 As one Palestinian fugitive 
asserted, “…a Palestinian collaborator will always know the village better than a 
soldier from Tel Aviv.”285  By the first quarter of 1989, collaboration was endemic in 
the underground network and by summer 1989, the OPT had been infiltrated by gangs 
of armed collaborators who worked with Israeli security forces to weed out suspected 
activists. As fear of them grew, the UNLU responded through measures of counter-
intimidation which led to the killing of many collaborators.
286
  
 
A security committee (in the capacity of a ‘police’ force), composed of former police 
officers—who had resigned en masse from the Israeli administration, and PLO cadres 
were made responsible for keeping law and order, securing premises and persons, and 
halting Israeli settler/collaborator attacks on people and businesses.
287
 However, some 
sections of this informal police sector—particularly PLO cadres made up of recruited 
members from the territories and returnees who fought from the Outside with Arafat—
engaged in vigilante justice by ‘enforcing’ the ‘law’ on suspected collaborators. In 
certain occurrences, the accusations were politically motivated for factional/political 
gain. In other cases, it was driven by corruption—through exploitation for financial 
gain or to settle tribal/familial disputes. The police force eventually deteriorated into 
intra-factional and intra-police hostilities. By the summer of 1989, the official count for 
collaborators killed since the beginning of the Intifada was more than 200.  However, 
the non-official toll was far higher
288
 and of those killed as collaborators an estimated 
                                                          
284
 Tamari, S. “Eyeless in Judea: Israel's Strategy of Collaborators and Forgeries,” (May-Aug. 1990), pp. 
39-40  
285
 Rabbani, M. “Rocks and Rockets: Oslo’s Inevitable Conclusion,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no. 
3 (Spring, 2001), p. 98 
286
 Tamari, S. “Eyeless in Judea: Israel's Strategy of Collaborators and Forgeries,” (May-Aug. 1990), p. 
41 
287
  Nasser, J. and  Heacock, R. (eds.). Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads. (1990),  p. 200 
288
 An estimated 1000 Palestinian “collaborators” were killed by Palestinians by the end of the Intifada. 
CHAPTER II: PALESTINIAN ELITE FORMATION AND DIVERGENT 
POLITICAL CULTURES 
 
130 | P a g e  
 
40 to 45 percent had maintained contact with the Israeli authority.
289
 By the end of 
1989, the factional divisions had subsided to some degree, and the UNLU reached an 
agreement with the Islamic Resistance Movement to coordinate efforts at activities, 
strike force, law enforcement etc.
290
  
 
The decentralising nature of the political sphere surrounding the UNLU and its 
leadership paved the way for maintaining fragmented political entities, factional and 
vying groups. Nevertheless, the UNLU as a ‘government’ entity was able to administer 
punishment, resolve disputes, provide social welfare services, and organise collective 
anti-occupation activities which contributed to unification of the mass. Although the 
UNLU was able to consolidate the various factional goals into a cohesive effort, like 
any informal institution, they failed in some aspects of control, as concerning vigilante 
groups and the ‘police’ force. Nonetheless, the UNLU provided a governing institution, 
albeit informal, which assured some form of social control and law. With the March 
1990 arrest of the last UNLU elected leadership, well-known UNLU Insider political 
personalities were compelled to the foreground to continue, or rather to direct, writing 
articles and bayanat.  It soon became public knowledge that these political personalities 
were involved from the conception of the UNLU filling in the gap between the arrest of 
one group of ‘leadership’ and the construction of a replacement.  These political 
personalities, with significant leadership, such as Ghassan Khatib (PCP/PPP), Zahira 
Kamal (DFLP), Hani Bayadun (PFLP), Faisal al-Husseini (Fatah), and Sari Nusseibeh 
(Fatah) amongst others came to change the conception of the leadership composition 
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and tone of the movement.
291
  It also became recognised that many of the UNLU 
leadership were also those who were members of the political committee who 
participated in the ‘formal’ track in dialogues with international representatives. 
 
Characteristics associated with the leadership of the UNLU, and their credibility, were 
that they had been politically active during their university years, imprisoned by the 
occupying regime, and had ties to traditional leadership and hamulas. However, the 
UNLU and its leadership served in the capacity of a government with an orientation 
towards a nascent democratic institution. All leaders were voted into office and all had 
contributed and participated in the political activities and mobilisation of mass 
participation.
292
 The leadership of the Intifada had sought to incorporate the concept 
and processes of a democratic state into their potential government. These counter-
elites believed the masses to be an integral part of the system and that diffusion of 
power should be a fundamental aspect of the government. Therefore, under the 
democratic principle they envisioned, the mass had the right to choose their own 
leadership and representatives for their particular constituencies. The government that 
they envisioned, in the form of the UNLU, should have limited power, where 
individuals and organisations have an important role, and that freedom should be based 
on individual responsibility and law of the land—action and consequence. The UNLU 
tried to implement these fundaments to a democratic government into their formation 
and function of the UNLU. As such, there existed a nascent form of democratic 
political culture among the counter-elites whose experience under the occupation 
propelled them towards the belief that the only way for a government to work was 
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through democratic principles where its populace will have freedom of movement and 
action, within the law of the state, and a voice to express their grievances and actively 
participate in the decision making process for their future.  
 
Under the ‘auspices’ of the UNLU, several other committees emerged and were set up 
to serve as part of the governing institution.  Although they had their independence to 
pursue projects and goals, they nevertheless had to adhere to the collective activities 
and goals organised by the UNLU—a similar approach to the PLO’s organisational 
structure of a mother-organisation whose umbrella various Palestinian factions were 
under. The first committee we shall look at is the agricultural committee which initiated 
a move towards economic independence from Israel and which triggered a backlash of 
Israeli Military orders and policies to inhibit the progressing nature of Palestinian self-
reliance and independence. 
 
 
AGRICULTURAL COMMITTEES 
Agriculture remained a key economic section and thus a power source for the 
Palestinians in sustaining the resistance movement, substituting for boycotted Israeli 
products, and mobilising the society towards self-sufficiency. Palestinian society was 
encouraged to restore its agricultural independence from Israel through disengagement 
from the regime and initiating community agricultural projects.
293
 In response, both to 
extend its own control and to expand its own settlements, Israel pursued policies aimed 
at discouraging Palestinian agricultural use of the land, limiting agricultural 
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development investment.
294
 Lending institutions were closed that would otherwise 
provide service to starving small farmers in need of capital. Access to water was 
restricted, which limited the productivity of farmers, and agricultural exports were 
restricted to prevent competition with Israeli products.
295
  
 
The Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee (PARC), the first agricultural relief 
committee, was established in 1983 as a response to the subsequent decline of the 
Palestinian agricultural sector.
296
  PARC Director, Khalil Shiha related that PARC’s 
initial intention was to assist small farmers with financial and educational support.
297
 It 
began as a small scale project by concerned agricultural engineers, experienced farmers 
and veterinary doctors, but soon developed into a full scale functional body providing 
agricultural relief to Palestinian farmers. Other agricultural relief programmes 
developed soon after but did not match the scale or influence of PARC. Shiha also 
pointed out that although various agricultural programmes professed to be non-political 
in nature, all in fact had political overtones—particularly factional ideology and 
agenda—which influenced their organisational activities and goals. 298  For example, 
PARC was tied to PCP, the Technical Center for Agricultural Services (TCAS) and the 
Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) were PFLP affiliated, and the Union 
of Palestinian Farmers’ Committees (UPFC) linked itself with DFLP. They all sought 
the agricultural liberation of Palestine, to create awareness of the link between land and 
                                                          
294
 Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC). Agricultural Development and the Uprising. 
(Jerusalem, May 1988), p. 4 
295
 Robinson, G.E. “The Role of the Professional Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian 
Society,” (May, 1993), p. 312 
296
 Robinson, G. Building a Palestinian State, (1997), p. 54 
297
 Shiha, Khalil. Personal Interview. 28 July, 2008. 
298
 Shiha, Khalil. Personal Interview. 28 July, 2008. 
CHAPTER II: PALESTINIAN ELITE FORMATION AND DIVERGENT 
POLITICAL CULTURES 
 
134 | P a g e  
 
nationalism, to disengage from the Israeli regime, to empower the Palestinian 
population, and to usher in social change.
299
 
 
Animal husbandry and cultivation increased through the help of the relief committees. 
PARC distributed 500,000 vegetable seedlings in 1989 alone while UAWC distributed 
615,000 during the first two years of the Intifada.  Rabbit farms were also established 
by PARC in Bayt Jala and Ramallah and worked with two goat cooperatives, twenty-
three chicken egg and twelve rabbits. UAWC on the other hand maintained that they 
had distributed 28,500 game-hens and 7,200 egg-laying chickens from 1988-89. The 
relief committees bought chicken and cows from Israel while goats and sheep were 
bought from local Palestinians.
300
 By the second year of the Intifada, animal husbandry 
increased by 30 percent despite Israeli efforts to prohibit the sale of animals by settlers 
to Palestinians. In response to this increased self-sufficiency, Israel took extreme and 
often harsh measures to suppress the movement. The Israeli army confiscated cows that 
were sold by Israelis to Palestinians. Moreover, the water supply was cut to villages 
with increased production—as in the village of Salfit - by 50 percent, and the price of 
barley—which is the main food for stocks—increased by 250 percent. Curfews were 
also imposed to keep farmers from the land leading to crop and livestock losses,
301
 
markets were closed leading to spoilage,
302
 tens of thousands of trees were uprooted 
and the land confiscated, the transport of agricultural products was impeded, and farm 
machinery destroyed.
303
 Israeli export companies sabotaged Palestinian produce 
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enroute to export markets – while in the process of ‘searching’ and opening every 
produce box the agricultural produce was bruised and damaged which lowered its 
value.
304
 Refrigeration systems were also tampered with at export ports, which 
subsequently ruined produce.  
 
Regardless of these setbacks, the Intifada was a period of growth for Palestinian 
agriculture. Crop production and animal husbandry increased and expanded 
dramatically.  The decrease in the number of Palestinians working in Israel meant an 
increase in the labour force in Palestine but also a loss in revenue.
305
  This led to 
significant structural changes as society was forced to accommodate new financial and 
political hardships.  Although consumption declined, production rose which lead to a 
surplus of supply.  There was no export market, except through Israel, and the Israelis 
were unwilling to help the Palestinians ease their situation at their own market’s 
expense. As a consequence, competition for production within Palestine was high and 
the value of produce dropped. As production became more costly and farmers had to 
take on alternative jobs to supplement their living, there was an increased effort 
towards self-sufficiency and disengagement. It was not a situation which could 
continue indefinitely and the demands placed increasing pressure on the unity of the 
factions within the agricultural relief committees.  Despite these problems the 
movement towards self-sufficiency and disengagement had produced not only social 
and political engagement on all levels in society but also a sense of community 
consequently challenging the authority of the Israeli regime. 
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MEDICAL RELIEF COMMITTEES 
 
Under Israeli occupation, there was an observable decline in health care services in the 
Palestinian Territories. The Israeli military regime was accused of measures which 
undermined the health-care system, including heavy taxation of health care 
establishments, curfews and limitation on the movement of health-care professionals 
and supplies resulting in understaffed hospitals and lack of provision for patients, 
closed professional unions, and denial of permits to Palestinian health institutions to 
expand, build or renew facilities. The deteriorating health care system compelled 
Palestinians to develop a parallel, informal system of health care provision. In 1979 the 
Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC) was formed. The 
committee was composed of professional volunteers—mainly from the medical 
profession.
306
 They were recruited from the counter-elites based on their work and 
education and aimed to provide a nation-wide Palestinian health care system, 
independent of Israeli control and extending into deprived and rural areas. As such, it 
bridged the gap between the rural villagers and refugee population and the more 
professional educated urban class.
307
 
 
Until the mid-1970s, health professionals had come from the traditional notable class 
and had promoted urban-based medicine practices which were devoted to treating 
conditions rather than prevention. The new, younger and better educated counter-elites, 
believed health should be considered in the context of social, economic, political and 
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environmental factors. They argued that there was a close link between the conflict 
with Israel and the health of the population, with the Palestinian health care system 
being under-developed as a result of the conflict.  Health care was thus a ‘political’ and 
national issue. 
 
The initial work of the UPMRC in rural areas was viewed with suspicion by traditional 
health communities who labelled them as communists, or accused them of ‘cheapening’ 
the profession by taking it into the rural villages.
308
 Their suspicion was also raised as 
women played an increasing and relatively novel role in health care through the 
UPMRC. Women played an important role in its establishment and there was an 
overlap between women organisations (PCP affiliated women committees and the 
Union of Palestinian Working Women’s Committees—UPWWC) and UPMRC. 
Although women only comprised 6 percent of doctors in the Palestinian territories they 
made up 32 percent of UPMRC doctors and 70 percent of its employees.
309
 The 
UPMRC trained local women as paramedics and health workers particularly in rural 
areas and refugee camps.
310
   It established clinics throughout the territories (17 by the 
start of the Intifada) and provided over 1000 training sessions where 22,000 people 
learned the basic skills of first-aid.
311
 This proved vital as the Israeli response to the 
Intifada involved beatings, firing with teargas, live ammunition and rubber and plastic 
bullets. With a chronic shortage of hospitals (in Hebron, for example, there was one 
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main hospital to serve 300,000 people while Gaza had three hospitals to serve 650,000), 
this proved invaluable.
312
  
 
The UPMRC was thus an essential component of the Intifada which helped sustain 
resistance by mobilising the wider population towards self-sufficiency and self-help 
preventive health care. Its leadership, drawn from the counter-elites, ‘democratised’ 
health care, by making it inclusive of all sections of the population, by taking it beyond 
urban areas into the rural villages, by de-mystifying the status of the profession, and by 
involving women in delivering services more than had been possible before. It also 
politicised health care, making it a national issue and one which involved the 
collaboration of all political factions. 
 
  
VILLAGE RESISTANCE COMMITTEES 
Another form of grassroots collaboration which brought new leaderships to the fore 
was the village relief committees, such as that of Bayt Sahur.  This village, which was 
home to a relatively affluent and well educated (predominantly) Christian community, 
came to be noted for its collective civil-disobedience and relief network during the 
Intifada. In the early years of the occupation Bayt Sahur had experienced an economic 
boom. However, the drop in oil prices in the mid 1980s and the downturn in the world 
economy
313
 resulted in loss of jobs for skilled workers in the Gulf States. As Palestinian 
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skilled workers returned from the Gulf, remittances declined dramatically. Israeli taxes 
nonetheless remained high. The population of Bayt Sahur responded to the 
disproportionate taxation policy with a tax boycott. They also argued that Israel had 
failed to fulfil its obligation as a government because as policy stood, there was 
taxation without representation for the Palestinians. An estimated 90 percent of those in 
Bayt Sahur refused to pay taxes in comparison to the West Bank where only 50 percent 
boycotted the tax policy.
314
 Israel reacted to the tax boycott through imposed curfews 
and restrictions which constrained movement, access to food supply, medical and social 
services, and education.  
 
In response, Bayt Sahur established a relief committee as a method to counter the 
hardship faced during the Intifada. Originally a joint effort between Bayt Jala, Bayt 
Sahur and Bethlehem, it was later confined to Bayt Sahur due to internal disagreements 
and lack of commitment on the part of the other towns. The relief committee asked the 
community for a contribution of either a day’s wage or up to 10 percent of a 
professional’s salary.315 From the donations received, they were able to distribute funds 
to areas hardest-hit by the Intifada. Bayt Sahur was not only able to set up security and 
look out points for the community (against curfews, looting and the Israeli military 
force) through donation of time and skills by former police officers; they also created a 
resource of teachers for ‘under-ground’ schools since schools and universities were 
‘officially’ closed by Israel, and purchased food supplies for the community. The relief 
committee established underground clinics, and encouraged self-sufficiency through 
local farming providing fresh produce for families.
316
 It established a form of ‘welfare’ 
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system for the community not only with money they collected from communal 
contributions but also from donated time, skills and experience of individuals and 
professionals within their community.  A backyard farming initiative known as “The 
Shed” was set up in Bayt Sahur, providing agricultural ‘education’ and services to its 
residents as well as the surrounding areas, later to become a successful project funded 
by the European Community. The Shed provided technical support and advice and also 
produced and disseminated seeds.  The Shed was of significance because it was not 
affiliated with any relief committee. The Shed purchased supplies, seeds and seedlings, 
and other agricultural requirements from both Israeli and Palestinian suppliers and then 
distributed them to the community at a cost. By the second year of the Intifada, the 
Shed had disseminated over three million seedlings. 
 
The Shed soon faced opposition from other Palestinian relief programmes, in particular 
the PARC which was the leading agricultural organisation during the Intifada and 
which was perceived as the informal governmental institution for agriculture. Disputes 
emerged in which the Shed blamed PARC for attempting to tarnish its reputation 
through rumours and accusations. Moreover, the Israelis fabricated charges against it, 
arrested its leader, and imposed routine closures which eventually led to the Shed being 
dismantled.
317
 Efforts to provide health care services for the local population were also 
stymied by Israeli closures of local clinics and health care centres under false charges. 
The leaders of Bayt Sahur approached a local Greek Catholic convent which held a 
valid health clinic license but which was not in operation, and with their agreement 
provided it with staffing and enabled it to reopen. Though they were under Israeli 
monitoring and subjected to frequent closures, illegal seizures of confidential materials, 
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and house arrest of doctors without charges, they were still able to maintain operation 
and services.
318
  Bayt Sahur also developed its own mobile clinic.
319
 
 
In order to resolve conflicts among the population, Bayt Sahur established a Sulha to 
serve as a legal authority, functioning according to Bedouin law. The Sulha meted out 
judgements and punishments. As this traditional form of community conflict 
management was expanded to take on new functions, its membership was also 
expanded to include members of the new counter-elites, having previously been the 
rights of traditional elites and village elders. The decline in power for the traditional 
notable elites and disruption to their traditional patrimonial control and influence made 
them more popularly accountable. The Sulha enforced ‘legitimate’ power within the 
confines of the old social system but with new power relations and structures.
320
   
 
Bayt Sahur’s successful movement towards self-sufficiency, governance and 
disengagement posed a political threat to Israel. Bayt Sahur’s non-violent, effective and 
highly visible movement posed both an existential crisis and a public relation fiasco for 
Israel in how they dealt with the situation. The high visibility and political threat 
derived from the fact that the civil resistance movement was led by well-educated, 
affluent, and articulate individuals living close to Israel with strong contacts both in 
Israel and in the international community.
321
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In an interview with Bassam Al-Salhi, Secretary General of the Palestinian People’s 
Party, he related that although Israel limited and placed obstacles to the development of 
these relief committees they acknowledged and initially allowed the existence of these 
committees because they provided social services that they could not provide.
322
 
Nevertheless, the increasing self-sufficiency, disengagement, and social cohesion of the 
Palestinians proved more problematic to their authority and legitimacy. The collective 
efforts in the resistance movement, with each sector’s, faction’s, and village’s strengths 
and contribution, ushered in a more politically mobilised community with a shared 
awareness of their situation. It also strengthened and supported the emergence of the 
new counter-elites who were primarily the activists and organisers of activities and 
committees in the resistance movement. It also questioned the contribution and role of 
the PLO in the resistance movement and their ability to consolidate, support and/or 
control Palestinian leadership, factions and groups. At times the PLO promoted one 
faction or group above another as a way of asserting its own control, and relations were 
not always harmonious or easy. But generally they enabled the new counter-elites, 
themselves drawn from the educated and professional classes, across a wide spectrum 
of society and sharing a nationalist and democratic approach to political behaviour, to 
embed themselves fully in grassroots organisations and extend their own relative 
influence to the detriment of traditional notable elites. The counter-elites drew 
legitimacy from their leadership of these grassroots organisations and from their 
participation in the nationalist resistance struggle. As their influence spread, so too did 
their political culture – one which endorsed popular participation, relied upon an 
inclusive attitude towards all social groups, and which introduced democratic processes 
for the popular election and promotion of leaders. 
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However, one distinctive group remained, to a degree, outside of these organisations 
and thus beyond, or at the margins, of PLO influence, themselves introducing a further 
dimension to the political culture of resistance.  The Islamist factions developed in the 
more restrictive environment of the Gaza Strip. They could neither be labelled as part 
of the emergent (largely West Bank) counter-elites nor the traditional notable elites.  
 
THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE 
 
The aftermath of the 1967 Arab humiliating defeat, and in the face of Israel’s policies 
to deconstruct Palestinian national and political aspirations, gave rise to political Islam 
which offered an alternative ideological proposition. The Islamist movement did not 
seek to return to ‘tradition’ but rather was an incorporation of both modernity and 
tradition.
323
 Contrary to the belief that the leadership of the Islamist movement were 
graduates of conservative religious universities, many of the leadership had received 
secular educations and a high number had obtained their qualifications from Western 
universities. In contrast to their colleagues who had received training in religious 
jurisprudence, these secular-educated Islamist elites were more vocal, confrontational 
and politically active.  Islamism represented a means whereby many of these rising 
politico-religious elites could voice their concerns. Political Islam’s main attractive 
feature which gained popular support was that it presented Islam as an alternative to 
Westernisation, secularism, and materialism which were perceived as threats to Muslim 
societies.
324
 The Islamist movement in the OPT could be traced back to Syrian-born 
Sheikh Mohammed Izz ad-Dinn al-Qassam who led a military struggle, although short-
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lived, against the British regime and the Zionist movement and was subsequently killed 
in 1935.
325
 However, the most influential factor for this movement in the OPT can be 
attributed to the Egyptian founded Muslim Brotherhood where it represented not only a 
politico-religious schema but also a form of social movement to attend to local needs 
and grievances not addressed by the regime. 
 
 
The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip at this time was mostly 
composed of upper-middle class merchants and traditional notables who lived in urban 
areas,
326
 unlike their members who were from poorer, rural, refugee and conservative 
backgrounds.
327
 They had little interest in challenging their Egyptian rulers directly, 
enjoying a continued status as elites under their protection. But as a consequence of the 
Brotherhood’s recruitment process, which drew on the large new impoverished refugee 
population in Gaza, and inspired by the successful Islamic revolution in Iran, the 1980s 
saw the emergence of a new middle stratum of laypeople who were more radical and 
politically active than their leadership. This middle stratum came to challenge the 
leadership’s policies of acquiescence in the face of post-1967 Israeli occupation.  
Whereas the old leaders sought to Islamise society first, the new middle stratum 
defined confronting Israel as the priority and all others secondary.  As a result, a 
powerful splinter group, the Islamic Jihad (al-Jihad al-Islami), emerged in the 1980s 
from the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and proceeded to advocate the idea of a 
simultaneous Islamisation of society and confrontation against Israel. Islamic Jihad 
leaders came to believe in the dialectical relation between social (religious) piety and 
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political power and the need for its inclusivity in the daily life of the society.
328
  
Though the two concepts appear to be in contradiction, they are two sides of the same 
coin.  They emphasised an interlaced consequential relation between socio-religious 
piety and political power. As a society ‘purifies’ itself and moves toward the level of 
piety, God will grant it political power and freedom.  The Islamic Jihad argued that this 
relationship must be fostered and reached simultaneously and that one cannot exist 
without the other.  Although the Islamic Jihadist rhetoric and method of approach 
against the occupation differed from that of the secular nationalists, they were still able 
to maintain close ties with Fatah and the PLO due to Islamic Jihad leaders’ former 
membership in Fatah.  Additionally, Fatah financially supported the clandestine Islamic 
Jihad prior to the Intifada. Therefore, with the onslaught of the Intifada, the Islamic 
Jihad supported the PLO in their efforts to unify society.   
 
The Israelis had tolerated the Muslim Brotherhood as a means to undermine the power 
of the PLO. However, the Islamic Jihad rapidly developed into a significant problem 
for Israel due to their increasing popularity and staged attacks against Israel.  In order 
to halt the attacks and stunt its development, Israel staged ambushes against Islamic 
Jihad members and expelled and assassinated many of its leaders.  With the Intifada, 
the tension between the old traditional elites of the Muslim Brotherhood and the new, 
militant and revolutionary Islamic Jihad leaders came to the fore as pressure mounted 
for the Islamists to contribute to the national efforts of united resistance. Both the 
Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood claimed “to be the authentic leadership of 
the Muslim community, and both claimed jihad, or struggle, to be a central tenet of 
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their ideology.”329  Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership’s resistance to 
engaging in the struggle against Israeli occupation could no longer be justified. It was 
difficult for the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood to make a drastic shift in their 
ideological position and consequently a breakaway group emerged, the Harakat al-
Muqawima al-Islamiya (HAMAS), Islamic Resistance Movement.
330
   
 
Hamas emerged onto the political scene in January 1988 and advocated an ideological 
position which the Muslim Brotherhood was reluctant to publicly espouse. By the late 
1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood itself had started to recruit young, educated technocrats 
who were more radical and uncompromising than the traditional Brotherhood old 
guard.
331
  The middle stratum cadres of the Muslim Brotherhood advocated militancy 
in action against the Israeli regime.  It was they who led the new Hamas group. Like the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad, Hamas claimed Palestine as a waqf, an 
“inseparable whole” which cannot be ceded to, nor divided amongst, non-Muslims.  In 
other words, they believed that no “temporal being” had the right to divide Palestine.332 
But the uniqueness of Hamas was their merging of a reformist approach (Hassan al-
Banna) with Sayyid Qutb’s revolutionary approach which ultimately called for the 
eradication of political Zionism. Furthermore, Hamas’ ideology was a merger between 
a nationalist approach and Islam.
333
 Hamas became increasingly popular in Palestinian 
society due to its “down-to-earth simplicity” and its particularity to the Palestinian 
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context. Moreover, it sought to equate nationalism and Islamism which became an 
emblem, for them, of the Palestinian ‘cause’.334 
 
With the creation of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood embarked on an ideological and 
political transformation. The emergence of Hamas as a political wing urged the rapid 
transformation of society by engaging in the struggle through a more militant path, 
while the mother Muslim Brotherhood retained its fundamental approach of 
transformation through ‘peaceful’ and ‘legal’ means.  Having Hamas’ as a political 
wing of the Muslim Brotherhood suited both their agendas. Hamas could use the 
Brotherhood’s resources and legitimacy to gain broader Islamic patronage and in turn 
the Brotherhood could stake a claim, indirectly, in the success of Hamas. However, if 
Hamas’ activities proved to be a failure, the Brotherhood could distance itself from 
Hamas without any danger to their political and ideological position.   
 
It has been argued that Israel encouraged the Islamist groups that emerged in Palestine 
as a means to counter and undermine the PLO and their activities.  However, it can be 
argued that Israel did not breathe life into Hamas; rather, it nurtured and tilled the 
ground for its growth. Israel did not perceive an unprecedented threat from Hamas—in 
part due to its novelty as a young organisation with no substantial track record of 
activities towards Israel.  For example, Israeli television’s Arabic service had 
previously avoided giving interviews or prominence to Palestinian nationalists during 
the Uprising. However, it soon heralded the emergence of a new political leadership to 
challenge the national movement in the OPT, in particular the leadership of the PLO.
335
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Hamas, and to a lesser extent Islamic Jihad, offered a challenge to the PLO in the OPT. 
Hamas as a counter-elite was similar to their PLO-affiliated counter-elites in 
challenging the validity of the traditional leadership, and seeking social as well as 
political structural change. However, in its early years, Hamas differed in its 
unwillingness to be co-opted under the PLO umbrella, accept the validity of the PLO 
leadership, recognise the right of Israel to exist, and concession of Palestinian land.
336
 
Hamas offered an equally nationalist political position which endorsed resistance and 
had mass popular appeal. It drew its leadership from similarly educated sections of the 
population, and included individuals who were not from the traditional notable elite 
families and clans. Its modus operandi was similarly democratic, in terms of 
encouraging mass mobilisation, being inclusive of, and providing welfare support to 
diverse social and economic groups, advancement on the basis of personal merit, and 
endorsement of a nationalist political vision. But its Islamist ideology was not inclusive 
of non-Muslim Palestinian populations, did not offer women similar opportunities or 
value as did the secular alternatives, and did not aim at the establishment of a 
democratic political state but one based on Islamic principles and law.  
 
Hamas nonetheless developed a broad popular base as it combined militant anti-Israeli 
action with a well-developed network of social and economic provision. Its alternative 
vision challenged that of the secular West Bank based counter-elites, who themselves 
began to fragment under that pressure, although it was fiercely resisted by secular 
groups in society who were fearful of its vision of an Islamic state and its resistance to 
any kind of territorial compromise as a solution to the conflict. Despite its growing 
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popularity, by the end of the Intifada, Hamas neither had the capacity to supplant the 
PLO’s political hegemony and leadership nor to reach its goal of ‘eliminating’ Israel.  
By April 1993, the OPT were on the brink of civil war with Hamas’ militant group 
leading the armed struggle against Israel.  The Israeli failure to militarily crush the 
Intifada and its Insider leadership found an interlocutor (PLO-Tunis) to negotiate on 
Israel’s terms. This brought about what would become the Oslo Accords. 337 
 
 
THE OSLO ACCORDS 
 
Following the Gulf War of 1990/91, and in the wake of the disintegration of the USSR, 
the president of the U.S., George Bush, believed a window of opportunity presented 
itself for a new effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.
338
 A conference was 
organised and all parties invited. A reluctant Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, 
was bullied into attending under threat of U.S. withholding vital loan guarantees which 
would enable the absorption of new immigrants from the Soviet Union.
339
 The 
Palestinians, who had sustained the Intifada without reaching a successful resolution 
for the conflict for over three years, were represented by members of the Insider 
counter-elites. Arafat’s Tunis-based PLO was officially excluded but – deprived of 
financial and political resources following a poorly judged endorsement of Saddam 
Hussein during the Gulf War and fearful of becoming a political irrelevance – endorsed 
the peace conference on condition it could “choose” the Palestinian representatives 
                                                          
337
 Usher, G. Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process. (London,1999), 
pp. 9-11 
338
 Lasensky, S. “Underwriting Peace in the Middle East: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Limits of 
Economic Inducements,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 1 (Mar., 2002), p. 90  
339
  Lasensky, S. “Underwriting Peace in the Middle East: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Limits of 
Economic Inducements,” (Mar., 2002), p. 90 
CHAPTER II: PALESTINIAN ELITE FORMATION AND DIVERGENT 
POLITICAL CULTURES 
 
150 | P a g e  
 
from amongst the Insider counter-elites. This served both Palestinian groups: it 
maintained the PLO’s and Arafat’s legitimacy as the ultimate voice of the Palestinians, 
while giving the un-elected representatives from the OPT political cover and legitimacy. 
The mutual dependence of the two elites was evident, but so too was the ability of the 
PLO in Tunis to act as a patron to the ‘clients’ of the Palestinian population.  In an 
effort to further unify Palestinian leadership under their control, Hamas was closely 
courted by the PLO and invited to participate in the PNC’s 20th session in Algiers—in 
September 1991. However, Hamas refused to be a participant as a result of the PLO’s 
rejection of their demand for 40 percent of PNC seats.   
 
In October 1991, the Madrid Peace Conference opened in Spain. Invitations had been 
extended to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians, as well as Russia, the EU and 
others. This was the first time that Israel was to hold face-to-face negotiations and 
‘talks’ with Palestinian entities, although it refused to have any negotiations with the 
PLO.   However, the PLO handpicked the Palestinian delegation and its own 
representatives were not only present at the hotel, but also directed and set-out the 
negotiating scheme for the Palestinian representatives.
340
 As the conference progressed, 
what initially began as a land for peace negotiation soon transpired to peace for peace, 
or security for peace, as Israel sought to unilaterally change the negotiation formula.
341
 
Little progress was made and subsequent U.S.-sponsored talks were held in 
Washington and elsewhere to continue the negotiations. The negotiations faced 
repeated delays, setbacks and resistance. Shamir was unwilling to cede anything, 
preferring to stall the talks in procedural issues. In 1992, Israel’s mass expulsion of key 
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Hamas figures had subdued Hamas’ rigid stance such that it eventually agreed to 
participate in roundtable discussions with the PLO.  But Hamas, like the Insider 
counter-elite, could not agree with the Outsider PLO on the scale and nature of 
concessions which could or should be made.
342
 The Insider elites’ delegation team in 
Washington had their priorities with the “cessation of settlement expansion, defining 
the legal status of the OPT, the applicability of international law, and the inclusion of 
Jerusalem in the interim stage.” 343  On the other, the PLO leadership was more 
concerned with the final status issues particularly their established role and authority 
and re-establishing “the PLO’s international status (with the possibilities for reviving 
Arab financing which that entailed.”344 However, both Hamas and Insider elites were 
unaware that even then Arafat was engaged in his own back-channel direct negotiations 
with Israel. The difference in priority derived from the fact that while the Palestinian 
delegation team in Washington were conducting negotiations (approved by the PLO 
leadership) which held them openly accountable to both the Palestinian people and to 
the PLO as the governing institution, the PLO back-channel negotiations were held in 
secrecy and were not liable to anyone but the PLO leadership—particularly Arafat (and 
Abbas who was conducting the negotiations).
345
 This illustrated a parallel operational 
nature of the PLO and Arafat’s method of governance where both open formal and 
closed informal approaches were simultaneously used to gain best results. Whereas the 
Insiders’ power-base and legitimacy derived from the Palestinian people particularly in 
the OPT, the PLO (Arafat) did not have such an attachment and did not base (or owe) 
its legitimacy in the OPT but rather to the diaspora and their funders. It needed to 
regain legitimacy from Arab neighbours and the international community—not only to 
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legitimise its position as the sole representatives of the Palestinian people committed to 
engage in/reach a political solution to the conflict but consequently to regain the very 
much needed international/Arab financial aid.
346
 As such, Arafat realised that 
promoting a hard-line approach through the open formal negotiation by the Palestinian 
delegation team in Washington would place the Israelis in a more compromising 
position to not only deal with the PLO directly but to also be more willing to concede 
more to PLO demands in the secret informal back-channel talks.
347
 
 
The “Oslo” process was initiated in London by Abu ‘Ala (Ahmad Qurei)—PLO 
representative to direct the delegation for the London talks, Yair Hirschfelds—Israeli 
Academic under the ‘informal’ approval of Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi 
Beilin, and Terje Rød Larsen—Director of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social 
Science, FAFO.
348
 Although Arafat was not informed of the initial ‘unofficial’ meeting 
between the PLO, Israeli representatives and FAFO, his approval and involvement had 
to be obtained in order for negotiations to continue. The secret informal talks with the 
Israeli government began to take place between PLO handpicked Outsider elites, with 
Abu ‘Ala leading the PLO team, and Israeli negotiating officials in Oslo while the 
Palestinian (Insider counter-elites) and Israeli teams were simultaneously negotiating in 
London and Washington. The Insider elites, who were negotiating in Washington and 
London, were left entirely in the dark until the agreement was reached.  The Insider 
negotiating team—headed by Haydar ‘Abd al-Shaf’i—reacted with anger and rejection 
of the agreement particularly for being misled by Arafat and being excluded from the 
negotiations. The Outsider Fatah hawks—particularly Muhammad Jihad and Sakher 
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Habash among other leading PLO figures—also reacted to Arafat’s concession as being 
unnecessary.
349
  In addition to their view of Arafat’s negotiating inefficiency, they 
perceived his method of conducting negotiations as dictatorial, and lacking both 
political preparation and professional bureaucracy.  Many from the Outsider Fatah 
hawks also objected to the notion of a two-state solution arguing that Arafat conceded 
what Palestinians could not afford to give away. As Muhammad Jihad stated:  “Has 
there been a leadership in history which ceded four-fifths of its homeland’s territory 
[the 1948 territory] in addition to abandoning two-thirds of its people, and is now 
bargaining over the remaining fifth of its homeland [the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip]?”350 
 
The Oslo Accords—or Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements - was signed in Washington, D.C. on 13 September 1993. With the 
signing of the Accords, Fatah relinquished its position as the pre-eminent opposition to 
Israel, propelling Hamas into this role.  For the PLO Outsiders, this was a price worth 
paying. Although the Intifada did not end the occupation, it had made clear that the 
status quo was untenable.
351
 But the effort of sustaining it could not be maintained, 
especially in the new international environment in which the PLO itself lacked 
international support, financial stability and direct control over its own constituency. 
With the “arrival” of the counter elites in the OPTs, and their new international role at 
Madrid, the Palestinian political centre was in danger of collapsing.  Arafat saw the 
Oslo Accords as offering salvation: formal recognition and legitimacy for the PLO 
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from the international community; a new relevance to the Palestinian masses for whom 
they had secured peace and an end to occupation; and renewed official endorsement as 
the official representatives of the Palestinian people. The highjacking of negotiations 
by the Outsider elites sidelined the Insider counter-elites, restoring the political 
dominance of the PLO Outsiders. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The formation and composition of the Palestinian elites differed in each epoch of 
Palestinian history. The political culture exhibited by elites at each period of conflict 
differed to some aspect from their elite predecessors and successors as a result of their 
political socialisation and experiences. From the Ottoman Empire, one observed the 
emergence of a Palestinian notable elite whose power was based on landownership and 
who were co-opted by the Porte. In order to maintain their power and status quo, the 
notable elites co-opted or eliminated competitors, aligned themselves with other 
powerful elites, and extorted lands from medium and small-scale landowners.  They 
sustained a political culture based on traditional patriarchal values and norms, which 
utilised patron-client relationships within kinship groups and local communities as the 
primary form of social organisation. The British occupation period also saw similar co-
optation practices by the new administration as with the Ottoman. However, fractures 
emerged among the notable elites as the British encouraged competition between vying 
Palestinian elite families them which undermined emerging Palestinian efforts towards 
national unified resistance.  
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In the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the al-Nakba experience, and the 
establishment of the State of Israel, the Palestinian notable elite leadership were further 
fragmented and where the masses were scattered throughout neighbouring countries. 
The experiences of the masses, however, led to new socialisation processes, including 
pauperisation, mass education, dispossession, and refugee status, engendering both new, 
counter-elites and a new political culture. Palestinians experience living under 
repressive Arab regimes was limited in their political activities and expressions. As a 
result, they had to practise a clandestine political culture where association, recruitment, 
and transactions were managed through informal networks and under-the-table activism.  
Their commitments to social transformation were compromised by the need to placate 
patrimonial host regimes on the one hand and the necessities of their own opaque 
structures and organisations on the other. 
 
Efforts by Arab states to regain Palestinian lands was quelled with the embarrassing 
defeat of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, where Arab regimes were forced to surrender the 
mantle of Palestinian representation to the PLO. The PLO incorporated this 
incongruous combination of an ideological commitment to democratic social 
transformation with a pragmatic continuation of neo-patrimonial operating methods. 
Cut off from the people it represented, the leadership was itself un-elected (other than 
from within its own ranks), and dependent on the financial support of Arab allies which 
it then used to build its legitimacy through neo-patrimonial forms of patron-client 
redistribution via its own social welfare networks. It was characterised by top-down, 
unaccountable leadership and the predominance of informal networks which centred on 
the personal figure of Arafat.  
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Within the OPTs, however, the Israeli military regime had introduced elements of 
democratic process in the form of municipal and mayoral elections. Rather than being 
rejected as an alien political system, these were seized upon by counter-elites who were 
emerging from the necessities of grassroots social activism to support a population 
whose social and economic structures were totally disrupted by Israeli rule. The 
counter-elites came to espouse a political culture which was inclusive, engaged the 
masses in popular participation, rejected tribal, kinship-based or religious divisions in 
favour of national unity, and endorsed democratic political processes.  
 
These counter-elites established grassroots organisations and committees with elected 
leaders which substituted official governing institutions. The Intifada witnessed this 
consolidation of counter-elite and its emergence as a potential rival to the PLO 
Outsiders for the status of representative leadership of the Palestinian people. 
Nevertheless, the interdependent relationship of both entities required collaboration 
rather than competition. The Insider elites considered the Outside leadership the 
government in exile, while the Outside leadership depended on the Insiders to recruit 
and mobilise internal popular support. With the signing of the Oslo Accords, Yasser 
Arafat established the international primacy of the PLO Outsiders and relegated the 
Insider leadership and elites to a junior and subordinate role. With the Accords paving 
the way for the PLO to return to Palestinian lands, the stage was set for two elites – 
with contrasting political cultures – to struggle for the political soul of Palestine. 
157 | P a g e  
 
 
CHAPTER III:   
THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY—A WEAK “STATE” 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter seeks to establish the extent to which the Palestinian Authority came to 
resemble a weak state. It examines the structures of the new governing authority within 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) as they evolved through the series of 
agreements reached between the PLO and Israel after the initial Declaration of 
Principles. The two subsequent agreements that had the most effect on the institutional 
and governing structure of the new government, and shall be discussed in more details 
later, were the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, hereinafter the Gaza-
Jericho Agreement, signed in Cairo on 4
th
 May 1994 and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, hereinafter the Interim Agreement, 
signed in Washington D.C. on the 28
th
 September. Both of the agreements were built 
on the concept of the DOP; however the Interim Agreement came to take precedence 
over all other previously signed documents/agreements, even the DOP, and set-out the 
formation of the new government in Palestine, the Palestinian Authority (PA).
352
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The chapter examines the institutional lay-out of the new PA, including the relative 
powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary. It also examines the accompanying 
institutions of the new political entity, including the security forces, political parties 
and the processes and mechanisms of elections. The chapter demonstrates that, despite 
their supposed democratic credentials,  the weaknesses of the structures created enabled 
parallel, informal, structures of power to be established alongside the formal structures, 
further “weakening” the state-in-waiting. These informal structures centred on the 
person of Arafat himself, allowing him to operate independently of the formal 
institutions. The weakness resulted from the lack of sovereign status for the new PA 
(and the absence of any guarantee that it would ultimately attain sovereignty), and its 
dependence on the goodwill of, and conformity with, the interests of Israel, and the 
sponsor of the peace process, the U.S. Under these circumstances, the PA was 
powerless in its negotiating power, and lacked legitimacy, since satisfying Israeli 
conditionalities only further compromised the PA’s credibility; as such, alternative 
modes of constructing regime legitimacy became necessary for the President and head 
of the PLO. This was achieved through elaboration of informal structures for 
distributing power and patronage, rather than the formal institutions which might have 
embedded democratic norms and processes in the Palestinian entity. 
 
OSLO ACCORDS THE MAKING OF A WEAK-STATE 
According to international law, an occupying power must maintain the existing legal 
institutions and substantive laws, and Israel inherited a variety of Ottoman, British, 
Jordanian, and Egyptian laws across the areas they now governed. These were largely 
maintained following the 1967 occupation of the Palestinian territories, with Israel 
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using an extensive framework of military orders to advance their own interests. No 
efforts were made to unite either the political or the judicial and legal systems, argued 
George Bisharat, and the ambiguity created by this incongruency allowed for Israel 
(and on occasion Palestinian officials) to exploit them to their own advantage. One 
exception was where Israeli military administration set up military legal courts which 
usurped the jurisdiction of indigenous court system, marginalising and rendering them 
ineffective.
353
  In protest against the imposition of the military court system and the 
illegality of the occupation, the Palestinian legal profession boycotted the court system. 
Those who sought to return to practice were ostracised by their fellow protestors. It was 
not until 1995 that the strike was called off. As a result, argued Bisharat, a whole 
generation was deprived of mentorship and legal knowledge, a fact which was to serve 
them ill when it came to negotiating the legal status and institutions of the post-Oslo 
period.
354
   
 
The informal 1993 negotiations that took place in Oslo and the subsequent negotiations 
that followed highlighted the extent to which the Palestinian negotiators’ were 
unprepared, passive and lacked a viable strategy.
355
  The PLO’s financial and political 
disintegration, and fear of being left out of a possible Arab-Israeli peace treaty, 
disposed them towards making far-reaching concessions in exchange for recognition by 
Israel.
356
 It was sold to the Palestinian population as a major achievement of the 
resistance movement and the Intifada; and to the Israelis on the ground that they would 
no longer have to deal with the taxing insurgency.  Part of their failure to construct an 
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alternative framework and position was attributed to their lack of prior planning, 
absence of comprehensible and realistic strategic planning, and failure to consult with 
the legitimate Palestinian Insider leadership, i.e. Insider elites as to the priorities and 
issues for Palestinians ‘on the ground’. 
.  
There was also a lack of parity in power relations between the negotiating parties.   The 
Oslo Process was based on the presupposition that this was an inter-state rather than an 
inter-group conflict. But the PLO was not a state, and lacked a state’s capacities, 
leaving the PLO leadership relatively vulnerable and easily manipulated.
357
  The 
signing of the Oslo Agreements under these circumstances set in motion a systematic 
institutionalisation of practices and functions that encapsulated the making of a weak-
state structure.  By signing the DOP, the PLO surrendered its role as the main political 
opponent to Israel. Moreover, it relinquished its political program of calling for a 
sovereign state, right to self-determination, Jerusalem as its capital, and the refugees’ 
right of return.  Thus, the PLO contributed to maintaining the Israeli settlement policy 
which would further fragment the OPT.  Furthermore, recognition of Israel’s right to 
exist and their legitimacy brought into questions the legitimacy of the Palestinian 
struggle for self-determination.
358
 As such, the DOP appeared to its critics as the 
antithesis to the national aspiration. 
 
The DOP  aimed to ‘end’ the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to forge a mutual 
recognition of their political rights and legitimacy where Israel recognised the PLO as 
the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the PLO in turn 
acknowledged the right of Israel to exist.  There was an underlying presumption, but 
                                                          
357
 Barak, O. “The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2000,” Journal of Peace 
Research 42, no. 6 (Nov. 2005), p. 720 
358
 Khatib, G. Palestinian Politics and the Middle East Peace Process, (2010), p. 107 
CHAPTER III: THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY—A WEAK “STATE” 
 
161 | P a g e  
 
never explicit, of the DOP being fashioned upon the Western concept of a liberal 
democratic state, yet it was not designed to establish permanent governing institutions 
but rather a transitional entity.
359
 A proposed Palestinian Interim Self-Government 
Authority would be established which would administer  the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
for a transitional period, not exceeding five years from the date of the signing of the 
Gaza-Jericho Agreement on the 4
th
 of May, 1994.
360
 The new provisional government 
would be administered by PLO officials (as stipulated by Article 6 of the Oslo Accord) 
during its provisional stage until the presidential election, in which the president would 
be chosen and national elections for a legislative council. Therefore for the provisional 
period, the PLO Central Committee (PLOCC) decreed that Arafat would be the 
president of the provisional PA. The PLOCC also tasked the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization Executive Committee (PLOEC) to construct a list of who were to be the 
provisional PA officials during this period.
361
 The composition therefore of the PA 
government and its officials would be ready when the PLO would take office.  
 
The Oslo Accord proposed a five year transitional period within which a permanent 
settlement or solution based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 
would be agreed.
362
 In theory, the full transfer of power and authority would have been 
completed by the end of the five years. The DOP therefore set in motion and defined 
the ‘role’ and features of the new government—an interim government tasked with 
setting up necessary institutions and infrastructures. Unlike the broader experiences of 
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decolonisation processes elsewhere, the DOP was ambiguous with no defined end 
result for the institution building.
363
 The PLO failed to get inclusion a clear 
commitment from Israel regarding military withdrawal, an end to settlement expansion, 
or a confirmation of the right of return.  Critics of the Oslo Accords argued that the lack 
of an unbiased broker (the U.S. being the broker) had given unprecedented power to the 
already dominant Israeli delegation during the negotiation process.
364
  
 
 AGREEMENT ON THE GAZA STRIP AND THE JERICHO AREA 
On May 4
th
, 1994, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed in Cairo between the PLO 
and the State of Israel. According to the agreement, withdrawal of Israeli military 
forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho areas was to be completed within three weeks 
immediately following the signing of the agreement. Concurrently with the withdrawal, 
Israel was to deploy its “remaining military forces” to the Settlements areas—Gush 
Katif, Erez, and the Gaza Strip settlements— and Military Installation Areas for 
external and internal security reasons.
365
 On completion of the withdrawal of the Israeli 
military from the Gaza Strip and Jericho and the transfer of power and responsibilities 
to the PA, the Israeli Civil Administration was to be dissolved.  Under Article III a 
Joint Civil Affairs and Cooperation committee (hereinafter refer to as the “CAC”) as 
well as two Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees, were to be set up for the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho in order to provide coordination and cooperation between the Israeli 
administration and the PA in matters relating to civil affairs.
366
 Their function was to 
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coordinate on day-to-day matters i.e. civil matters such as transfer of powers and 
responsibilities, Palestinian infrastructure, passage between Gaza and Jericho, day-to-
day employment permits, hospitalizations, transportation licensing, transfer of 
information, joint projects etc.
367
 The Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees 
would each deal with the day-to-day civil affairs of their respective areas; however 
Jericho was to be given the task of coordinating relations between the PA, military 
government and the Civil Administration in the rest of the West Bank.
368
 The 
withdrawal of the Israeli Military Government from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area 
was aimed at allowing for the establishment, and the transfer of power and 
responsibilities to the PA with the stipulation that it would still be a necessity to 
cooperate and coordinate between the new government and the Israeli Administration. 
These conditions would ingrain the Israeli Administration in every aspect of the 
Palestinian day-to-day life which would sustain their control and provide up-to-date 
firsthand knowledge of Palestinian activities. These provisions therefore set up a 
framework where the functioning of the new government was to be intertwined with 
the military administration with regards to day-to-day civil affairs. It left no room for 
genuine independent decision making by the PA. 
 
Article III of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement sets out the processes, infrastructure and 
where the Palestinian Authority would be located. The offices for the new PA were to 
be located in Jericho and the Gaza Strip until the creation of a Legislative Council 
through election as stipulated in the DOP.
369
 The agreement laid the foundation for the 
structure and composition of the PA in the meantime, whereby it would consist of one 
                                                          
367
 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area--Cairo, (May 4, 1994), Annex II 
368
 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area--Cairo, (May 4, 1994), Annex II, Article 1, 
Paragraph 2. 
369
 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area--Cairo, (May 4, 1994), Article III, paragraph 6 
CHAPTER III: THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY—A WEAK “STATE” 
 
164 | P a g e  
 
body with 24 members and holding responsibility for carrying out all legislative, 
executive and judicial responsibilities transferred to them under the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement.
370
 The PA would inherit departments from the Civil Administration and 
would have it within its power to create new departments and “subordinate 
administrative units” necessary for the implementation and execution of its new 
responsibilities. In other words, the PA was to be given the authority to determine its 
own internal procedures. Nevertheless, they would still have to coordinate with the 
Israeli administration regarding infrastructure and day-to-day civil affairs. The PA 
would be given territorial jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area (with the 
exception of Settlements and Military Installation Area), functional jurisdiction 
(excluding foreign relations, internal security and public order of Settlements, Military 
Installation Area, Israelis and external security), and personal jurisdiction.
371
   
 
The Agreement also set out and defined the powers and responsibilities of, as well as 
limitation for, the Palestinian Authority. The PA was to have legislative, executive and 
judicial power, with an emphasis on the separation of powers where justice would 
(should) be administered through an independent judiciary. The PA would be given 
many of the powers and functions of a state, inter alia, keeping population 
statistics/census, issuing licences and documents, establishing departments, authorities 
and institutions, formulating and implementing policies and employing staff. However, 
the agreement prohibited the PA from engaging in the area of foreign relations as in the 
establishment of consulates or embassies, having diplomatic posts or dealings 
abroad.
372
 Neither were foreign embassies, consulates or missions allowed to be 
established in the Gaza Strip or Jericho. However, the PA was to be allowed to conduct 
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negotiations and sign agreements with other states and international organisations only 
on the condition that they were economic agreements, regard the provision of 
assistance to the PA, implementation of regional development plans, agreements that 
would enter into the “framework of the multilateral negotiations,” or agreements that 
provided culture, scientific and educational enhancement. This would be the only 
instance in which the foreign state or international organisation could establish a 
“representative office” in the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area.373 Furthermore the 
Agreement gave Israel control over the external and (some) internal security of the 
territories. Israel would have control over the Egyptians and Jordanian borders with 
Gaza and the West Bank, respectively. With the exception of crossings into Israel, there 
would only be two main exits for Palestinians: the Raffah crossing from Gaza into 
Egypt and the Allenby Bridge Crossing from the West Bank into Jordan. In addition, 
the Agreement would grant Israel absolute power to take any necessary step in order to 
provide and ensure internal security and public order for Israelis and the Settlements.
374
 
However, it would provide the PA with the power to establish a Palestinian Police force 
that would be responsible for the Palestinians’ internal security in the Gaza and Jericho 
Areas, with the exception of specified locations agreed upon in the Agreement. The PA 
would not be allowed to establish an armed force, nor manufacture or import any arms 
or ammunitions. Military force, which is a given right of states, was to be solely 
Israel’s right and responsibility, Israel also being responsible for the provision of 
ammunition, arms and equipment for the Palestinians.
375
  
 
Article XII asserted that both Israel and the PA were to abstain from incitement or 
hostile propaganda against the other. Each would be expected to take legal measures in 
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order to “prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within 
their jurisdiction” which would inhibit their freedom of expression. Further, the PA was 
expected to cooperate with Israel in combating criminal activities, inter alia, offenses 
against properties and vehicles.
376
 Article XIV emphasised the importance of human 
rights and the Rule of Law, and the responsibility of both parties to upold 
“internationally-accepted norms and principles.”377 Nonetheless, Israel and the PA were 
given the authorization to “take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of 
terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling 
under the other’s authority and against their property,…[moreover to]… take legal 
measures against offenders.  The PA would take all measures necessary to prevent 
hostile acts against the Settlements and the Military Installation Area. In like manner, 
the Israeli administration would also assure that the Israeli Settlements do not pursue 
hostile undertakings against Palestinians.
378
  
 
The significance of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement is that it designed the foundations for 
the functions, duties, and limitations of power for the PA. Although it gave some power 
to the PA, it nevertheless retained complete control for Israel to oversee, revoke, or 
approve any PA decisions which they felt were a threat to the security of Israel and its 
citizens. Although these provisions under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement provided the PA 
with some form of ‘authority’ over internal affairs, this was limited to periphery affairs 
which would not threaten the Israeli interests. The important sovereign powers such as 
those regarding foreign affairs, diplomacy, external security and border control as well 
as affairs relating to the settlement and military areas inside the West Bank, were 
reserved for the Israeli administration. Indeed, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement linked 
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every aspect of the PA’s own security to that of the Israeli administration. The PA was 
unable to develop its own external security apparatus and was thus dependent on Israeli 
military force for ‘protection’ from outside penetration. Even in exercising its authority 
over ‘internal’ Palestinian security, it was dependent on co-ordination with, and 
supplied from, Israel.  
 
In sum, the Agreements allowed the PA certain degrees of ‘autonomy’ but only within 
the confines of, and defined by, Israel’s own security and interests. The ultimate 
‘weakness’ of the new PA entity was clear – it lacked sovereignty and was dependent 
on, and constrained by, Israel. Whilst the DOP suggested this was a temporary state of 
affairs, without a clearly established end-game, which included sovereign state status, 
the PA would always have a question mark hanging over it, both in terms of legitimacy 
for its own people, and its capacity to deliver an ultimately satisfactory territorial 
settlement for them. 
 
THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP 
Signed on the 24
th
 of September 1995 in Taba, Egypt and endorsed four days later in 
Washington D.C., the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
(formerly Jericho Area) and the Gaza Strip, also known as Oslo II, became the primary 
vehicle for establishing the subsequent final status negotiations. The interim self-
government was only one part of the peace process outlined in Oslo II – the other was a 
commitment to negotiations on permanent status which would conclude with the 
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. But, it soon became 
apparent that the definition for “peace” as prescribed in the Interim Agreement would 
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be based upon “unconditional security for the Israelis and conditional security for the 
Palestinians.”379 This term of ‘conditionality’ would later have ramifications on the 
nature and structure of PA political institutions and reaching a final status on the basis 
of the UN’s territorial determinations. 
 
Despite the conditional tone introduced into the Interim Agreement, it provided for the 
rights of Palestinians to hold “free and general political elections.” In stressing the need 
to establish Palestinian institutions with democratically elected representatives, 
observers were hopeful that the foundations of a democratic state were being laid. The 
elections would therefore be a preparatory phase in which Palestinian rights were to be 
recognised and a democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions.
380
 
As such, the agreement set the tone for the PA political structure, its role and function. 
 
Chapter I of the Interim Agreement called for the transfer of power to the “Council” 
(Palestinian Authority) following its inauguration whereby the Israeli Civil 
Administration in the West Bank would be dissolved and the Israeli military 
government withdrawn. The PA would assume all powers and responsibilities with the 
exception of pertinent “powers and responsibilities” which shall be reserved for, and 
exercised by, only the Israeli military government. The transfer of power to a 
Palestinian police force would be in phases. In addition to the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement’s proposal for the CAC and the Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees 
for the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the Interim Agreement called for District Civil 
Liaison Offices to be set up in the West Bank. These offices would provide 
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“coordination and cooperation in civil affairs between the council and Israel…”381 
whereby Israel would still be directly involved and engaged in the civil affairs of the 
territories under the PA. 
 
THE ARRANGEMENT OF AREAS A, B, AND C 
As the Agreement progressed, however, its positive attributes began to give way to a 
clear imposition of Israel’s security interests over the sovereign possibilities for the PA. 
Although the DOP had agreed on a temporary administrative partition of the OPT into 
three zones, Areas A, B, and C, the Interim Agreement provided the specification for 
the zoning which would serve as a security arrangement for ‘both’ Palestinians and 
Israelis. Area A, comprised of the major Palestinian cities, was granted full autonomy 
under the Palestinian Authority’s jurisdiction with the exception of routes and vicinities 
important to Jewish holy sites, Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus and Shalom al Israel 
synagogue in Jericho
382
, to be manned by Joint mobile units (both Israeli and 
Palestinian security). Area B in contrast was made up mostly of the rural communities 
and therefore would have a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces. Yet, the 
Palestinian Authority would only be granted partial autonomy over civil administration 
and control over public orders for Palestinians while Israel had principal control over 
security for “protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.”383 Area C, 
classified as the largest area, which constituted approximately 62 percent of the West 
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Bank, would be under the full control of Israel.
384
 Area C was of particular importance 
to Israel because it contained major Israeli settlements and natural resources, i.e., the 
main water sources and aquifers for both Israel and the OPT, and agricultural lands for 
Palestinians living in Areas A and B.
385
  Of the four main water aquifers which supplies 
water to Israel and the OPT—with the exception of the Mountain Aquifer which runs 
along the border between Israel and the OPT, the remaining three water aquifers are 
situated entirely in the West Bank. The water reserve from these three aquifers was 
largely earmarked for Israeli consumption. The Western Aquifer (primary supplier of 
water) had 95 percent of its water extracted by Israel, the Northern Aquifer with 70 
percent, and the Eastern Aquifer by 37 percent mainly by settlers.
386
 The division of the 
OPT into ‘Areas’ and the ambiguity of the partition agreement allowed for re-
interpretation, particularly for resource rich and settlement populated Area C. Israel’s 
assertion of complete control over Area C was a strategic gain for them and a costly 
concession for the Palestinians.  
 
The Agreement proposed Israeli redeployments to take place in three phases from 
Areas A, B and C.  The transfer of internal security to the Palestinian police would 
similarly be conducted within three phases, with an ‘interval’ of six months between 
them, and completed within 18 months, with exceptions being made where they 
involved “issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel’s overriding 
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responsibility for Israelis and borders.”387 Redeployment would be subject to revision, 
i.e. assess the situation whether to re-evaluate or proceed to the next phase, only after 
six months following the completion of the first phase of redeployment. This of course 
made implementation of the Agreements conditional, allowing for what could become 
perpetual postponements on important issues.  
 
The Interim Agreement also established clear restrictions and demands on the ability 
and role of the PA which was often in contradiction to each other thus infusing the 
agreement with ambiguity which could be reinterpreted. While on the one hand the 
undertone of the Interim Agreement implied an empowerment of the PA by providing 
them with ‘symbolic’, though limited, governance within the OPT as they proceeded 
towards a permanent status; on the other hand pertinent responsibilities and power 
necessary for the PA to conduct its function as an interim-governing body over the 
OPT were either given to, or remained with, the Israeli military government. The 
ambiguities in the Agreement also affected other structures of the new government, 
which was designed by both the PLO and Israel, particularly the composition, 
allocation and separation of powers within the new Palestinian Authority. 
 
PALESTINIAN COUNCIL 
The Interim Agreement set out the structure of the new Palestinian Interim Self-
Government Authority where the Palestinian Council would be elected by Palestinian 
residents of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. The Council would be composed 
of 82 elected representatives, presided over by the Ra’is (President) of the Executive 
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Authority. The Council of the PA would also have a committee which would exercise 
Executive Authority over the Council as well as determining “internal procedures” and 
the “decision making process.” The election for the Council and the Ra’is of the 
Executive Authority of the Council would be held simultaneously.
388
  
 
Of most importance to the structure of the PA was the formulation of the power of the 
Speaker of the Council. According to the Interim Agreement, upon the Council’s 
inauguration, a Speaker would be directly elected by the Council to administer and to 
preside over the affairs and meetings of the Council. Moreover the Speaker would be 
expected to introduce proposals for Council voting and to disclose those outcomes. He 
or she would also present, for the Council’s approval, internal formal procedures for 
regulating voting, decision making process and so forth.  The function of the Council 
and its subsidiaries, their internal procedures and regulations would be governed by the 
principles established under the Interim Agreement as well as according to the Basic 
Law to be created specifically for the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority 
(and the law to be adopted by the Council). However, the Basic Law should not be in 
contradiction to the provisions under the Interim Agreement.
389
 
 
Although the PA was given authority over certain internal procedures, their power was 
limited and defined by the Interim Agreement. It granted the PA the right to formulate 
and implement policies, draw up and sign contracts, and employ staff necessary for the 
“realization of Palestinian self-government”.  Nevertheless, the Agreement maintained 
the same inclination of restriction as had the DOP and Gaza-Jericho Agreement, with 
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the PA restricted from establishing foreign relations i.e. embassies, consulates or any 
other form of diplomatic staff or establishment abroad. Exceptions that were permitted 
under the DOP and Gaza-Jericho Agreement also applied where the PA was granted 
power to conduct and conclude negotiations with foreign states and international 
donors/organisations however only in areas where it would provide economic, cultural, 
educational assistance, as well as contribute to regional development plans and 
multilateral negotiations.
390
  
 
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
According to the Interim Agreement, the PA would have a committee to implement 
executive power i.e. the Executive Authority. The Ra’is, or President that would head 
this Executive Authority would be elected by the Palestinian people concurrently with 
the election of Council members and would be an ex-officio member of the Executive 
Authority.
391
 The Ra’is of the Executive Authority was given the authority to appoint 
non-council members—not to exceed twenty percent of the total members of the 
Executive Authority—to the Executive Council.392 However, all members of the 
Executive Authority were to be members of the Council, chosen and proposed by the 
Ra’is of the Executive Authority, and approved by the Council. Thus the composition 
of the Executive Authority would be the Ra’is—highest official in the PA—and the 
Council of Ministers, appointed by the Ra’is.  
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In order to prevent the Executive Authority from abusing their position, a system of 
checks and balances was introduced with the Interim Agreement where the Executive 
Authority would be “monitored” by the Legislative Council.393 Moreover, the executive 
power granted to the Executive Authority was specifically to “act on behalf of the 
Council” and not as a higher office to govern over the legislative or judiciary power. 
The design of the different offices allocated specific duties and responsibilities to each 
which provide space for independent decision making and action.
394
  By providing each 
of these offices with their own duties and responsibilities served as a check and balance 
system.   
 
LEGISLATIVE 
The PA was given legislative power within its jurisdiction to “promulgate legislation 
including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.” The Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC), as it came to be known, did not take precedence over the 
Executive Authority: however it did serve to monitor and balance the work and power 
of the Executive Office through its legislation, regulations and laws. Nevertheless, any 
promulgated legislation by the PLC would first have to be submitted to a CAC 
Legislation Subcommittee where they would decide, by request from Israel, whether 
such legislation would be beyond the jurisdiction of the PA or in conflict with the 
condition of the Agreement.
395
 If the Legislation Subcommittee would be unable to 
reach a decision within 15 days after the submission of the legislation, the proposed 
legislation would therefore be referred to a board of review consisting of judges from 
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the OPT and Israel who would then compose a “written informal rules of procedure.” 
Legislation would only take effect if the board of review decide that it did not infringe 
on Israel’s security.396 Furthermore, Israeli laws and military orders—in effect in the 
Gaza Strip and Jericho Area before the signing of the Agreement—would still be 
enforced unless otherwise specified or amended in the Agreement.  Although the 
ultimate legislative power rested with the Palestinian Authority, the Ra’is of the 
Executive Authority was given authority to initiate or propose legislation to the 
Palestinian Authority, promulgate legislation approved by the Council, and issue 
secondary or regulate legislation adopted by the Council.
397
 This would provide a check 
and balance on the legislative power of the Palestinian Authority, to be regulated by the 
Ra’is of the Executive Authority. Conversely, this gave power to the Ra’is of the 
Executive Authority which would later have far reaching implications for the PLC and 
the Judiciary.  
 
JUDICIARY 
The Judicial system created under the new PA was considered by many to be the 
weakest area of the government. Established to be an independent entity with 
independent Palestinian courts and tribunals,
398
 the Palestinian judicial system failed to 
have the autonomy it needed to be impartial. The formulated Palestinian Judiciary 
system was envisioned to have independent judges and courts of various types and 
levels. Judges’ appointment, dismissal, questioning and promotion were to be as 
prescribed under the law and based on merits. Moreover, the Interim Agreement 
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provided clauses where if any organisations or individuals are affected by the decision 
of the Ra’is of the Executive Authority, members of the Executive Authority or the 
Council, or believe that their actions exceed their authority under the law, they can 
apply to the relevant Palestinian Judicial court for review of those actions.
399
  
 
The judiciary was to serve as regulators, moderators, objective judges, and 
implementers of the law. Thereby, it was neither subordinate to nor required to answer 
to any authority other than the law itself. As envisioned by architects of the new 
Palestinian Basic Law “Judges shall be independent, and shall not be subject to any 
authority other than the authority of law while exercising their duties. No other 
authority may interfere with the judiciary or with the exercise of justice.”400 It was thus 
intended to serve as a check and balance between the Executive Authority and the 
Legislative Council. 
 
However, in praxis, what eventually emerged were two variant judicial systems in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank reflecting their differential pre-existing legal status and 
bodies of law deriving from the Israeli, Jordanian, Egyptian, British and Ottoman laws. 
As a result the Palestinian judicial system exhibited a contradictory system of rules and 
laws, which collectively blurred the areas between its own role and function and those 
of the Executive Authority. The incongruency in the laws created a fertile ground for 
corruption and the use of informal structures in order to bridge the differences between 
the two. The judicial system became a subject of much discussion for its lack of 
transparency, judicial independence, and susceptibility to outside influence and 
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authority, particularly from the office of the Executive Authority. Moreover, the 
judicial system under the stipulation of the Interim Agreement was subject to Israeli 
policies and military court orders which also subordinated the Palestinian judicial 
system to Israeli security interests. Thus in due course, the intended ‘democratic’, and 
independent Palestinian judicial system became an object of manipulation for those in 
power.  
 
The Interim Agreement therefore had both benefits and drawbacks for the new PA.  On 
the one hand, it seemed to explicitly endorse the notion of democratic state-building 
through its stipulation of elected institutions, separation of powers, independent offices, 
and an established system of checks and balances. On the other hand, it reflected the 
superior negotiating power of Israel in the limitations and constraints that it put on the 
development of the structure and authority of the PA which might have amounted to 
Palestinian sovereignty, and its subordination of every aspect of the PA’s function 
(from its territorial jurisdiction, joint-liaison, to day-to-day management) to Israel’s 
own security interests. Established Israeli military orders were the default position for 
the legal system, and joint committees reviewed all new legislation before it could be 
approved. Thus far from being a clear preparation for statehood, the PA represented a 
governing body to administer Israeli regulations in the OPT with no clear end in sight 
for a permanent solution other than a time-line within which it should be determined. 
Whatever “strength” the new PA was to have, it would be undermined by the 
“weakness” which was embedded in the system through the absence of sovereignty, 
dependence on Israeli good will, subordination to Israeli security (and other) interests, 
and a muddled and incongruous legal framework to underpin the checks-and-balances 
supposedly established in the institutional arrangements.  
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THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITY FORCES—DIVIDE AND RULE 
TACTICS 
Nowhere was this contradiction more evident than in the devolution of internal security 
from the Israeli administration to the PA. The Oslo Accord gave the PA unequivocal 
power to establish a “strong police force.” At the same time, it subordinated the power 
and autonomy of the PA through obligated cooperation between the PA and the Israeli 
security forces and strict limitations on the PA security forces’ competence.401 The 
Gaza-Jericho agreement established a Palestinian Police Force; while the Interim 
Agreement (Article IV) defined the role and function of the Palestinian Police Force, 
also known as the General Security Services (GSS). It was to be divided into six 
sections: Civil Police, Public Security, Preventive Security, Presidential Security (Amn 
Al Ri’asah), and the Intelligence and Emergency Services and Rescue (Al-Difa’a Al 
Madani). The Palestinian Police Force established under the Agreements would 
provide internal security, social order, intelligence, internal border control and many 
other services but would not have a military-defence capacity.  However, authority over 
external security and border control for the OPT were reserved for the Israeli military 
government. Although the Gaza-Jericho agreement initially limited their number to 
9,000, the Interim Agreement allotted the PA a security force capped at 12,000 
personnel.
402
  Besides the Palestinian Police Force and the Israeli military forces, no 
other military forces were to be established or in operation in the OPT. Moreover, no 
organisation or individuals were to manufacture, sell, possess or acquire (except that 
prescribed under the agreement for the police force) any form of weapons, ammunition, 
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explosives, etc.
403
 With these limitations, sets of regulations, and structure prescribed 
by the agreements, a unique Palestinian Police force was established, one which 
ultimately came to police on behalf of Israel more than the Palestinians. This was in 
line with the prescriptions of the agreements that required the PA to detain, prosecute 
and “systematically act against” any Palestinian expression (or suspected perpetrating 
acts) of violence and terror, acts which became more prolific as the peace process failed 
to deliver.
404
  In time the police force would become a tool in the hands of the PA as a 
means to maintain and enforce social order, coerce oppositional and dissident voices, 
and to gain and sustain its own ‘legitimacy’.  
 
The PA was able to construct and maintain a fully operational police force, though 
within the limitation of the agreements, within a short period of time because an 
informal police force was in existence prior to the peace process. The Oslo Accord 
allowed for the transfer and training of the existing (illicit) PLO revolutionary military 
police to serve in the capacity of a legitimate police force under the PA.  The PLO’s 
multiple “police” forces, already functional prior to Oslo, had served in different 
capacities in the diaspora as well as inside the OPT during the Intifada.  For instance, 
the PLO Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (PASC)—the Palestinian military 
police—had been in existence since 1969 to unite, coordinate, control and keep “order” 
relations between PLO extensions and organisations under its ‘umbrella’ for the armed-
struggle.  It also served as a paramilitary body where, in Jordan, it threatened the social 
cohesiveness of the country and challenged the Jordanian government in its ability to 
enforce control over the population. Between 1968 and1970, the PLO police had 
become a hazard to the Jordanian government, ‘policing’ through kidnaps, arrests, 
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detainments and threats of Jordanian service personnel and soldiers.
405
 In response, 
King Hussein expelled the PLO to Syria and Lebanon between 1970 and 1971. In 
Lebanon, the PASC reorganised and served in the capacity of a civil police force 
through the 1970s and 1980s, overseeing the welfare of the Palestinian refugee camps 
and maintaining discipline among PLO factions. They became a powerful entity, 
resisting interference from the Lebanese police even to the point of barring access to 
Lebanese officials entering the camps.
406
 Despite being subject to charges of corruption 
and ill-treatment against PASC guerrilla/police commanders, the PLO depended on 
them to maintain “order” in its domains.407  
 
The PLO also operated an elite Force 17, created in the 1970s to provide security for 
Arafat and PLO officials. This elite force engaged in clandestine intelligence activities 
and in the 1980s was foremost in coordinating attacks against Israel and opposing 
Palestinian groups.
408
 Force 17 was in essence an informally run operation, with Arafat 
retaining control over it through co-optation and by condoning corruption as he sought  
functional social control and to assure the survival of the PLO and its subsidiaries.  
 
Similar practices were found within the PLO intelligence services. While in Tunis 
various security breaches in the PLO’s intelligence branch—including the murder of 
heads of intelligence and discovery of an Israeli informant inside the PLO’s top 
echelon, led Arafat to reshuffle and reorganise the PLO’s intelligence sector and merge 
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two of its highest level intelligence agencies, the United Security Agency and the 
Central Intelligence agency into one agency called the General Intelligence Service 
(GIS). This Tunis based intelligence agency was to be overseen by Colonel Amin al-
Hindi (PLO’s main liaison officer with Western Intelligence agencies), Tariq Abu 
Rajab and Fakhri Shaffurah.
409
 Colonel al-Hindi eventually took over the position of 
overall director of the intelligence community when the Tunis based PLO returned to 
Palestine. With the large number of agents under his direction as well as for his many 
powerful connections with the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies, he became 
a powerful presence in his own right. The cultures and practices of these various 
security arms of the PLO, was transferred along with the PLO military police force into 
the new PA police force under the PA.  However, there are some distinctive differences 
between the PLO police force drawn from the diaspora and those who came from 
within the OPT themselves.  
 
Firstly, the PLO police who originated from within the OPT drew their roots from the 
local resistance movement against the Israeli occupation regime (rather than from 
policing Palestinians abroad or fighting other forces). They were closely linked to the 
Insider counter-elites and sought to maintain unity among the Palestinian population 
and as much control over it. Secondly, the formal judicial processes were augmented 
within the OPTs by tribal and traditional courts, presided over by the community or 
village elders, where disputes were settled or the accused judged and “sentenced.”  The 
local Insiders in the PLO ‘police’ force had some influence on the traditional court 
system and its decision making process through its members who were locally born, 
were student activists or former prisoners, or who were involved with the traditional 
courts. The Insider PLO police force had come to view themselves as the internal 
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security of the OPT which was an alternative to Israeli policing. They were the 
informal ‘social’ enforcers of the law in the absence of a legitimate formal governing 
entity and, as Brynjar Lia comments, they perceived their existence in the OPT as an 
entity not to “terrorise people” but rather to “help people.”410  They did not perceive 
themselves as outlaws because their laws and rules were based on the PLO 
Revolutionary Penal Code of 1979.
411
 They also enforced the imposition of the death 
penalty, which was granted by the Revolutionary Penal Code, on individuals who have 
committed and found guilty of offenses.
412
 This ‘informal’ police force did come with 
its own maladies taking into account that there was no official governing structure to 
mandate its activities, but it still represented an alternative policing culture from that 
brought in with the Tunis-based PLO police.  
 
With the preparation for the establishment of the PA, PLO leaders were now faced with 
restructuring and transforming its paramilitary informal police structure into a formal 
legitimate law enforcement body.  Although the Police Force fell under the Ministry of 
Interior, the ministry itself was quickly ‘hijacked’ by Arafat who made it his personal 
responsibility. PLO elite police forces were transplanted onto the new police system. 
For instance, the former Force 17 was given the new title Presidential Security, al-Amn 
Al Ri’asah, and was headed by the same officer, Faisal Abu Sharah. Arafat gave 
individuals who had held leadership positions in the PLO security apparatus similar 
responsibilities in the new PA, including for example Colonel Amin al-Hindi, Tariq 
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Abu Rajab, Fakhri Shaffurah, Colonel Musa Arafat, Ahmed Qurei, and Muhammad 
Dahlan.
413
 
 
In order to provide some order for the police forces, they were to be consolidated under 
the GSS, which according to the Oslo Accord should be the highest and only security 
office. However Arafat created separate and more powerful security organisations 
under his direct supervision. The two security units that reported directly to Arafat were 
the Presidential Security (which provided security, counter-terrorism, and tracked anti-
opposition activities) and the Special Security Force (SSF), (that monitored and 
gathered information on opposition groups inside the OPT, conducted internal 
investigations on other Palestinian security and intelligence units).
414
  Therefore the 
Palestinian Security Services (PSS) came to be consisted of three units: GSS, SSF, and 
the Presidential Security.
415
 One security apparatus worth mentioning, although under 
the rubric of the GSS Civil Police, was the Preventive Security Force (PSF) (al-Amn al-
Wiqa'i)—the PA’s largest intelligence force in operation in the West Bank (under the 
command of Jibril Rajoub) and Gaza Strip (under Muhammad Dahlan)—responsible 
for preventive actions against terrorist attacks and opposition groups, and intelligence 
gathering in Israel. The PSF became a particularly powerful entity with a reputation for 
human rights violation i.e., torture, violence, abduction of civilians, and torturing to 
death of detainees.
416
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These early manoeuvres by Arafat to superimpose the PLOs diaspora police force onto 
the new PSS created by the peace process indicated the weakness of the PSS as an 
institution. Lacking the legitimacy which would come from serving a sovereign state, 
and lacking the capacity which would come from a professional and democratic 
culture, the police force became an instrument for Arafat, personally, in his efforts to 
exert his own control over the OPT. Firstly, by multiplying and expanding the various 
organisations within the PSS, he could keep the various “strong men” of the PLO in 
competition with each other for his patronage. But with multiple organisations and 
intra-rivalry, there soon emerged issues of overlapping duties, a lack of coordination, 
indistinct jurisdiction, and dysfunctions which weakened the capacity of the police as a 
national institution. Secondly, given the PAs lack of sovereign authority to enforce law 
and order demanded by the agreements, Arafat saw the establishment of parallel 
structures as a way of getting round restrictions. The structure of the PSS met the 
conditions of the peace agreements; but the units within often functioned autonomously 
from them: they were above the law. The leeway they were given for their activities 
derived from the fact that the PA needed legitimacy as the governing body. However, 
such a freehand approach encouraged clandestine, and often violent, activities causing a 
backlash effect and de-legitimising the state. This was not unique to the PA but is a 
common feature of policing in post-colonial environments. As observes Lia, societies 
that emerge from violent conflicts usually have a blend of formal state function and 
informal revolutionary-based policing where the informal structure will often have an 
“ill defined mission, a secretive and fluid organization and weak legitimacy/’collective 
authorization’.”417 Rather than operate as an entity collectively authorised by the 
society, the security sector often acts independently on behalf of a minority to 
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‘legitimise’ the group’s status and rule.  As a result, what emerged were redundant PSS 
units competing with each other, at the encouragement of Arafat for his favour.  
 
There were various claims as to the number of agencies under Arafat but due to the 
clandestine nature of some of the intelligence agencies it was not certain how many of 
them were in (co) existence. Although the security apparatus under the GSS were to be 
accountable to the PA, the PSS functioned in a patrimonial fashion where Arafat had 
direct supervision over several “police” sectors and indirect “management” over all of 
them, and nearly all reported directly to Arafat.
418
   The overblown number of security 
and police organisations was argued by Arafat to be his only means of preventing 
Israeli-intelligence penetration and assassination attempts by radical Palestinian groups. 
Two of the largest police sectors, the Palestinian National Security Forces and the 
Civilian Police, comprised three-quarters of all salaried police employees.
419
 However 
the Presidential Security/Force-17 was not far behind. In 1994 after the formation of 
the PA, Palestinian Police employed 10,000 personnel (but did not include the branches 
and sectors which were secretive and only known to Arafat). By 1995, there were 
16,800 employees and two years later in 1997, the number had more than doubled to 
42,000 employed police personnel.  
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Table 1 
The Palestinian Police: Legal and Semi-Legal Units, 1994-1997 
September 1994 January 1995 1997 
Civilian Police    2,500  2,600  10,500 
National Security Force (PNSF)  5,000  7,900  15,000-16,500 
General Intelligence Service (GIS)  1,000  2,500  3,500 
Emergency Service and Rescue  
 Civil Defence   500  400  550 
 Coastal Police  ---   600  1,200 
Semi-Legal police branches  
 Preventive Security Agency (PSA) c. 600  c. 1,300-1,800 4,500-5,000 
 Presidential Security/Force-17 c. 100  c. 1,000  5,500 
 Military Intelligence      1,000 
Total     c. 10,000 c. 16,800 c. 42,000 
 
Source:  Brynjar Lia, A Police Force Without a State: A History of the Palestinian Security Forces in the West Bank and Gaza, 
2006. Table 8.1, p.310 
 
Due to the political uncertainty in the OPT—and Arafat’s ability to play on this 
drawback to receive funding from international donors which incidentally fed into the 
expansion of his patronage network—international donors saw the build-up of the 
police force as a way to consolidate the new PA (and its legitimacy) and to protect the 
peace process from its militant critics. The early period therefore of 1993 to 1994 saw 
the United States funnelling direct assistance for the PA through the Holst Fund
420
 via 
the World Bank to the tune of $36 million USD for economic development,
421
 with an 
additional $5 million USD in cash and equipment to develop and support the Palestine 
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Police Force.
422
 External actors’ efforts to train the police in inter alia human rights 
issues, and the democratic process, contributed to building up and sustaining the power 
of the PA.  
 
In doing so, they endorsed the view that the PA was preparing for democratic 
statehood. However, the Palestinian Police Force increasingly functioned more as a 
military force rather than a civilian police force whose objective is to protect its citizens 
and maintain order. The militarisation of the police force became more apparent as it 
increasingly identified and silenced ‘enemies’ deriving from the inside i.e. critics, 
opposition groups. The police apparatus (particularly the security sector) soon gained a 
reputation for brutality and violence as a means for instilling fear among its own 
population.  In order to teach what Cottam and Marenin identify as “substantive 
democratic policing” in which police not only, “abide[s] by the norm that the police are 
subjects to the law, rules, and professional codes and do not act arbitrarily, 
capriciously, corruptly, or brutally, when they exercise the power to coerce”423 but also 
police according to the democratic social interests, 
424
  political elites must have the 
‘will’ to implement accountability in the judicial, political and societal arena.425 Arafat 
clearly did not have this political will and thus external financial support was used to 
prop up numbers rather than to develop the democratic potential of the police as an 
institution. Instead the security-police force was riddled with patronage, corruption, 
redundant and competing missions as well as lack of coordination reminiscent of the 
PLO informal operational structure in the diaspora. 
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THE FUNDAMENTALLY WEAK PA INSTITUTIONS 
 
Although the peace agreements were intended to be bilateral agreements between Israel 
and the PLO, it was Israel which controlled the negotiations due to the weak position of 
the PLO. Having surrendered to Israel’s key requirements in Oslo, the PLO had little 
else to offer other than Israeli security. Israel held all the cards in a land-for-peace 
exchange, and little incentive to concede them. Thus the significance of the peace 
agreements was less that they marked stages towards a conclusive peace, but that they 
defined a permanent structure for the PA which assumed basic democratic principles 
but which denied it the capacity to enact them.  What was created was a fundamentally 
weak state structure with flawed political institutions which lacked sovereignty and the 
autonomy to act in its own self-interest
426
. The agreements were infused with ambiguity, 
officially temporary in nature, and had no clearly specified date for the end of the 
transition period. They lacked clarity about Israel’s responsibilities and the limits to its 
powers. The PA was structured to foremost assure the security of Israel rather than the 
needs of its own people. The Oslo Accords linked everything from water, demography, 
economy, and politics to the question of security (Israeli security).  Israel had a 
monopoly over the interpretation of security. They had the authority to decide which 
policy would suit or detract from their security. Therefore, Palestinians were allowed 
certain actions but never the final assessment of actions (whether in the form of policy 
making, or movement) which would be (un)acceptable for their situation. Most policies, 
if not all, were with Israeli security in mind. If policies put forth by the Palestinian 
Legislative Council are contradictory to the security of Israel then assuring Israel’s 
                                                          
426
 Ezbidi, Basem. Personal Interview.  3 July, 2008. 
CHAPTER III: THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY—A WEAK “STATE” 
 
189 | P a g e  
 
security takes precedence, consequently nullifying any Palestinian independent 
decision making. All decisions and policies were formulated around Israeli goals and 
security and not firstly based on Palestinian needs or security. Basem Ezbidi, a lecturer 
of political science from Birzeit University, argued that the “final decision for the 
Palestinians was left for the Israelis to determine.”427  If the PA failed to provide the 
security for Israel, then this would affect the ‘ability’ of the Israeli government to move 
forward with the negotiation. It was a carrot-and-stick method of negotiation with Israel 
and its U.S. ally dictating the terms.    
 
The agreements  gave the PLO an advantage from the start in structuring a state 
according to its own interests (and political preferences), enabling a transfer of the PLO 
Outsiders’ political cultures and behaviours into, and onto, the PA. All of these factors 
weakened the legitimacy of the formal PA governing structures, undermining public 
confidence that they could “deliver” the requirements of the Palestinian population, 
either in governing or in the peace process itself. The power of the PA was perceived as 
being granted and legitimised by its Occupier. The Peace Process “resolved” issues in 
certain areas—as in ending decades of confrontation, acknowledging the PLO as a 
legitimate entity and the representative of the Palestinian people, recognising the 
political rights of the Palestinian and need for security etc—yet doubled the complexity 
and rigidness of  restrictions in others areas where none previously existed—as in 
restrictions in entering Jerusalem and travelling within its own territories inside the 
OPT, as well as rapid increase on the number of Israeli checkpoints inside the OPT.   
 
The agreements in essence awarded Israel a carte-blanche to deal with the situation as 
they saw fit, and with their own security in mind, whereas the PA could deal only with 
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the aftermath or consequences of these actions. Moreover, Israeli administration could 
and did reinterpret the Agreements to establish reasons for not following through with 
their part of the agreements which often cited PA failures to subdue and/or halt 
insurgency by factions, opposition groups or individuals. But the PA neither had the 
authority, power or legitimacy to impose restrictions or stop insurgency from 
opposition groups in the OPT since its own structures were so fundamentally weakened 
by the arrangements. Without full authority, independent of Israel, they were not able 
to exercise power in a way that would be seen by the masses to be legitimate, equal to 
Israel, and in fulfilment of Palestinian aspirations. Furthermore, with subsequent 
concession to Israeli demands, the PLO and the PA began to lose even the semblance 
of independence and free will.
428
 Over time, mass support and trust declined resulting 
in the PA increasingly resorting to either tactics of intimidation and coercion to enforce 
law and order, or cooptation to gain support, which consequently lead to yet more 
mistrust and fear. For example in February 1993, the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre (JMCC) conducted a poll in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on 
the question of whom they considered the representatives of the Palestinian people. An 
overwhelming 66 percent of Gaza Strip and 56 percent of the West Bank, believed that 
the PLO was their legitimate representative. Another poll conducted in September 1993 
by JMCC showed that 64 percent of the West Bank and 74.7 percent of the Gaza Strip 
believed in the peace agreements, particularly as a means to get them out of their 
situation, and a 64.4 percent of West Bank/Gaza Strip still believed in the PLO’s ability 
to deliver them.
429
 In a January 1994 public opinion poll, 35.9 percent of the Palestinian 
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population believed in the ability of the PLO to manage the PA in a positive manner.
430
 
By July 1994, positive image of the PLO’s (PA) ability to manage of the OPT 
increased to 52.8 percent.
431
  Moreover, 55.1 percent reacted positively to the return of 
Arafat and the Palestinian leadership (Outsider). Yet a year later following the PA’s 
establishment, PA support decreased to 40.5 percent where PA practices were cited as 
reasons for the decrease in support.
432
 By October 1995, following the Oslo II, PA 
popularity continued to decrease to 37.1 percent.
433
  The more the democratic 
institutions of the PA were seen to lack capacity, the more Arafat relied on the informal 
networks through which he could exert power, his own authority, and his coercive 
ability to control.  
 
Arafat and his entourage did not consider their tactics in terms of violations of human 
rights or actions of an authoritarian regime but rather as a means to an end. From the 
inception of the Interim Authority (PA), Arafat gave preferential positions to the 
Outsider elites and increasingly transplanted corruption and human rights violation to 
the territories which ignited the anger of the Insider elite.
434
 As Rabin stated, “We 
shouldn’t be pressing Arafat on human rights or even corruption.” This argued Ross, 
stemmed from the fact that the Israelis, U.S. and international community believed that 
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Arafat was the only person that could control the Palestinians.
435
 As such, Israel, the 
U.S., and the international community did not significantly interfere. Rather, “[t]hey 
turned a blind eye on Arafat’s tactics.”436 What was of foremost importance, to external 
actors, was that the peace process continued. For internal actors, including PLO 
Outsiders and indeed much of the PA, it was more important to preserve the unity of 
the new PA and its ‘grip’/control over the Palestinian jurisdictions and people than to 
question its methods too closely. Moreover, the PA was bound by the legal agreements 
as well as by its own lack of military and manpower to take on Israel. Furthermore, top 
officials were ‘rewarded’ with perks and financial deals for their ‘cooperation’ with 
Israel. Thus distrust of the PA intensified where they were viewed as enforcers of 
Israeli policies in the OPT and puppets of international demands at the expense of the 
Palestinian national aspiration. Consequently, the PA realised that if they were to 
survive as a political entity and to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian 
population and the international community, there would have to be a genuine push for 
election through the ‘democratic’ process. The PA was not opposed to this idea 
particularly when opinion polls and international monitors were predicting victory for 
the Fatah party if elections were to take place. 
 
 
FLEDGLING PA LEGITIMACY  
In its earliest days, and despite reservations from their critics, the DOP and the 
subsequent agreements created widespread support for Arafat and the PLO in the 
OPTs. In February 1993, the Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre (JMCC) 
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conducted a public opinion poll on the Palestinian Attitude to the Peace Process and the 
Palestinian Expellees where an overwhelming majority of 58.1 percent stated that they 
felt the PLO was the representatives of the Palestinian people. A breakdown of the 
overall percentage showed that 66 percent of Gazans polled were in favour of the PLO 
versus 56 percent of those polled from the West Bank.
437
 Although they believed in the 
PLO as their spokesman and representative, they nevertheless observed the dire need 
for democratic reform within the PLO where a poll conducted a month prior to the 
signing of the DOP found an astounding 87.7 percent of Palestinians from both the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in favour of reform.
438
 An overwhelming majority of those 
polled expressed the belief that the DOP would not only “save them” from their present 
situation, but would also weaken and delegitimize the occupation and would in due 
course lead them to a Palestinian state. 
439
   
 
Following the signing of the Oslo Accord, there was a perceivable increase in 
Palestinian support for the PLO where a poll conducted by JMCC of the West Bank 
and Gaza found that overall support increased by 47 percent, with 64 percent believing 
the PLO would save them from their current situation, 64 percent believing in the 
Palestinian leadership’s ability to administer Palestinian affairs during the transitional 
phase, and an overwhelming 72 percent in support of continuing negotiations with 
Israel.
440
 Nevertheless, by January 1994, disillusionment with Arafat and the PLO’s 
lack of progress with the Peace Process had already set in. Support for the PLO 
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declined by 30 percent and support for the DOP declined by 24 percent.
441
  By August 
1995, in a another poll conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies 
(CPRS), 60 percent of those polled were disillusioned with the peace process believing 
that it would not lead to lasting peace.
442
 Palestinians were already calling for reform 
before the PLO took office.  Although many believed that Arafat and the PLO’s443 
negotiation with Israel was individualistic and not based on democratic principles,
444
 59 
percent of the population still believed in continuing negotiation with Israel even if they 
would only result in slight changes.
445
 However by October 1995, following the signing 
of the Interim Agreement, support for Arafat increased, suggesting an improvement in 
perceptions of his performance, and solidifying support of the PA. However, perception 
of the PA as a legitimate entity continued to decrease to 37.1 percent. 
 
The rise and fall of public endorsement of, and trust in, Arafat, the PLO and the PA 
was a result of a tension between the two principal functions of the new governing 
authority. The provisional government was faced with two tasks; democratic state 
building and liberating the territories from the occupation regime.
446
  However, the PA 
state structure could not accommodate both objectives. Each was pursued to the 
detriment of the other. Pursuing liberation required collaboration with Israel and the 
United States in a peace process with uncertain ends and predicated on the primacy of 
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Israeli security. Pursuing democratic state-building would threaten this process, 
unleashing as it would constraints on Arafat’s ability to make concessions and 
subjecting him to political challenges from within the OPTs. Democratic legitimacy in 
the short term therefore had to be sacrificed for the longer-term revolutionary objective 
of the sovereign independence which Arafat was banking on being the outcome of the 
negotiations process. 
 
The Palestinian Authority elections in January 1996 were therefore a significant event, 
though fraught with contradictions for Arafat’s PLO. On the one hand they offered the 
opportunity for the PA as an institution, and for the PLO leadership itself, to win 
legitimacy through popular election
447
. With this under his belt, Arafat would be able to 
reassure negotiating partners of his ability to convince and engage the Palestinians with 
him in the peace process.
 448
  But the democratic aspects of the electoral process were 
worrying: While electoral prediction indicated a victory for Fatah, Arafat knew there 
was significant opposition, not only to the peace process but also to his own style of 
leadership and to his imposition of Tunis Outsider elites onto the new PA. He therefore 
needed to assert his own stamp on the ‘democratic’ character of the elections from an 
early stage. 
 
PARTIES AND ELECTIONS 
As prescribed by the Interim Agreements, an election process was seen as a necessary 
step towards setting up a democratic basis for a self-governing Palestinian entity.  On 
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7
th
 May 1994, the PLO officially took office as the governing officials of the new 
Palestinian Authority provisional government but conditional on elections subsequently 
taking place in order to elect the new Palestinian Council members and the Ra’is of the 
Executive Authority. Therefore the new Palestinian Authority provisional 
government—composed of PLO Outsider elites—designed an electoral system which 
suited and reflected their own political agenda. Presidential decrees soon followed to 
establish the envisioned composition and structure of the PA governing institutions and 
thereby the PLO governing structure was effectively superimposed on to the new PA 
governing institution. On 13 December, 1995, the first Presidential decree was issued 
calling for elections and designating 20 January 1996 as the election date. It also 
provided a nine-day margin, commencing on the 14
th
 December, during which parties 
or individuals could submit their candidacy.
449
 In a bid to meet the nine-day deadline 
for open nomination, several factions and parties raced to submit their proposed 
candidates. Others who were denied their bid for candidacy by their respected party ran 
as independents. 
 
The announcement of the 1996 election was received both with anticipation and 
suspicion. On the positive side, the election was perceived of as a preparatory step 
towards a democratic system—which would differ from that of surrounding Arab 
countries—and where the leadership would be elected by popular vote. Optimists 
envisioned a pluralistic political system with a democratic regime while critics argued 
that the election—or rather the ‘democratic’ process—was being sold as a “remedy for 
all that has befallen Palestinians.”450 However, critics argued that the election would 
neither provide nor accomplish Palestinian goals of an independent state alongside 
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Israel. Indeed, the election would define and crystallise the final shape of the 
Palestinian entity and the status quo of the agreement which would sideline issues 
concerning Palestinians living under Israeli control.
451
  Furthermore, critics (already 
conscious of Arafat’s style of rule and the PLO’s patrimonial political culture) asserted 
that the election was only a political game, which would be manipulated by Israel and 
the selected few who occupied leadership positions in the new government, thus 
serving only the interests of a small elite group.  The elites’ power in office would be 
legitimised, establishing an authoritarian state.  An elite in such a position and who 
espouses the practices and political orientation of the new government, would be 
prepared, by any means, to keep their position and power.  
 
Critics also argued that, from an Israeli perspective, the election would institutionalise 
the relationship between Israel and the new Palestinian government.  The election 
would limit the Israeli-PLO/PA negotiations to those specific areas and OPT over 
which the elected PA ruled, to a great extent “negating” any further negotiations for 
other areas that were already settled by Israel.
452
 Thus the election could officially 
demarcate a ‘permanent’ boundary for the OPT. It was also important for interest 
parties (particularly those critical of PA method of practice and governance) pressing 
for the election that a new leadership would emerge as an alternative to the Palestinian 
National Council (PNC) of the PLO—where the strongest criticism of the peace 
process stems from—who will be under the direct control of the Palestinian Authority 
leadership in direct negotiation with Israel.
453
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Although the 1972 and 1976 elections in the OPT (under the Israeli administration) had 
been important events for ‘nationalising’ the Palestinian population, the 1996 election 
marked the first genuine national elections in the OPT.  While the 1972 and 1976 
elections were limited to specific cities and villages within the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip and with the approval and good grace of the Israeli governing military 
administration; the 1996 election was an inclusive electoral process for Jerusalem, the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  As such, the international community, and interested 
parties, had their eye on Palestine and the January 1996 election. The PLO negotiators 
had hopes that a high turnout for the elections would give them legitimacy and 
strengthen their role when negotiating with Israel on the permanent status of Palestine, 
Israeli complete withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the 
establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.
454
  Those who opposed the Oslo 
Accords argued that the elections would seal the permanency and perhaps to a high 
degree ‘legitimise’ Israel’s presence in the OPT.  
 
Regardless of opposition, election registration was officially opened on the 19
th
 of 
December, 1995 a month prior to the election, for candidates running for President of 
the Authority and Council members. The position for President of the PA was open to 
any citizen who was at least 35 years old, had the right to vote, and had a minimum of 
5,000 sponsors.
455
 Parties were also encouraged to submit their candidates. The result 
was an atmosphere of perceived open political space for all parties and candidates. 
However, irregularities did emerge on the institutional level. Registration was to 
officially close by 23 December. However Arafat issued Presidential Decree Number 6 
which ordered the registration polls in Hebron, Jerusalem, Gaza City and Khan Younis 
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districts to be kept open until midnight on 31 December.  Arafat furthermore amended 
Law Number 16 which gave the President the right to extend the period specified for 
nomination.
456
 Further misconduct appeared in the form of fixed candidacy.  Eligible 
candidates who submitted their candidacy were struck off the list and replaced with 
party-chosen candidates (particularly with the Fatah party) who were not as qualified or 
legitimate in the society. As a result those who were eliminated and excluded from the 
list ran as independents. For instance, of the 75 individuals on Fatah’s official candidate 
list, the majority were selected by Arafat and the leading Fatah leadership, with the 
remainder selected through primaries.
457
  Thus it incited critics to question the legality 
and extent of Arafat’s power and actions, besides its obvious violation of the rules of 
electoral laws.  On the other hand, supporters argued that some of the alternations were 
necessary measures to overcome the political reality on the ground.
458
 
 
By the closing of the registration, there were 672 candidates competing for 88 seats in 
the Palestinian Legislative Council, many of which based their legitimacy and 
qualification on political activities, clan affiliation, and on personal wealth.
459
 In total, 
there were 17 political parties and affiliation represented with the top six being (in 
accordance to the number of members running for office): Independent—503, Fatah—
77, Palestinian People’s Party (former Communists)—26, Popular Struggle Front (new 
list)—12, FIDA Party (split from Democratic Front)—11, and the Arab Liberation 
Front (temporary command)—8.460  The candidates running as independents were 
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inclusive of many parties that were not selected by their party (as with Fatah—who 
encompassed the majority of candidates running as independents), their party was not 
running officially (as with HAMAS), and others who were either dissidents from their 
political parties or did not subscribe to any of the political parties. 
 
THE ELECTION RESULTS 
 
Despite the irregularities, 1600 polling stations were opened in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, and voter turnout was estimated at 80 percent for those registered in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, only 40 percent of voters participated in 
Jerusalem due to various measures taken by the Israeli government. For example, the 
Israeli government only provided five voting sites for the 4,400 East Jerusalem 
Palestinian residents.
461
 Moreover, the Likud party was accused of propagating a fear 
campaign among Jerusalemites through city-wide notices “threatening Palestinian 
voters with loss of their Israeli IDs, health and national insurance, and even their right 
to reside in Jerusalem.” if they participated in the Palestinian election.462 Even 
candidates were harassed by the police. One example was of Abu Ala (chief negotiator 
with the Israelis) who was ordered by the police to move his campaign rally from the 
football stadium (where it was scheduled to be held) to indoors. Another example was 
another Fatah candidate Hanan Ashrawi, who was banned from entering the city in her 
car unless she removed her photo and campaign posters from her vehicle. The dispute 
that ensued with the soldiers resulted in the arrest of her driver and colleague and the 
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banning of her car from the city.
463
 On the day of the election, complaints were 
prevalent of Israeli police harassment (and in cases arrests) at voting sites of election 
monitors, voters, journalists, and exit pollsters.
464
 In the OPT, there were also 
complaints about clear violations of election campaigning laws and of PA officials 
disregarding the established protocols. There were also allegations of Arafat’s police 
harassing, intimidating, and arresting journalists, human rights activists, and Palestinian 
newspapers. There were furthermore numerous complaints of electoral results in 
primaries being dismissed and pro-Arafat Fatah candidates being summarily awarded 
the winning result. 
465
 
 
In the end, the election results demonstrated the flaws of the new system. For a start, 
the electoral system was designed to consolidate and reinforce the already prevailing 
Palestinian Authority and its power base—the Fatah political party.466 The electoral 
laws promulgated by presidential decree gave smaller parties little opportunities to 
capture seats.
467
 Therefore smaller parties boycotted the election because they observed 
that there was no means whereby they could win any seats. The election system was 
structured as a “Winner Takes All” system where great distortions existed between 
actual votes and the proportion of seats taken by large well-known parties.
468
  The 
multi-member and majority district system maintained those that were in power and 
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sustained disproportional representation. For instance, the candidates running on a 
Fatah slate who received only 30 percent of the popular vote gained 58 percent of the 
88 seats in parliament. On the other hand, Fatah candidates running as independents 
gained 60 percent of the popular votes but only managed to capture 40 percent of the 
parliament’s seats.469  The PPP also suffered from the electoral system where they did 
not win any seats despite receiving 7.6 percent of the vote.
470
 
 
On the presidential front, only two candidates competed for the position. The only 
challenger to Yasser Arafat’s Fatah was the female political activist Samiha Khalil 
(DFLP). Arafat emerged as the victor of the race with 87 percent of the vote compared 
to Khalil’s 10 percent. 471  No individual could rival Arafat’s stature or match his 
charisma to pose a significant challenge to him at this point in time. He held a symbolic 
stature beyond his political office, as the leader of the revolutionary movement, and 
thus had a remarkable hold over society at large. Moreover, to challenge him at this 
point would have threatened the unity of the new Palestinian entity and even his 
detractors were reluctant to do this. 
 
Arafat was thus sworn in as the first president of the Palestine Authority on 12 
February 1996 and the Palestinian Legislative Council conducted its inaugural 
ceremony in Gaza a month later on 7 March.
472
 The new elected officials composed of 
Arafat as a freestanding president, Ahmad Qurei (a member of the Outsider elite who 
had been  instrumental in the Oslo Accord negotiation) as the newly elected speaker of 
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the Palestinian Legislative Council, and ministers selected into Arafat’s cabinet who 
were, to a high degree, the same leadership from the Outside elites as had dominated 
the Provisional Government, —with the exception of token Insider counter-elites who 
were appointed into ministerial positions for strategic interests and for the sake of 
enhancing legitimacy. As critics of the election argued, Arafat’s method of conducting 
the election—which was expected to result in his victory by an overwhelming 
margin—was associated with the way he managed the PLO, “autocratically, arbitrarily, 
secretively, and without accountability.”473  
 
In terms of the Legislative Council elections, the result established Fatah as the 
dominant force in Palestinian politics.
474
 The popular support for Fatah disillusioned 
many of the aspiring political factions who saw their own opportunities to access power 
as illusionary.  While manipulation of lists, candidacies and results by pro-Arafat elites 
had played a large part in determining results, so too had the role of traditional family 
links, suggesting that the democratic possibilities of the new electoral system were not 
as embedded as many had hoped. 
 
The 1996 election was what political scientists term a “founding election,” in theory a 
stepping stone towards the establishment of a democratic government. But in practice, 
holding largely “free” and transparent elections did not guarantee a democratic result 
because the condition under which the elections were held were constricted by the 
occupation and Arafat’s manipulation of rules and statutes for the electoral process. 
Furthermore, even if it did provide a promising “democratic” element, it was already 
clear that the PLO Outsider elites were not committed to the democratic political 
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culture which such institutions presupposed. As one critic of the Palestinian Authority 
administration argued, “democracy requires more than elections.”475  A democratic 
government involves encouraging a “meaningful rotation of power, including the 
highest office in the land; oversight; separation of powers; the rule of law; respect for 
human rights; and freedom of assembly, expression, and the press.”476   
 
The PA elections had clearly not resulted in a rotation of power: the Palestinian 
Authority leadership – Arafat’s Executive Council - composition that emerged 
following the election closely resembled the PLO Outsider leadership hierarchy, and 
the roles played by individuals within the two, parallel structures were only indistinctly 
demarcated. The Palestinian Legislative Council, on the other hand, did include 
counter-elites, including both independent nationalists and Fatah members, with few 
elected from other factions.
477
  The election resulted in Fatah capturing 75 percent of 
the Palestinian Legislative Council seats.
478
 But even here, most of the Fatah 
individuals in the Legislative Assembly had been handpicked by Arafat and the PLO 
leadership or at least endorsed by them and manipulation of the voting system meant 
the Legislative Council as a whole did not represent the proportional voting of the 
population. Therefore, from the inception of the Palestinian Legislative Council, it was 
already politically engineered to legitimise and sustain the PLO Outsider leadership in 
the PA. 
 
In sum, although the procedural principles of democracy had been largely adhered to, if 
not to the letter in all instances, the substantive aspects were missing for the new 
                                                          
475
 Abu-Amr, Z. “The Palestinian Legislative Council: A Critical Assessment,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 26, no. 4 (Summer, 1997), p. 90 
476
 Abu-Amr, Z. “The Palestinian Legislative Council: A Critical Assessment,” (Summer, 1997), p. 90 
477
 Brown, N.J. "Constituting Palestine: The Effort to Write a Basic Law for the Palestinian Authority." 
Middle East Journal (Middle East Institute) 54, no. 1 (Winter 2000), p. 30 
478
 Shikaki, K." The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment."(Spring, 1996), p. 20 
CHAPTER III: THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY—A WEAK “STATE” 
 
205 | P a g e  
 
governing institutions of the PA. Arafat had used the advantages handed to him by the 
early superimposition of PLO structures onto the Provisional Authority, to weight the 
“democratic” institutions in favour of his own power-base, thereby undermining that 
very democracy and, ultimately, the legitimacy of the institutions in the eyes of the 
wider population. As Arafat proved to be increasingly authoritarian and prone to 
patrimonial rule (a theme which will be developed in the next chapter), the Legislative 
Council was ever less able to constrain him.  
 
Yet the election results suited both Israel and the International Community: they 
appeared to endorse the peace process and more importantly to confirm the status of 
Arafat, the Palestinian interlocutor in that process. Electoral irregularities were not 
deemed important in the greater scheme of things, and thus democracy was sacrificed 
to the continuation of an already flawed peace process. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The structure of the PA established by the agreements was destined to resemble a weak 
‘state’ entity. Rather than creating a PA governing entity with sovereignty and power to 
make self-interested policies which could establish and sustain its legitimacy, the 
agreements created a governing body that was dependent financially and politically on 
outside sources. Moreover, the agreements failed to provide a clear decisive 
specification for the end of its transition period which would indicate a defined timeline 
or goal for the creation of perhaps a more permanent and independent political entity 
with full sovereignty, nurturing insecurities and fear.  
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The agreements also established a basic contradiction, between democratic institutions 
on the one hand and an imposed PLO elite with a guaranteed political advantage over 
opponents on the other. By favouring a patrimonial inclined Outsider elite over the 
nascent democratic Insider political elite in terms of how the institutions were 
structured and in what order, the peace process further weakened the formal institutions 
in support of informal networks and structures. The lines distinguishing the PA and the 
PLO were progressively blurred, until the PLO was the PA and the PA the PLO. 
Executive authorities in the PLO were also Executive authorities in the PA, additionally, 
inter alia, members. The 1996 elections legitimised and consolidated the leadership of 
the PA as comprising virtually the same hierarchy as the PLO leadership.  Insider 
counter-elites were given periphery positions which would not threaten the make-up or 
goals of the PA leadership from the Outside. Therefore the PA, despite being tasked 
with applying ‘democratic’ principles to its state building process, conformed to the 
description of a ‘weak’ state with a propensity for corruption by using the informal 
network for its political primacy and survival. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
OUTSIDER-INSIDER ELITES STRUGGLE FOR 
SUPREMACY—IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF 
THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The 1996 election established a new political reality.  It also formally crystallised, and 
perhaps to an extent legitimised, a certain pattern of governance. The election 
confirmed the status of the Outsider leadership as dominating the political sphere in the 
Palestinian Authority, and that of the Counter-elite (Insiders) as seeking to constrain 
this power and wrestle it away from the Outsiders.  As such, this struggle for power 
saw an increasingly centralised government. The new government had two major elite 
groups composed of Insider counter-elites and the Outsider elites with two distinct and 
divergent political cultures, identified in Chapter Two. The elite from the Outside 
espoused an informal and neo-patrimonial political culture while the elites from the 
Inside (counter-elites) embraced a nascent democratic political culture, often causing 
conflict in their method of governance.  
 
This chapter will demonstrate the Outsider elites and Insider counter-elites struggle for 
power. It will show how, in order to balance the political system and to bypass the 
restrictions and limitations imposed upon his rule by the Oslo Accords and subsequent 
PA governing structures, Arafat employed a parallel system of governance (an informal 
structure) to assure that the peace process continued, the PA survived and his 
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leadership was sustained. The two structures – formal and informal - divided the 
Outsider elites from the Insider counter-elites in terms of how they dealt with state 
institutions. On the one hand, the PA formal structures were created by, publicly 
supported by, Israel, its U.S. ally and the International Community, supposedly in 
pursuance of a democratic “state” in the making. But so too was the informal structure 
(operated according to the political culture of the Outsiders) indirectly supported by 
external actors, particularly Israel and the U.S. Israeli and U.S. public endorsement of 
Arafat’s leadership and their ‘silent’ endorsement through inaction against his 
democratic violations and corruption, led to a system of unaccountable, non-transparent 
and corrupt practices which directly contradicted the supposed objectives of the PA 
itself.  
 
Throughout intra-elite struggles between the Outsider and Insider elites in the OPT, 
external actors (Israel and US) can be seen to indirectly supported the informal political 
culture of the PLO through the endorsement of Arafat, and silent endorsement of his 
undemocratic PA practices i.e. inaction against human rights violation, corrupt 
practices etc. While they supported the formal structure of the PA through its 
institutional relationship with the Israeli government and diplomatic relations with the 
US, they did so when it suited them and their own interests, notably securing Israeli 
security, rather than in order to consolidate the PA’s democratic potential. Without firm 
Israeli and US prioritising of the PA institutions themselves from the beginning of its 
life, the PA was crippled by weak institutional capacity, the absence of a clear final 
status of state-hood, and a failing peace process, of all of which called its legitimacy 
into question for the wider Palestinian population and propelled it further into 
weakness. 
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The function of this chapter is to demonstrate how the incompatible political cultures of 
the PLO Outsider and the Insider Counter elites were encouraged to compete with each 
other for primacy, their competition sustained by weak institutions. It will therefore 
look at the Palestinian political elite from 1996 to 2004. Specifically to identify the 
early measures taken by Arafat both before and immediately after the 1996 elections. 
Of interest is to see the development, alliances and struggles between elites within the 
PA for power and supremacy.  
 
THE PALESTINIAN ELITES 
To have a more clear and practical identification of the dominant elite groups in the 
post-Oslo Palestinian Territories, for the purposes of this thesis the Outsider elites are 
identified as those mainly from the Outside in the diaspora (with some elites from 
inside the OPT) who adhered to the neo-patrimonial political culture of Arafat; while 
Insider counter-elites are those who drew mostly from an inside-experience in the OPT 
(although inclusive of elites from the Outside who challenged Arafat’s neo-patrimonial 
rule and governance) and who operated based on a nascent democratic political culture.  
This distinction has to be qualified, however. Of course, as previously indicated, not all 
elites from the Outside espoused the neo-patrimonial political culture of the Outsider 
elites, nor did all elites from the Inside adhere to the nascent political culture. Moreover, 
the practice of ‘democracy’ in the OPTs was always limited in the Palestinian case, its 
‘ideology’ having had no real political history in either the Arab world, Developing 
world, or even under the British colonial regime which introduced some limited, urban 
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democratic institutions.
479
  However, as discussed in previous chapters, the Israeli 
military regime had enabled Palestinian society to participate in limited forms of 
democratic process—such as university student and local elections. Political parties co-
existed, albeit illegally, under the Israeli military administration, which created a 
politically vibrant environment.
480
 The 1987 Intifada had further ‘democratised’ 
political activities and set up governing institutions through the UNLU and the relief 
committees. The Insider population had consequently become familiarised and engaged 
with a greater degree of democratic culture and practice than their Outsider counter-
parts situated in neighbouring Arab states.  
 
Although Outsider and Insider PLO members were held together by either their shared 
political ideology, vision for an independent Palestine, or recapturing lost lands from 
Israel, there was still a distinct political difference—in the manner in which they 
operated—between the Outsider and Insider membership who subsequently served 
within the PA.  As Cheryl Rubenberg observed of the counter-elites inside the OPT, 
they were highly educated and experienced with expertise in political leadership to 
professional proficiency.
481
 Moreover they were politically active in the democratic 
process seeking a more participatory form of government. The Outsider elites, on the 
other hand, came to adhere to and encouraged neo-patrimonial method of governance 
which reflected the nature of rule under which they were socialised, and operated, in 
the diaspora.  The establishment of the provisional PA government paved the way for 
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democratic elections and it established a collaborative relationship between the two 
elites; however the 1996 elections eventually marked a juncture for the Palestinians.  
 
Arafat actively sought to merge the two elites, which would provide the Outsider elites 
legitimacy and bring the Insiders counter-elites into the PA governing structures and 
more closely under his own authority.   If Arafat had hoped to extend his own mode of 
rule over the new PA, the Insider counter-elites saw this as only a temporary situation, 
anticipating that the 1996 election would subordinate the PLO and its leadership to the 
PA’s formal democratic structures. As a result, an observable tension began to emerge 
between the Outsider elites and the Insider counter-elites.  
 
 
EARLY ALIGNMENTS OF THE PA’S OUTSIDER AND INSIDER ELITES 
 
The Palestinian Insider counter-elites played an important role in challenging, and 
changing aspects of the status quo and mode of practice within the PA, particularly in 
its initial formative years as they sought to move towards more democratic governing 
institution. At the same time, the PA (Arafat) used the parallel system to co-opt and 
eliminate oppositions particularly the counter-elites who were composed mainly of 
those who had been involved in, and led, the resistance movement during the Intifada. 
These Insider counter-elites progressively became inclusive of dissident Outsiders who 
also adhered to ‘democratic’ norms and were frustrated by Arafat’s increasingly 
authoritarian style of rule. The counter-elites were embedded in the population, with a 
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strong internal cohesion between leaders and masses.
482
 They included Insider elites 
such as Ghassan Al-Khatib, Faisal Al-Husseini, Mamdouh Aker, and Hanan Ashrawi; 
but also some Outsider Fatah ‘hawks’ , such as Muhammad Jihad (a stout opponent of  
Arafat and a Palestinian Liberalisation Army member), Abbas Zaki (Fatah’s head of 
operations), Sakher Habash (chief of the Revolutionary Committee and Fatah’s 
ideological mobilisation department), Rafiq al-Natsha (PLC member and formerly a 
Central Committee member), and Hani al-Hasan.
483
   
 
The alignments of the two sides – Outsider and Insider -  had become evident during 
the Madrid Peace Talks as early as 1992 when, even though certain elite figures  from 
the Inside like Ahmad Qurei (Abu ‘Ala), Nabil Sha’ath, Yasser Abed Rabbo and 
Hassan Asfour, were handpicked by Arafat to lead the negotiations and filled important 
positions pre- DOP, their personal loyalty to  Arafat did not lead them to agree with 
him on the concessions he made to Israel  or on his  exclusion of many other significant 
counter-elite figures. However, they were eventually co-opted to and espoused Arafat’s 
neo-patrimonial system. Between signing the DOP and the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, 
negotiations were handled mainly by Outsider individuals hand-picked by Arafat.  As 
Ahmed Qurei explained, in August 1994, Shimon Peres requested a meeting with 
Arafat where the Israelis presented a proposition of redeployment only to occur every 
six months. Arafat astonished the Palestinian delegation when he accepted the Israeli 
position without opposition or further negotiation.
484
  Although the counter-elites did 
not agree with the methods employed by Arafat during the negotiation periods i.e., 
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exclusion and clandestine dealings, they largely supported the peace process itself, 
perceiving it to be an opportunity through which to realise their vision of an 
independent state.  Thus they were reluctant to upset the process by dividing the 
Palestinian negotiating position and challenging Arafat directly. As Walid Khalidi, a 
Palestinian professor at Harvard University, observed during the 1995 annual meeting 
of American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee in Washington, D.C., those in 
attendance believed that to remove Arafat from the picture would grant Israel more 
power. Disposing of Arafat “would remove the symbol linking Palestinians inside 
Palestine with those in the diaspora. [Therefore i]t would also initiate a [destructive] 
struggle for succession.”485 The only option for the Palestinians was to support and 
sustain Arafat.  Even the 1995 poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Center (JMCC) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip found that although 
60.9 percent of people polled perceived Arafat as the symbol of Palestine, only 39.4 
percent supported his leadership.  
 
 
Once the Oslo Accords had been signed, however, and with the prospect of a self-
governing Palestinian state-in-the-making, the counter-elites called for viable, 
transparent and representative Palestinian institutions which would enable a process of 
formal democratisation.  Their aim was both to limit the power of Arafat within and 
over the PA and to reform the higher institutions within the PLO and Fatah itself, 
fearful of the reproduction and transfer of PLO/Fatah practices and institutions onto the 
new PA institutions.
486
 This attempt at democratisation was initially assisted by 
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Outsider Mahmoud Abbas, the PLO’s second in command, who, following Oslo, called 
for institutional reform and a shift from revolutionary governance to democratic state-
building.
487
  However, following the elections, these ambitions were quickly and 
progressively thwarted and co-optation became a modus operandi. What emerged was 
out of the elections was effectively a one-party system in which Fatah dominated the 
political realm.  Smaller opposition political parties were by default eliminated from the 
1996 electoral process due to a presidential degree and “Winner Takes All” electoral 
system which would assure their defeat
488
; and Islamic parties politically boycotted the 
election due to the nature of PLO concessions to Israel. So from the start of the PA, the 
Insiders were facing an uphill struggle in their efforts to contain Arafat. It was hardly 
surprising, then, that Arafat was able to utilise a strategy of co-optation to convince so 
many that their pursuit of reform would be better served by acting within the PA, than 
standing directly against it. 
 
THE PA UNDER CONSTRUCTION 
Arafat’s unilateral decision making in the PLO and his—as well as Fatah leadership in 
the PLO— incapacitating procedures of nepotism, autocracy, corruption, and political 
deviation caused internal conflicts and were often heavily criticised by the Arab world 
and the West.
489
 This divisiveness often paralysed the function of the PLO institutions 
which resulted in Arafat taking decisions with impunity negatively affecting the 
Palestinian cause. However, this form of paralysis and discordance allowed for Arafat 
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to establish, design and merge the newly established PA and the PLO bureaucracy.
490
 
As such it resulted in a PA institution which was profoundly “weak” as a ‘state’ entity. 
The PA institutional structures onto which the PLO was superimposed were deeply 
flawed in ways which impeded the Insider counter-elites struggle to assert their 
democratic aspirations.  
 
For a start, while the Oslo Accords and the subsequent Palestinian elections nominally 
recognised the PA as the national authority, they did not transfer all the powers of a 
state to the PA government.
491
 On the contrary, the ability of this governing entity to 
develop into a full-fledged sovereign democratic ‘state’ was obstructed and limited by 
the peace agreements. Democratic development of PA institutions was impeded for the 
sake of Israel security. As a legal advisor to Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Ministry 
stated, the PA "will not be independent or sovereign in nature, but rather will be legally 
subordinate to the authority of the military government.”492 Even the 1996 election, 
viewed as a process towards democratic institutional building, took place while the 
civil rights and political freedom of Palestinians was under on-going constraints.
493
 As 
such the democratic credentials of the elections were flawed. Nevertheless, the 
elections granted legitimacy to the Outsider elites who were installed in leadership 
positions in the PA by Arafat, and provided Arafat with the power (and authority) to 
co-opt Insider counter-elites with offers of positions.  
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As As’ad Ghanem observes in his analysis of the PA structure, within the various PA 
ministries and its agencies, signs of such co-optation were in abundance, with 
preposterous numbers of director-generals, totalling thousands, being appointed.
494
 In 
addition, numerous advisors were installed in the various ministries who, like the 
director-generals, had no defined roles. The subsequent overlapping of powers between 
institutions, and roles and personnel, was not only inefficient but detrimental to 
operating the PA and implementing its policies.  
 
Prior to the 1996 election, the top three positions of each Ministry were held by Fatah.  
Of the 40 deputy ministers in the 20 ministries of the provisional PA, 33 were from 
Fatah, 6 were independents but pro-Fatah, and only one (who later resigned) stemmed 
from another faction.
495
 Following the elections, political appointment was not 
necessarily based on the outcomes of the democratic process or on the qualification and 
skills of the individual, but rather on a mode of  neo-patrimonial distribution. As Nahla 
Abdo argued, appointments were based on either “party politics or involving allegiance 
to the ruling party on clan or tribal grounds.”496  
 
Some individuals from within the Insider counter-elites were also co-opted into the new 
government, Nabil Sha’ath, for example was originally a member of the Insider counter 
elite although he had latterly been in exile with Arafat. He came to adopt, and later 
exemplify, the modus operandi of the Outsider. For his loyalty to Arafat, he was 
appointed to the 1994 provisional PA government as Minister of Planning and 
International Cooperation, a post which he retained following the 1996 election.  A 
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similar example was Abdel Aziz Ali Shahin (Abu Ali Shahin), who allegedly founded 
the Shabiba (Fatah youth) movement. He had been jailed by the Israelis in 1967 for 
‘armed infiltration’ but finally released in 1982, only to be deported from Gaza in 
February 1985.
497
 He returned in 1993, and was appointed the Minister of Supply 
following the 1996 election.
498  Jabril Rajoub, a journalist and managing director of the 
al-Abeer magazine had served 15 years of life prison, for throwing a grenade at Israeli 
soldiers, before being released in May 1985. He was rearrested on 29 December 1987 
charged with inciting the Intifada and secretly expelled to Lebanon on 13 January 1988. 
Rajoub returned to the OPT with Arafat and was rewarded for his service by serving as 
the Head of the Preventive Security Services in the West Bank.
499
 Muhammad Dahlan, 
a student and Shabiba leader, and a close ally of Khalil Al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) in the 
Gaza Strip, was arrested and finally deported by Israel in January 1987. Following his 
return with Arafat, Dahlan was appointed as the Head of Preventive Security Services 
(PSS) in Gaza. The positions of Heads of PSS were important strategic positions—
allocated only to Arafat’s trusted and loyal associates. So although these individuals 
had Insider elite credentials, their time spent in exile with Arafat in the later stages of 
the pre-Oslo period had clearly brought them into his inner circles. 
 
It should also be pointed out that some of those Insider counter-elites who had endured 
Israeli deportation and who were briefly appointed high-ranking PA positions in the 
new PA following their return to the OPT, were soon disillusioned with the functioning 
of the PA and its leadership and were to become Arafat’s strongest critics. These 
included individuals like Abdul Jawad Saleh Hamayel, an Insider who was elected 
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mayor of al-Bireh in 1967, and was expelled to Jordan  in 1973 for his role in creating 
the Palestinian National Front (PNF).
500
 Hamayel was allowed to return in 1993, when 
he was briefly appointed as the Minister of Agriculture in the 1994 provisional 
government before becoming one of Arafat’s strongest critics and moving into 
opposition.  Azmi Shu’aybi, also an Insider political activist, from the 1970s (winning 
in the 1976 municipal council elections and in university student elections) until his 
deportation in January 1986 following charges of being the leader of DFLP, was 
allowed to return to the OPT in Spring 1993.
501
 He was adamant in clarifying that he 
did not return with Arafat, nor was he one of Arafat’s returnees.502 However, as a 
member of the counter-elite with legitimacy and support from the community, he was 
offered the post of Minister for Youth and Sports until 1996.  Shu’aybi also became 
one of the main critics of Arafat and his modus operandi.  Marwan al-Barghouti, also 
politically active as an elected president of the Birzeit University student council, was a 
third year student when he was deported in May 1987.
503
 Even Muhammad Dahlan 
who initially ascribed to Arafat’s modus operandi following their return to the OPT 
began to sell himself on a ticket of opposition to Arafat, calling for political reform and 
more coherent policy.
504
  
 
Moreover not all Insider counter-elites who had remained within the OPTs were 
sympathetic to Arafat’s way of doing things. Co-optation was also to become a means 
of drawing Insider critics into the PA. It served in particular to contain those Insider 
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critics who refused to be silent about developing corrupt practices, the absence of the 
rule of law, violations of human rights, or bureaucratic inefficiencies.
505
 Insider 
counter-elites began to form their own NGOs to articulate and campaign about these 
concerns. Arafat then sought to bring them inside the PA as a way to silence them. For 
example, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi and Abd el-Jawad Salah were promoted to positions of 
Minister of Higher Education and Minister of Agriculture, respectively. Hamas 
supporter and critic of Arafat, Imad al-Fluji, was allocated the position of Minister of 
Communications while Talal Sidr received the position of Minister of Sports and 
Youth.
506
 
 
Arafat drew on a further mode of co-optation in order to undermine the competing 
legitimacy of Insider counter-elites who sought to criticise him to subordinate him to 
democratic processes. With the establishment of the PA, Arafat reinvented the hamula 
as a state tool to consolidate clan allegiance and as a method for appointment to 
leadership positions. This was instigated during the PA’s provisional years in 
anticipation of – and to subvert - the elections.507 The allocation of positions in the 
provisional PA was primarily based on loyalty, service, and affiliation rather than on 
merit or formal qualification. Arafat courted clan leaders and members of the 
traditional notable elites, restoring and re-establishing some of their social influence 
and binding them to him in an informal network of power and position. When the 
elections came, he had already developed the network and assured its social power over 
sections of the population, undermining the Insider counter-elites who sought to build 
democratic institutions to formalise and “check” the exercise of power. 
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Arafat’s final “tool” in his efforts to undermine the early consolidation of democratic 
institutions was his willingness to use coercion and his determination not to be 
constrained by the rule of law in the silencing of his critics. His security forces enjoyed 
his personal protection when they engaged in human rights abuses including arbitrary 
detention and torture. Special security courts, allowed under the Israeli rule of State 
Security Courts, were set up in the OPT which acted as tribunals and carried out 
executive orders which did not abide by any defined legal norms.
508
 The secret trials 
often held at night and defendants were held without charges, not informed of charges 
or not allowed legal representation. Trials were often held in less than hour and as not 
being part of the civil legal court system, defendants were not able to appeal their case 
to a higher court.
509
  There were numerous cases which illustrate well the early signs of 
Arafat’s rejection of democratic practices and principles and relates to his willingness 
from the beginning of his rule to endorse torture and human rights abuses, and restrict 
freedom of speech to prevent criticism of himself and the PA.  
On 2 July 1997, Dr. Fathi Suboh, a community leader and lecturer of education at Al-
Azhar University University, was arrested by the PA’s Preventive Security Forces 
under the charges of ‘security reasons.’ The arrest was challenged by the Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) as illegal and demanded the release of Suboh. His 
wife had testified to PCHR that Suboh was arrested as a result of positing an 
examination question to his students which asked for their opinion about administrative 
corruption in the PA as well as at Al-Azhar University. A day following the 
examination, the Palestinian police forced themselves into Suboh’s home and 
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confiscated all the exam papers. This according to PCHR and the press was a violation 
of educational freedom and freedom of expression which were indicators of the real 
reason Suboh was arrested.
510
 
 
In August 1999, Ismaeil Abu Shanab, one of the most prominent figures of the Islamic 
leadership, and a former Head of the Engineering Association was arrested by the 
Palestinian police following a television interview where he called for the cancellation 
of the Oslo Accords.
511
 A day later on the 7 August, 1999 two prominent figures of 
Hamas, Dr. Rantisi and Ahmed Nemr Hamdan, were arrested and charged with 
“disseminating false information in an attempt to terrorize the public.” Dr. Rantisi was 
previously detained in April 1998 and then released in a July 1999 (more than a year 
later after it was ordered by the Palestinian High Court of Justice for his immediate 
release) where he interviewed with Al Quds news agency announcing that the reason he 
was not released was due to a security-cooperation between the PA, Israel and the 
CIA.
512
 This ‘accusation’ led to his August 1999 re-incarceration.  While these figures’ 
imprisonment presented a human rights issue, it also exposed Arafat’s institutional 
structure, method of governance, and disregard for democratic processes. 
 
In effect, Arafat took every opportunity to assert his personal power and authority over 
the PA both before and after the elections. Arafat dictated the decision making process, 
instilled a repressive policing structure, appointed and dismissed officials, and 
suppressed any actions towards power-sharing.  As his PLC critics Abdul Jawad Saleh 
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Hamayel and Ziad Abu-Amr pointed out (accordingly), “Arafat is individualistic to an 
abnormal degree...[where] he prefers to make decisions on his own.” And “[i]f there is 
an embodiment of institutionalization, Arafat’s style of leadership is the antithesis.”513 
His need to micromanage in order to keep power close at hand meant that Arafat was 
directly or indirectly involved in, and made aware of, every aspect of the PA activities - 
from the security sector, to the judiciary, to the PLC. Arafat’s anti-institutional 
approach appeared to a degree to be based on fear and paranoia of being removed from 
power. The instability and uncertainty of the peace agreements contributed to this 
atmosphere of insecurity, compelling Arafat to use methods of compromise, 
manoeuvre, co-optation, and competition between officials, factions and clans, in order 
to maintain the upper-hand.
514
 Some of Arafat’s critics have conceded that it was 
perhaps his personal charisma and dominant character which enabled him to act this 
way, as well as his personal legitimacy and the legitimacy conferred on the PA by the 
peace process and elections.
515
  
 
It should also be noted, however, that Israel, the United States and the International 
Community effectively turned a blind eye to Arafat’s individualistic style of leadership 
at this crucial early stage. Their interests lay in the continuation of the peace process 
which would, it was believed, provide security for Israel. Ailments in the management 
of the Palestinian Authority, would be overlooked and forgiven as long as the survival 
of the peace process was not jeopardised, even when these meant silent endorsement of 
human rights abuses and the undermining of democratic institutions and processes. 
From the Israeli and American points of view, Arafat was understood to be the only 
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person who could keep control over the POTs in the face of Islamist and other 
opposition to the peace process (and the concessions which it entailed). He was 
therefore of personal importance and they were prepared to ‘overlook’ some of the 
PA’s ‘undemocratic’ behaviour if he could suppress opposition to the peace process, by 
whatever means necessary.
516
 
 
In time, however, complaints about the PA became rife as oppositions criticised its 
authoritarian nature and mismanagement of state resources. The PA became distrusted 
not only because of its attachment to and coordination with Israeli security but also 
because of Arafat inability to delegate authority and suppression of any effort towards 
reform. The security sector was increasingly accused of performing outside of the 
prescription of law. For example, cases of land dealer (Palestinians who were selling 
lands to Israelis) assassination were attributed to the GIS sector and PA intelligence.
517
  
PA undemocratic practices and mismanagement was also ascribed to the PA’s 
obligation to fulfil its end of the agreement pursuant to the DOP and subsequent 
Agreements in order to ensure its political survival.  
 
The absence of power for the different branches of the government propelled the 
counter-elites to strike a balance between the power vested in each governing body by 
the peace agreements and the power asserted by Arafat in all aspects of the governing 
institutions.  This unchecked control and his obstruction of the governing entities from 
performing their duties prompted the counter-elites to offset this imbalance through 
measures pushed through the PLC. These policies were hoped to limit the executive 
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power of Arafat by diversifying the power sources.  As such, the work of the counter-
elites within the PLC will be examined to understand how the institution sought to 
counter Arafat’s authority. 
 
THE PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
The Palestinian Legislative Council (hereinafter PLC) officially commenced its work 
as a legislating body on the 7
th
 of March 1996. Structured as a parliamentary 
democracy, the PLC consisted of a presidency elected on a yearly rotational basis, 
standing and ad-hoc committees and subcommittees, as well as set of rules for 
legislative conduct, procedures, floor protocols, etc.  The internal statutes  defined the 
composition of committees, procedures for submission of bills, speech order, 
membership issues, conditions of immunity for council members, the establishment of 
departments within the PLC to support its work etc.
518
 The PLC was responsible for 
legislation and oversight of the executive branch.
519
 The first act therefore of the PLC 
upon its opening session was to elect its presidency composed of the chairman of the 
council, his two deputies, and a secretary. The election process for these positions was 
to be a secret ballot during the PLC’s first meeting after the elections; at the beginning 
of each new activity year, a new presidency would be elected. The peace agreements 
prohibited the PA Chairman and Ministers (Executive Authority) from holding any 
position in the PLC presidency, as a move to emphasise in both concept and practice 
the separation of power.
520
 This restriction was supposed to give the PLC, in theory, 
more flexibility and freedom to assure their independence in decision making from the 
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executive branch, in particular from Arafat. The PLC presidency was given the 
responsibility to oversee the management, administration and financial affairs of the 
house. The responsibilities of the Chairman of the Council included being its 
spokesman, maintained security and order within, conducting and concluding council 
meetings, and granting or withdrawing  the right of speech to council members. The  
separation of powers would grant the PLC independence in formulating its own policy, 
implementing its decision making processes, and ensuring the independence of the 
projects, work and investigations of its subcommittees (permanent and ad-hoc)—which 
were to focus on specific areas and issues for the development of the PA.  
 
In addition to its other duties, the PLC as a parliament was given the authority to 
control the “actions of the other authorities and actions of legislation, etc.”521 It was 
also responsible for continuous control and monitoring of all other authorities in the 
government which included the Executive, Ministers and any other officials working in 
the government ministry. They were granted with the power to issue summons and 
demand clarification from members of the Council of Ministries and their subordinates 
whereby they would be legally bound to attend and answer. Ministers were also subject 
to the PLC’s approval in that they cannot begin to carry out their ministerial duties 
without the majority approval of confidence from the PLC. Furthermore, the PLC was 
given control over the operations of government officials. A council member could 
formally ask for clarification or justification on certain projects or procedures from 
Ministers or ministries, who would be legally bound to provide clear responses to the 
queries. The framework proposed for the Palestinian Legislative Council was a check 
and balance system which sought to maximise transparency and efficiency, as well as a 
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move towards decentralisation of power. There was, as Cheryl Rubdenberg asserts, a 
clear element of support for a democratic regime in the structures and functions of the 
PLC, and an aspiration from council members who were from Gaza and the West Bank 
that this would move the new government forward towards a pluralistic democratic 
entity.
522
   
 
However, with the election result, and Arafat’s capture of the position of President of 
the PA, this independence was compromised.  Even senior positions in the PLC were 
occupied by Arafat’s close associates i.e. Abu ‘Ala, who was elected as the PLC 
speaker.
523
 Indeed, the system that arose following the commencement of the PLC was 
not dissimilar to the PLO system of governance. Arafat held control over strategic 
positions and ministries of the PA, and vetoing power which limited and contained the 
ability of the PLC to implement some of their legislative objectives.  At the same time, 
the PLC members were unwilling, or unable to challenge this constriction of power by 
Arafat. Firstly, they did not want to challenge the symbolic legitimacy of Arafat which 
would portray an image of a divided nation. Secondly, they still believed that only 
Arafat had the credibility to create peace with Israel. Thus the Insider counter-elites 
sought to challenge Arafat’s usurpation of power over the PA by seeking to consolidate 
its own democratic structures and processes rather than by rejecting the PLC itself. This 
was evident in three areas of struggle for democratic reforms. Firstly, for passing and 
the implementation of a Basic Law which would limit the power of Arafat and define 
the role of the PA leadership, governing bodies and departments; secondly through the 
commissioning and issuing  of the 1997 Corruption Report—which made fully public 
the neo-patrimonial modus operandi of the PA and served as a platform to initiate 
                                                          
522
 Rubenberg, C.A. The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace, (2003), p. 248 
523
 Rubenberg, C.A. The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace, (2003), p. 248 
CHAPTER IV:  OUTSIDER-INSIDER ELITES STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY—
IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
 
227 | P a g e  
 
reform and transparency within the system; and thirdly through the struggle for control 
of the NGO sector—which represented a source of financial power and political 
legitimacy which the PA leadership sought to bring under its own control.   
 
 
THE BASIC LAW 
The structure of the Palestinian Authority created by the peace agreements resembled 
an entity that performs partly as a Parliament and partly as an oversight committee.
524
 
The ambiguity of the agreements necessitated that the Palestinian Authority create its 
own Basic Law to govern its own “organization, structure, and functioning.”525 The 
Basic Law would provide the principles of law and power, concretely (rather than 
superficially) separating, defining and limiting the roles and duties of the three 
governing bodies, the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. Moreover, it would also 
define, provide and guarantee the rights of its citizens.
526
 Implementing a Basic Law 
would limit Arafat’s personal ability to manage the PA as an extension of the PLO. 
Additionally, he would have to adhere to democratic political structures, processes and 
modes of behaviour, which would undermine the influence of the PLO’s neo-
patrimonial practices and informal networks.  
 
The concept of a democratic and sovereign Palestinian state was not new and the notion 
of a Basic Law had long accompanied this goal. At the PLO’s 1988 PNC meeting in 
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Algiers, the PNC had declared an independent Palestinian State with a “democratic 
parliamentary system.” The PNC had passed a resolution which authorised its Central 
Committee to pass a Basic Law, over Arafat’s objections. They had envisioned the 
Basic Law to serve as an articulation of constitutional principles.
527
 This was perhaps, 
as Nathan Brown has suggested, a premature designing of a constitutional mechanism 
considering that the PLO/PNC lacked both territories and people over whom to govern.  
In theory, a constitution usually follows independence from foreign control and 
construction of a governing structure.  Hence, a constitution reflects modified “power-
realities” and is maintained by the political elite.528  
 
In the Palestinian case, the 1988 PNC resolution in favour of a Basic Law remained 
ignored until 1993.
529
 The signing of the Declaration of Principles significantly 
changed the priority for drafting the Basic Law. The framework under which the Basic 
Law was drafted was constrained by the Oslo Accords, by its restrictions, prescriptions, 
limitations, and principles which ultimately prioritised the security of Israel over 
Palestinian state-building and indeed did not articulate an end-goal of such a 
Palestinian state. Furthermore, it was originally formulated under the auspices of the 
PLO as the provisional PA, by selected PLO officials, and with no process of public 
consultation. This was far from the norm of constitutional formation.  In a developed 
form of constitution building, a constitution is written by elected officials, representing 
the people, not by leadership-appointed individuals, and then submitted to popular 
referendum whereby, once ratified, it can only be revised through a constitutional 
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majority of the legislature, followed by popular ratification.
530
 As the issuer of the 
Basic Law, the PLO was exempt from the rules and laws that would later govern the 
PA and so, for Arafat, it became imperative that the Basic Law be drawn-up before the 
establishment of the PA.
531
  
 
The 1993 Basic Law was drafted by a group of PLO-appointed Palestinian jurists under 
the leadership of jurist Anis al-Qasem.
532
 Moreover, it was formed while still under the 
authority of foreign control (Israel), with a lack of any clear indication of the power-
dynamics between the occupier and the occupied, and with no permanent resolution in 
place. The temporary and conditional nature of the Basic Law was clear then, as it 
lacked the basic characteristics of a normal constitution (such as defined policy 
competencies for the executive and legislative branches) and it was exclusively tied to 
the interim period.  It was conditional because it was dependent on the successful 
completion and implementation of the DOP; and it was temporary because it was tied 
to the interim phase. 
533
 Nevertheless it was envisioned to provide the legal framework 
for a future Palestinian constitution.  The drafting of the Palestinian Basic Law 
therefore sought to accomplish two objectives: first, on a symbolic level, to indicate a 
measure of sovereignty; second, on a practical level, it supposedly aimed to create a 
democratic, liberal and accountable government.  Hence, the establishment of a Basic 
Law would lay claim not only to a sovereign and independent Palestinian entity but 
also to a constitutional government, a departure from the ‘norm’ in the Arab world.534    
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There was a general reservation regarding the Basic Law’s stated aim to provide 
institutional stability and political accountability and whether the Palestinians would be 
able to depart from the perceived regional ‘norm’ of authoritarian and neo-patrimonial 
rule. The PLO’s haste to draw-up the Basic Law—in preparation for the provisional 
government—did not encourage a positive image of an inclusive drafting process or 
give confidence that the contents would be fair and democratic in nature. Rather, it was 
perceived as a means to secure in place a governing mechanism which would outline 
and control the function of the new Palestinian entity vis-à-vis power given to the PLO 
and its leadership.  Pressure was put on the PLO to publish the draft Basic Law to get 
some public input and participation in its drafting before the setting up of the 
provisional PA government in the Gaza Strip. The draft Basic Law was therefore 
published on December 1993, when it was met with public outcry and criticism.
535
 The 
draft contained elements that were rejected by both Israel and the Palestinian public.  
The Israelis opposed to the PNC’s reference to the Palestinian people as the source of 
their authority and their declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.
536
 
Palestinian critics argued that it gave exclusive power to the executive branch. The 
Basic Law was anticipated only to serve as a temporary ‘constitution’ for the newly 
established Palestinian entity until an independent state was established and whereupon 
a permanent constitution would be constructed.
537
 However, critics feared that if 
accepted in its unrevised form, the provisional constitution would become permanent in 
the envisioned sovereign state.  They further claimed that because of the nature and 
environment under which the constitution was drafted i.e. in secrecy and in haste 
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without public or external inputs, it contained (or included) loopholes which were 
conducive for Presidential authoritarianism.
538
 Due to public pressure therefore, the 
draft was revised and reissued in January 1994, debated at a February conference in 
Jerusalem, and redrafted and republished in April. While some scholars argued that this 
process had led to a considerably improved and restructured April draft of the Basic 
Law which addressed some of the concerns, they recognised that improvement was 
only in relation to the original draft. Moreover, many of the concessions were only 
symbolic.
539
  
 
Subsequent drafts of the Basic Law met challenges from the PLO leadership, 
particularly from Arafat, who consistently sought to stall redrafts which might impose 
on his autonomy.  Counter-elites’ meanwhile saw their efforts to get a redrafted 
comprehensive and liberal Basic Law as a means by which to balance power-dynamics 
in the political sphere. When the Palestinian Legislative Council assumed seats in 
parliament following the January 1996 election, it was anticipated that they would 
address issues, problems and criticisms raised in the public sphere through 
comprehensive legislative initiatives and implementation of the rule of law. Counter-
elites were aware, therefore, of the significance of passing a Basic Law which would 
not only limit and define Arafat’s power as president, but also provide autonomy for 
the PLC members to implement and make policies. Therefore, by April 1996, during 
the Palestinian Legislative Council’s second session of its first term, it issued 
Resolution No. (8/2/1) which demanded that the Ministerial Cabinet present a final 
draft of the Basic Law to the Legislative Council within three weeks.
540
 Although this 
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did not come to fruition due to the unwillingness of Arafat to construct and implement 
a Basic Law which would relinquish and/or share his power, it provided an avenue 
towards reform and transparency.  
 
In order to provide a more comprehensive and inclusive Basic Law, subsequent drafts 
of the al-Qasem version drew upon various sources and received inputs from Al-Haq 
human rights groups and constitutions from other countries.
541
 This eventually became 
a struggle for power between the Counter-elites in the PLC on the one hand, and Arafat 
and his Outsiders on the other, as the PLC sought to secure Arafat’s signature to pass it 
as law and Arafat vetoed each draft. This tug-of-war between Arafat and the Counter-
elites showcased Arafat’s use and abuse of power as he sought to make clear to the 
PLC that he would not ratify any legislation that would limit his power.
542
 On the other 
hand, the Counter-elites sought to redirect, and to an extent restructure, the ‘state’ 
institutions to reverse Arafat’s centralisation of power and obstruct his neo-patrimonial 
style of rule.
543
 Professor Ziad Abu Amr, one of the leading PLC critics of the PA 
leadership, perceived this struggle as the PLC as being hindered in its role and unable 
to exercise control over the Executive power.
544
  
 
After subsequent drafts and their vetoing by Arafat, the PLC decided to unilaterally 
approve a 1997 revised draft of the Basic Law without seeking to ‘consult’ or 
compromise with Arafat. One of Arafat’s adamant rejections of the Basic Law 
stemmed from a clause which would demote the Ra’is (Arafat’s) power, consequently 
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limiting the power vested in the office and its control over other departments and 
sectors attached to the PA. This long standing impasse of wills between the Insider 
counter-elites and the Arafat/Outsider elites eventually reached a break-through in its 
deadlock due to imposed pressure from external powers i.e., the United States and the 
international community, which forced Arafat to ratify the Basic Law in May 2002.  
 
In March 2003, amendments were made to the Basic Law which provided more power 
and independence for the Palestinian Legislative Council members, more defined roles, 
and a legal foundation for the PA. One significant amendment which was previously 
‘overlooked’ was the position of prime minister. The absence of a prime ministerial 
role was not an inconsequential or overlooked issue but rather a methodological effort 
on Arafat’s part to resist power sharing. While the amendment endowed the prime 
minister with the responsibility for “forming and modifying the council of ministers 
and overseeing government institutions,” it gave the president the authority to “refer the 
prime minister for investigation.” Simultaneously, it gave the prime minister the right 
to “refer ministers to investigation – when accused of crimes.”545 It was a check and 
balance relationship between the office of the president and the prime minister; 
whereas previously the authority of nomination and dismissal of ministers, and 
management of government institutions among other executive decisions rested solely 
with the president.  Placed in a precarious position with further pressures from external 
power to pass the measures, Arafat relented and signed the amendments into law thus 
formally demoting his own office’s power.546   
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The elites in the PLC viewed this concession by Arafat and feat of passing the 
amendment as a foundation measure for increasing their role, and autonomy as a 
parliamentary body to perform their duties without meddling from the president’s 
office. The significance of this amendment is that it further allowed for “10 members of 
the 88-member legislative council to submit a request to hold a special session to 
withdraw confidence from the government, or from any of its ministers, after 
investigation.”547 Consequently, it provided more power for the PLC to monitor the 
cabinet and ministers of the president’s office which would consequently, in theory, put 
a limit on their activities and their governing power. The amendment furthermore 
introduced the PA’s first disclosure requirements where all PA ministers and the prime 
minister were obliged under law to provide a financial report on themselves, their 
spouses and their dependent children. Moreover they were to declare any conflicts of 
interest.
548
 However, even formulating and passing these laws, Arafat still ‘unofficially’ 
maintained power and control over the government defying all legal arrangements and 
laws. For example, in October 2003, following a suicide attack in Haifa which killed 19 
Israelis, Arafat used his presidential power to call for an emergency government and 
installed a new 8-member cabinet before submitting the names of his cabinet to the 
PLC for approval. The move was criticised by opponents calling this unlawful for it not 
only negated and undermine the role of the PLC—which had granted the power to 
select a cabinet to the Prime Minister—but it also criticised Arafat for imposing his will 
as President to implement a motion of “emergency government” not provided for in the 
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Palestinian Basic Law (Constitution).
549
 The “new” cabinet that was installed by Arafat 
included his most ‘trusted’ allies, most of the old members of the former cabinet, many 
of whom were named, unsurprisingly, in the 1997 Corruption Report produced by the 
PLC and would not have necessarily been approved by the PLC if they had been 
consulted before the cabinet members were officially ‘installed’ in office.550  This move 
by Arafat illustrated the struggle for power between him and the PLC, where each was 
seeking to curtail the influence and power of the other. 
 
It should be noted that Israel, the United States and the international community only 
became actively engaged in seeking to curtail Arafat’s power through support for the 
PLC’s initiatives regarding the Basic Law and its amendments, once Arafat was 
beginning to lose his credibility as their own “partner for peace”. For example the 
Sharm al-Shaykh Accord signed on the 4
th
 of September 1999 between Arafat and 
Ehud Barak—which was seen as the continuation of the (suspended) Wye 
Agreement—were mainly concerned with the final status negotiations, Israeli (2nd) 
deployments from Area C (in three stages), and the release of Palestinian prisoners 
came to a impasse when Israel refused to implement the second stage of redeployment 
and in its stead authorised further settlement in the West Bank.
551
  Efforts to have the 
U.S. intervene resulted in the U.S. declaring that the two sides should work out the 
differences themselves.  This forced Arafat to announce a deadlock to the final status 
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talks claiming that Israel used the negotiations as a veil for further settlement 
expansion.
552
  
 
By December 1999, Arafat and Barak resumed talks however was again at a deadlock 
when first, Israel postponed the 3
rd
 stage deployment date—which was supposed to be 
completed in January 2000—to the end of 2000 without consulting PA.  Second, Barak 
presented Arafat and the PA a finalised map of the 3
rd
 stage redeployment (which did 
not include populated areas near Jerusalem) from the OPT without, yet again, 
consulting the PA which infuriated Arafat and suspended further talks.
553
 The trilateral 
Camp David Summit in July 2000 which involved the U.S., Israel and the PA, was to 
revive the failed Sharm al-Shaykh Accord.  President Bill Clinton made a last-
opportunity push to reach a Middle East peace solution before he left office, which was 
prematurely perceived by Arafat and eagerly by Barak.
554
   
 
Arafat’s staunch refusal to compromise on the core issues of right of return for 
Palestinian refugees, unclear stipulation on Israel being forbidden to dig in areas 
adjacent to the Western Wall, and Israeli security presence in the Jordan valley, was 
blamed as the cause for the collapse of the 2000 Camp David.
555
 However, Arafat 
position was backed by the majority of the Palestinian population. It was claimed that 
Barak was willing to give back 90 percent
556
 of the West Bank and all of Gaza Strip, 
allowed for return of some refugees, and shared sovereignty over the Temple Mount 
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which Arafat refused and perceived as an illustration of his unwillingness to end the 
conflict.
557
 In hindsight, if Barak’s offer is viewed on the basis of what the Palestinians 
would gain from the land swap then it would entail Palestinian losses with minimal (if 
any) concessions from the Israeli side. For example, on the western border of the 
territories, “the Palestinians get the 1967 lines, but with modifications to take account 
of the Israeli settlements; on the eastern border, it’s sovereignty for the Palestinians, 
with Israel’s security needs met; on refugees, it’s the general principle for the 
Palestinians in terms of reference to UN General Assembly resolution 194 (not the 
“right of return”) and its practical limitation for the Israelis.”558  Nevertheless, the U.S. 
and Israel united to declare that the failure of the 2000 Camp David Accord was 
attributed to Arafat’s refusal of Barak’s ‘generous offer’ to share Jerusalem.559 
 
With the collapse of the 2000 Camp David Accord, it promulgated a series of killings 
and suicide attacks against Israel where Arafat (PA) was blamed for his modus 
operandi of either encouraging, in collusion with, or unable to reign in the culprits.
560
 
As such, Arafat’s failure to accept final status peace agreements, his inability or 
unwillingness to reign in Islamist militants as he sought to maintain his delicate 
domestic juggling act, and the increasing propensity of his own security services to act 
outside of understandings with Israel, made him progressively appear something of a 
liability. Only then did Israel and the U.S. begin to demonstrate concern over Arafat’s 
style of governance, or actively endorse PLC efforts to constrain through a Basic Law, 
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once more demonstrating the weakness of the Palestinian institutions and their 
dependence on external support which was preconditioned not on democratic principles 
but self-serving aspirations for Israeli security. 
 
The PLC effort to reform the PA into an entity that would resemble a democratic 
governing institution was not limited to providing a Basic Law to govern the PA but 
also sought to disclose and resolve the  financial mismanagement of the PA, which they 
hoped would in turn lead to a more transparent and accountable political system.  As 
such, the PLC pursued the issue of transparency through its 1997 Corruption Report, 
which was itself a response to Arafat’s own commissioning of the PA’s Auditor 
General’s Office to produce an auditing report in response to international donor’s 
concerns over financial mismanagement of international aid and development funds.  In 
my interview with Azmi Shu’aybi regarding the investigation towards the 1997 PLC 
corruption report, he stated that the finding indicated very clear models of misuse of 
power for private gain.
561
 The 1997 PLC report subsequently found irregularities and 
implicated ministers and ministries in corruption, highlighting the conflicting and 
duplicating duties and roles of departments, the lack of operating procedures or 
measures for monitoring and accountability, and the existence of an informal system of 
governance. It is worth examining here how the PLC counter-elite members used this 
report as an opportunity to push for political reforms and to restrain Arafat’s use (and 
abuse) of power. 
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THE 1997 CORRUPTION REPORT 
Throughout Arafat’s tenure in office, he was able to use the official power vested in 
him as president of the Palestinian Authority to control and manoeuvre every aspect of 
the political, economic and social sectors of the OPT, not only for “personal” and 
informal ends, i.e.: for non-state matters and on behalf of his cohorts, but to also bypass 
the restrictive terms of the Oslo Accords by means of ‘rewards and punishment’.  This 
form of ‘carrot and stick’ approach was achieved through the use of informal and 
formal means legitimised by his official position in office. As pressure mounted on 
Arafat—following the 1996 election—for political reform and to improve budgetary 
management and transparency, Arafat launched an investigation into these charges. The 
comptroller for the PA’s Auditor General’s Office (General Control Office, GCO) 
Jarrar al-Qudwa, himself a cousin of Arafat, headed the taskforce to look at government 
use of public funds.
562
 By May 1997, a report emerged from this investigation, which 
came to capture donor interests in both the PA’s internal control systems that monitor 
spending within the Ministries and external audits.
563
  
 
When the al-Quds television station broadcast the PLC debate on the Corruption Report, 
its owner, Palestinian-American journalist Daoud Kuttab, was arrested by the PA police. 
He was charged with violating the Law of the Press and the terms of his contract with 
the PA Ministry of Information and the PLC. Although Kuttab’s contract entailed him 
to broadcast PLC debates and sessions, apparently conditions in the fine print 
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prohibited from transmitting the infamous debate and Kuttab was only released when 
he agreed not to broadcast any more PLC sessions without first securing the approval 
of Arafat.
564
  
 
Arafat’s concern was not surprising, for the 1997 GCO report generated a public outcry 
and widespread demands for reform, initiating extensive public dialogues and debates. 
The report also gained international attention as sections of the Palestinian media who 
criticised the PA were blocked and censored by the PA-run Palestine Broadcasting 
Corporation.  The report criticised the performance of the different public 
administrations and institutions, revealing revenues of the PA which amounted to about 
$325 millions to have been wasted or misused, as well as various forms of misuse of 
official power among officials in the PA. The 600 page al-Qudwa audit report—which 
was abridged by Arafat—provided an initial insight into the extensive wide-spread 
practice of corruption and graft inside the PA.
565
 Although the report was considered by 
both PA critics and PA officials to have been not very well prepared and to be flawed 
in many areas, it was nevertheless praised for its efforts to publicise and disclose PA 
internal problems of mismanagement of funds, and the incongruity between its methods 
of financial operation and those required by international donors and organisations. On 
the other hand, many of those inside the PA whether in opposition to Arafat or not 
conceded the flaws of the report.  
 
Those that were close to Arafat argued that al-Qudwa was not qualified and 
knowledgeable enough to perform the audit. As the Minister of the Palestinian 
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Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR)—which is a 
ministry of the PA, Dr. Mohammed Shtayyeh recounted in our interview, al-Qudwa 
could not differentiate between bad policy and corruption. Moreover, al-Qudwa only 
superficially touched upon real issues of corruption in his report, for example within 
the para-military institutions, but rather reported on less central issues such as the use 
of U.S. donor money to augment tax-exemptions for returnees.
566
  In my interviews 
with prominent Palestinian political elites, they related that the al-Qudwa report also 
highlighted the poor performance of the PA and its structural weakness as a state entity 
to implement and enforce viable and sustainable policies, or to define organisational 
structures and functions which would not only provide a more transparent governing 
institution but also hold its actors accountable.
567
  
 
Ministers and high ranking government officials were implicated in the report but the 
authors of the report placed particular focus on the mismanagement of budgets by 
ministries. It lent credibility to the claims that the Palestinian administration was 
inherently corrupt in nature.
568
 Although this perception of the PA as a governing entity 
rife with graft and corruption had existed almost from its inception, the report validated 
the image by providing clear evidence. Arafat’s response to the report was ‘typical’, 
remarked George Giacaman in our interview, in that he ordered an abridged version of 
the full report to be distributed which under-stated the extent of the damage.  In 
response to further pressure to resolve the problems, Arafat “founded a new committee 
to look into the report itself and the recommendation [that accompanied it], which was 
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headed by Nabil Kassis, then a minister in the PA.” 569  The Budget and Finance 
Committee included PLC members Azmi Shu’aybi, Sa’di al-Krunz, Yousef Abu 
Safiyye, Fakri Shaqqoura and Hikmat Zeid and was tasked with compiling the PLC 
report in response to the al-Qudwa report.  However, they faced many challenges to 
their request for access to information and justification for ministerial budgetary 
activities.
570
   
 
The creation of this special committee presented the opportunity for the counter-elites 
to bring the government to task for its failings. It reflected mounting frustration 
amongst the PLC members over their inability to perform their roles and function due 
to Arafat’s interference and his by-passing of their offices through his own appointees 
and networks.  The President and his cabinet not only ignored the PLC’s oversight roles, 
but he made no presidential actions  in response to their  legislations, disregarded 
resolutions, and did not encourage or acknowledge the PLC’s effort to write a Basic 
Law.
571
 The only drastic measure that the PLC could hold over the President and his 
cabinet, in order to enforce their power, was the threat to withdraw confidence. This 
argued Brown, was an approach that was rarely performed by an Arab parliament and 
seemed to hold true with the PLC. However, on the other hand members of the PLC 
were themselves coming in for public criticism for being incompetent and inefficient
572
, 
the result of both  their  reliance on the President’s approval for getting anything done 
and the constraints of the Oslo Accords and Israeli stipulations.  With these frustrations 
mounting, PLC members were eager to sue the 1997 Corruption report as a means of 
vindicating themselves and bringing Arafat and his Outsider elites to account. 
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Between them these reports revealed that there was no written mandate or job 
description for officials. The PA’s Internal Auditing department itself had no defined 
operating procedures and, like PA ministries, did not possess any comprehensible 
organisational structure, thus paving the way for the manoeuvring of positions for 
power and mismanagement of funds by officials.
573
 The PLC examined Al-Qudwa’s 
report and proposed a full investigation of the allegations of corruption. In my 
interview with Azmi Shu’aybi, who was one of the main PLC members investigating 
the corruption charges, stated that their investigation was grounded and based on “very 
clear models of misuse of power for private gain…[particularly] conflict of interests in 
general, monopolies, and big procurement.”574  Bribery, which is often found when 
assessing corruption in former colonial states, was according to Shu’aybi not one of the 
main problems uncovered in the PA corruption allegation. However, the use of official 
power and the diverting of donations and funds into private accounts were widespread 
and part of Arafat’s own modus operandi.  Shu’aybi concluded that some of the 
problems could have been resolved through legislation which would have ‘legalised’ 
transactions into accounts set up specifically to address some of the problems 
associated with supporting PLO branches and families abroad. However Arafat and 
many of the ministerial officials of the PA who were part of this scheme preferred to 
conduct business in the clandestine and personalised manner of the revolutionary 
period since this presented greater opportunities for abuse, less accountability and 
reinforced the informal ties between those involved.
575
 
 
                                                          
573
 Where there is no clear definition of duties or responsibilities, it contributes to the mismanagement of 
funds either through double dipping, or different officials paying the same invoice etc.  
574
  Shu'aybi, Azmi. Personal Interview.  4 August, 2008. 
575
  Shu'aybi, Azmi. Personal Interview.  4 August, 2008. 
CHAPTER IV:  OUTSIDER-INSIDER ELITES STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY—
IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
 
244 | P a g e  
 
 Shu’aybi and his colleagues published their findings much to the chagrin of Arafat, not 
least since this was a crucial time for the PA in confronting similar allegations of 
corruption from the international community.  George Giacaman commented in our 
interview, that once the findings were presented to Arafat, the report was deliberately 
set aside with no actions proceeding from it. Giacaman commented on how Arafat 
perused the report and filed it at the bottom of one of his drawers.
  
He was less 
concerned with the findings than with the appearance of ‘doing’ something about the 
allegations which would on one hand pacify critics and donors while on the other hand 
allowing the PA to continue to function exactly as it had, without significant 
institutional changes.
576
  Rather than withhold confidence, which would have been an 
insult to the President and perhaps have no significant impact on the modus operandi of 
the Executive body and his ministers, the PLC decided to issue a resolution which 
would enable the prosecution of ministers and officials who were indicted on 
corruption charges arising from the report findings. Moreover, by the end of July 1997, 
they insisted that the President should install a new and corruption free cabinet.  In 
response to the PLC resolution and demand, Arafat asked for the resignation of his 
cabinet members pending a reshuffle. However, by autumn 1997, the reshuffle was not 
complete and the existing cabinet members remained in office.
577
  
 
The frustration and outcry among PLC members mounted to such a point that Arafat 
was forced to make a rare appearance at the October PLC meeting. In a series of 
concessions, the Speaker, Abu ‘Ala, related Arafat’s intention to sign some of the 
approved PLC legislation within ten days, to reshuffle his cabinet, to allow for a joint-
committee drawn from the PLC and his own cabinet to look at 187 PLC resolutions, 
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and to resubmit the overdue 1998 PA budget for PLC approval.  In return for these 
compromises, the PLC would be asked to give his ministers the opportunity to defend 
themselves against the corruption charges.  However by December 1997, Arafat had 
yet to reshuffle his cabinet and failed to fulfil any of the other presidential promises 
issued in October.
578
 Arafat did manage to sign some of the more insignificant 
legislative bills, but disregarded important pieces of legislation. He set up a non-
effective joint-committee, whilst meeting with Fatah PLC members to gain more time 
and support, all of which were moves to satisfy the bare minimum of his pledge.  
 
Azmi Shu’aybi, who had been one of the leading investigators for the corruption report, 
actively sought out the ministers, calling them to account and demanding transparency 
in PA transaction from Arafat. This brought the confrontation with Arafat to a head 
when, at the end of 1997, Arafat refused to cooperate with the PLC unless Shu’aybi 
was removed as the Chair of the Budget Committee. According to Shu’aybi, the main 
problem for Arafat was that Shu’aybi refused to accept the 1998 Budget “as is” and he 
and his colleagues threatened a no-confidence vote on Arafat’s cabinet unless Arafat 
and his cohorts discontinued their diversion of PA funds and the practice of sending 
money to outside untraceable and unofficial sources. As such, from the latter part of 
1997 until early 1998, Shu’aybi refused to approve the budget and Arafat refused to 
accept the recommendations. The deadlock in the presidential budget, with a two-
month halt on the budget, caused rifts within the PLC. Shu’aybi was pressured by 
colleagues to step down while Arafat changed tactics by co-opting a number of the 
legislative council members into his cabinet. Promotions were offered for ministerial 
positions, to include some of the prominent individuals named above, which was to 
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ensure their vote of confidence in the government. This ultimately led to pressure on 
Shu’aybi to resign in 1998 and resulted in a vote of confidence by the PLC for Arafat’s 
government and all his expenditures.
579
 Shu’aybi remarked in our interview that even 
his staunch supporters and friends who had previously supported him in all aspects of 
drafting rules and policies, reforms, investigation of Ministers and ministries and so 
forth were unwilling to back him against Arafat. “They could not say ‘no’ to Arafat.”580  
 
These events gave Arafat more confidence in his position relative to the PLC.  Despite 
PLC members’ complaints about his failure to carry out his part of the bargain, and 
threats by dissident members of setting up a parallel Fatah bloc within the PLC to 
challenge Arafat, in the end no actual actions were taken to implement these threats and 
complaints. Instead, the PLC itself began to split into two camps: one corner was 
composed of those choosing not to disturb the status quo or to challenge the President 
for fear of weakening national unity or indeed for fear of Arafat and his security 
services. On the other side an increasingly few dissident counter-elites actively sought 
genuine reform from the inside, seeking  to hold Arafat accountable and arguing that 
the current modus operandi of the PA and their lack of actions sustained  weak-state 
institutions and contributed to a decrease in public trust in the governing system.
581
 
They argued that the accommodating PLC members’ refusal to challenge the president 
was damaging to their image, indicating a lack of power and ability to build a 
democratic state.   
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Notwithstanding the demands and resolution of the PLC for reform and a change of 
cabinet, it took one year before Arafat finally announced a new cabinet. However, 
Arafat’s chosen ‘new’ cabinet members included those indicted in the corruption report. 
The only exception to the new composition was the replacement of those who had since 
died, with new members being appointed to replace them.  To further reiterate his 
power to the opposition, and to gain support and legitimacy, Arafat installed new 
ministers into his cabinet—which exceeded the limit of nineteen as prescribed by the 
Basic Law—established new ministries without PLC approval, and co-opted PLC 
members into his cabinet.
582
   
 
The significance of the GCO report was that it identified how the PA leadership has 
used corruption to create specific political opportunities for themselves. The absence of 
financial transparency has enabled the officials within ministries and the president’s 
office to access general funds which then allowed them to pursue types of projects 
which the PA itself was prohibited from pursuing under the terms of the Oslo 
Agreements. In my interview with Salim Tamari, he emphasised that this included 
creating a “cash flow in the hand of the President to create group funding support 
outside the domain of the PA, embassies, consulates, militias, martyrs funds, support 
for groups outside the country in Lebanon especially, refugee camps”. 583   Tamari 
referred to this as misappropriations as distinct from other forms of corruption. A 
second form of “opportunity” came in the PA’s creation of monopolies which not only 
created economic empires for individuals but more specifically were aimed at creating 
new avenues for the exercise of power by Arafat and Outsider members of the PLO.
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By 2003, a law was introduced which would finally define specific penalties for 
misappropriation of public funds or any act relating to corruption in public office. This 
was an opportune moment for legislators who had been pushing for transparency in the 
PA. This particular law would issue “penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment for 
embezzlement of public funds, up to 15 years for bribery and life imprisonment for 
destroying evidence to facilitate, or cover up, embezzlement. Funds would be 
recovered and fines imposed equal to the amount of embezzled funds or damages 
incurred.”584  
 
THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION CHALLENGE 
The third realm in which the Counter-elites sought to circumscribe Arafat’s 
personalised power was that of the NGO sector. When the First Intifada occurred, the 
Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) sector was one of the entities that 
enabled and promoted mass mobilisation in the resistance movement. NGOs provided 
the means for popular Palestinian disengagement from economic, health and 
agricultural dependence on the Israeli regime. As recounted Issam Abu Al-Haj, 
Director of Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center and a former Birzeit student 
leader, during my interview conducted with him, there were certain criteria in place for 
selecting people into NGOs. Individuals had to be, inter alia, pioneering, previously 
arrested for their political activities, faced harassment by the Israelis, and to have made 
personal sacrifices and/or provided voluntary service to the cause or to help the 
Palestinian communities.
585
 Thus there was a strong link between the society and these 
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organisations which were instrumental during the Intifada to coordinate resistance 
activities.   
 
In the early 1990s with the establishment of the PA, Palestinian NGOs went through a 
transformation from a popular movement to a professional entity, with salaried staff 
funded by international donors. The successful NGOs swiftly adapted themselves to the 
new situations by revamping their organisations toward Western donor states and 
International NGOs.
586
 Their agendas also displayed this transition: from reflecting 
grassroots needs and autonomous activities with a domestic agenda to their increasing 
dependence on injections of donor funding subsequently internalising donor agendas. 
As remarked PECDAR’s minister, donor money is always accompanied by donor 
agenda, which is political in nature.
587
  Recruitment to NGOs also became more a 
technical than a political issue—as with the political recruitment and self-sufficiency 
movement towards Israeli disengagement during the Intifada. As such, observed Abu 
Al Haj, value was now placed on skills such as foreign language competence, computer 
literacy, or additional types of technical proficiencies. In turn, this affected the type of 
elite that came to lead the NGOs, and the institutional culture which they exhibited.
588
  
Tasks and social services that were the basis for the establishment of Palestinian 
NGOs/grassroots organisations to provide during the absence of a legitimate 
Palestinian formal government, in the areas of health, education, social welfare, waters, 
human rights, civil rights etc., had to be revisited. As recounted Nabil Kassis in a 
personal interview, the PA sought to take on many (if not all) of these responsibilities 
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which created tension between the government and NGOs.
589
  At the same time, the PA 
recognised the need for NGOs to handle some of these issues. It indirectly provided the 
PA, as the governing body, with the much needed legitimacy to ‘stamp’ their right as 
the formal authority in the OPT through the works of NGOs and other bodies to 
“provide services, links to the key constituencies, and external credibility.”590  
 
The international community’s role in supporting the legitimacy of the PA propelled an 
injection of donor money into the OPT both to the PA and to NGOs.  As such, there 
was an observable shift where some local NGOs, argued Issam Abu Al Haj in our 
personal interview, “continued to keep their cultures, [while] others lost this culture and 
became more donor-oriented rather than society-based.” 591  The institutional 
transformation which increasingly valued technocrats and leadership who were donor 
and Western oriented, in contrast to occupation-resistance culture in pre-PA era, led to 
processes of depoliticisation.
592
  As such, many NGOs in the OPT were increasingly 
associated with image of elitism and detachment from the society. Nevertheless, many 
NGOs still maintained an essential role in the society, providing much needed services 
(and continuing to do so as the PA progressively failed to do so).
593
 For example, in 
early 1996, it was estimated that majority of the health care system (60 percent), 
hospital care (50 percent) and day care services for pre-school age children (100 
percent) were provided by NGOs.
594
 Furthermore, agricultural assistance, micro-
enterprise credit programmes, and low-cost housing aid services, and private schools 
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(particularly in Jerusalem) were provided by NGOs.
595
 Thus, whilst their political 
culture changed somewhat with the introduction of professionalism and donor funds, 
NGOs remained fundamentally imbued with the nascent democratic political culture of 
Insider counter-elites wherewith the legacy of resistance to occupation had inspired.  
 
Many of the Insider counter-elite leadership—with histories of leftist affiliation—
established NGOs, served as directors, or were associated in one form or another with 
NGOs. With increasing PA authoritarian attitude towards NGOs, these organisations 
also became the most critical voices against the PA and Arafat’s modus operandi. A 
well organised lobby group and NGO groups were established under the umbrella of 
the Palestinian NGO (PNGO) which served as a challenge to PA rule.
596
 By the 1996 
elections, NGOs became engaged in a struggle to maintain their independence from the 
PA as Arafat sought to regulate and control them. The previous year in 1995, the PA 
(Arafat) proposed a restrictive law which would have regulated and limited NGOs’ 
ability to receive international and local funding without first receiving permission 
from the Ministry of Social Welfare whose jurisdiction they were under. Additionally, 
they would be restricted from holding bank deposits more than one month’s 
expenditure and not allowed to have cooperation with other organisations outside of the 
PA jurisdiction. They would be required to register (and get permission) with each 
ministry wherewith correlated with their activities and individuals would be prohibited 
from participating in more than one NGO at a time.  The drafted law would also have 
provided the Minister of Social Welfare with the authority to “dissolve any NGO, 
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cancel permits, and initiate any type of regulation she/he sees fit to execute.” 597  One of 
the main reasons for Arafat’s move was to impede upon NGOs ability to become 
competitors for funds and power, particularly in close connection to the international 
community and donors.  
 
The NGOs represented key donor funding as well as the political power-base for 
independent critics of the PA and Arafat. By bringing them under his and the Outsider 
elites’ control, he could kill two birds with one stone. Thus Arafat began to take a 
heavy-handed approach towards the NGOs similar to the methods used by the 
neighbouring Egyptian and Jordanian regimes which contributed to a deteriorating 
relationship between the PA and the NGOs.
598
 NGO complaints about being passed 
over for funding by the PA compelled the World Bank to strengthen the sectors by 
establishing in 1997 the World Bank Palestinian NGO Project initiative which would 
create a $15 million USD Palestinian NGO trust fund, labelled ‘NGO Project’.599  This 
posited Palestinian NGOs as an actual, rather than a periphery, threat to the authority of 
the PA.
600
 The PLC was therefore compelled to issue legislation whereby it would 
regulate relations between the PA and the NGOs as well as protecting the rights and 
independence of NGOs.
601
  In 1998, the PLC drafted a law which would have provided 
NGOs relative protection from government interference. It would entitle them the 
freedom of formation, access international funds without informing the government, 
and also to have control over their own budgets and set own agendas. The law was 
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approved by Arafat with one significant change in that NGO registration would have to 
be with the Ministry of Interior (under the personal jurisdiction of Arafat and also 
known for controlling the mukhabarat—intelligence services) which the PLC outright 
rejected.
 602
  It led to confrontations between the PA and NGOs where the NGOs 
lobbied the support of the international community and donors.
603
 In response, the PA 
launched campaigns of vilification, and harassment against NGO leaders.  
 
In 1999 following a UN report on post-Oslo donor support to human rights and legal 
sectors, leading PA officials, led by the Minister of Justice accused (inaccurately) 
human rights organisations and other NGOs of siphoning off the PA designated $100 
million USD funds leaving only a small fraction of $4 million USD for the PA.  NGOs 
were also vilified as living off funds designated for the Palestinian people. 
604
 However, 
according to the report, it calculated that approximately only $20 million USD went to 
human rights, NGOs and other organisations.
605
 In response to NGOs increasing role in 
the political sphere, the PA set up a governmental NGO network to compete with the 
PNGO for funding as well as to widen the PA’s patron-client network.606  There was 
also a crackdown on PNGO activities where networks in Gaza were barred by the 
Force 17 army from holding elections until they first acquire a permit from the Ministry 
of Interior to hold a ‘public meeting’. Moreover, leading NGO lobbying groups were 
suddenly audited by the President’s office’s Financial Oversight Board which 
demanded that the NGOs provide them with everything from funding sources, names to 
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political histories of their employees.
607
 International donors and the NGO community 
criticised and condemned the PA for this intimidation.   
 
 It is not difficult to surmise the involvement of the PLC in the conflict particularly 
when many of the counter-elites inside the PLC and in ministerial positions also were 
attached to NGOs either as directors, board members, or consultants.  Despite PLC 
resolutions, Arafat refused to sign any such legislation into law. This constant struggle 
for power between an increasing authoritarian PA under Arafat and the Palestinian 
NGO community continued until NGOs sought the intervention of the international 
community through applied pressure of threat of fund withdrawal which would 
ultimately jeopardise their legitimacy. Nevertheless, it was the NGOs’ fierce lobbying 
of PLC, and staged demonstrations which provided them with the visibility needed not 
only to ratify and pass the NGO law but to gain international attention.
608
   
 
The international community and Donors poured money into NGOs which they hoped 
would strengthen their role in challenging the PA, particularly Arafat. However, 
observed Bassam Al-Salhi, Palestinian People’s Party Secretary General, the 
international community and Donors needed to maintain the legitimacy of the PA for 
the survival of the peace agreement therefore simultaneously supported the PA through 
financial assistance.
609
 Nevertheless, due to the bulk of their funding deriving mainly 
from international agencies and donors, NGOs beseeched the involvement of these 
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agencies and donors to put pressure on the PA/Arafat for a more fair and viable law 
whereby NGOs would have more autonomy from the PA.
610
  
 
The PA-led smear campaign to undermine the legitimacy of NGOs was in response to 
the PLC’s rejection of Arafat request for change. These PA public charges against 
NGOs were correlated accordingly to deflect the Agence France Presse’s published 
scathing appraisal of the Palestinian justice system particularly which criticised the 
PA’s dysfunctional legal system and rampant corruption. 611  As such, NGOs were 
supported by the press where they rallied behind them publishing a press release signed 
by six political factions (including Fatah) denouncing the PA smear tactics, defending 
the NGOs credentials and demanding ratification to the draft NGO law.
612
  In January 
2000, the NGOs won what many have termed a “near total victory” whereby the 
Palestinian NGO Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organizations (No. 1 
of 2000) became one of the least restrictive and more liberal NGO laws in the Middle 
East.
613
 The NGO community not only were able to pressure Arafat into conceding but 
also gained independence from the restrictive PA control.   
 
Whilst it is tempting to see this as a victory for democratic elements in the PLC, 
however, again it demonstrated that the PLC was only able to stand against Arafat 
when it had the support of the international community in doing so, indicating its own 
institutional weakness. In the meantime, the struggle between the PLC and Arafat over 
the autonomy of NGOs was played out not only through formal political manoeuvring, 
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but through the utilisation by Arafat of his security forces, along with the intimidation 
and coercion which accompanied, against NGO leaders and their supporters. In an 
interview with Basem Ezbidi, he recounted that the PA would put pressure on NGOs 
through various means of violence, arrest of individuals, attack offices of certain NGOs, 
as well as through PA procedures and legal tools targeting NGOs as with rejection of 
registration or requiring minutiae information on employees and organisation.
614
 
 
Eyad Sarraj, a psychologist by training and one of the most prominent Palestinian 
human rights activists, was at the time the Commissioner General for the Palestinian 
Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights. In my interview with Sarraj in Ramallah, 
West Bank, he related how he established several community health clinics across the 
Gaza Strip upon his return from studying aboard in UK and Egypt.  Witnessing PA 
human rights violations, Sarraj in his capacity as the Commissioner General publicly 
criticised the PA, in particular Arafat. In an article published in the New York Times, 
Sarraj accused the PA of being corrupt, dictatorial and oppressive.
615
  He was arrested 
by the Palestinian Security Forces and imprisoned for defamation and various 
concocted ‘offences’. In prison, Sarraj related how he was tortured and put in solitary 
confinement, released, and then re-arrested on additional charges that had no credible 
foundation when brought before the judges.  Among the various charges were drug 
smuggling, defamation, assault, corruption and harming the public interests, 
accusations cited as preposterous by his supporters.
616
 Furthermore, his clinics were 
searched by the PA Security forces, who declared they had ‘found’ stashed marijuana, 
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and staff members were threatened to testify against him, which was later revealed as 
planted.
617
 However, Sarraj recounted, it was later revealed that the drugs were ‘planted’ 
as part of the operation. His case received backing from numerous international human 
rights groups who put pressure on Arafat for his release.
618
 But before his final release, 
Sarraj was compelled to sign a statement confirming that he would abide by the law 
when publishing information about the PA.
619
 On the 5 August 1999, Sarraj was again 
summoned by the Palestinian Police after publishing an article which criticised Arafat 
for not ratifying the NGO law adopted by the PLC. He was held in questioning and told 
that he was not allowed to leave the country until further notice.
620
 
 
In my interview with Sarraj, he stated that Arafat’s prime mistake was putting him in 
prison: in doing so, Arafat had exposed himself to the criticism of the international 
community as his methods of suppressing dissident voices were bared for all to see.
621
 
“I paid a price," said Sarraj, "but I have no regrets. My imprisonment helped the cause 
of human rights in a way. It made people understand the importance of freedom of 
expression."
622
 When the PA was questioned regarding the arrest and torture of Sarraj, 
Arafat’s spokesman, Marwan Kanafani, stated that “Dr. Sarraj had been interrogated 
for making hurtful accusations against the general national feelings and offending the 
president with no excuse."
623
  While Saraj’s imprisonment presented a human rights 
                                                          
617
 Sarraj, Eyad. Personal Interview. 22 July, 2008. 
618
 Sarraj, Eyad. Personal Interview. 22 July, 2008. 
619
 Bisharat, G.E. “Peace and the Political Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine,” (Summer/Spring 
1999), p. 281 
620
 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network. Annual Report of Activities 1999-2000. Annual Activity 
Report, Copenhagen: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (2000), p. 22; Also see: Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights. Annual Report 1999: 1 January - 31 December 1999. Annual Report, Gaza 
City: The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 1999, p. 151 
621
 Sarraj, Eyad. Personal Interview. 22 July, 2008. 
622
 Lewis, A. "Abroad at Home; Peace With Arafat?" (July 1, 1996) 
623
 Lewis, A. "Abroad at Home; Peace With Arafat?" The New York Times, (July 1, 1996). This author’s 
own italicisation of the original quote. 
CHAPTER IV:  OUTSIDER-INSIDER ELITES STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY—
IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
 
258 | P a g e  
 
issue, it also exposed Arafat’s aim to suppress dissident voices from the NGO sector 
who present a challenge to this authority and governance.  
 
As these struggles between the PA dominated Outsider elites and the counter-elites and 
NGO community progressed, a third political grouping became increasingly visible and 
influential within the political domain, the Islamic opposition. With the exception of 4 
candidates from the Al-Aqsa Regiments (a split from the Islamic Jihad) and 2 
candidates from the Islamic Struggle Movement—where none won a seat.  The Islamist 
groups refused to participate in the 1996 election as a result were largely excluded from 
the domain of formal PA politics (the exceptions being those individuals who had ran 
as independents where 7 won seats).
624
  The refusal of either Hamas or Islamic Jihad as 
a party to recognise the Oslo Accords and the associated right of Israel to exist, and 
their disengagement from the political dialogue, had discredited them in the eyes of the 
international community as a legitimate partner for negotiation. However, as the PA 
proved progressively unable to deliver on either the democratic aspirations of the 
population or the peace process itself, the arguments of the Islamic groups gained local 
legitimacy. They developed into a political opposition that paralleled the work of the 
PLC and NGOs in challenging Arafat but went further, denying his and the PA’s very 
legitimacy.  
 
THE ISLAMIC DETACHMENT 
The reinterpretation of nationalist goals and aims, factional division, and competition 
for the collective aspiration had shaped the (reorganisation of) political identity in the 
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OPT.
625
  Islamist groups, in particular Islamic Jihad, offered ideological and militant 
challenges to Israel and to the PA.  However, the prominence and strength of Hamas in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, its shift in role to become the main opposition to the 
PLO/PA and Israel only became concrete following the breakdown of the 2000 Camp 
David Accord. Additionally, the rampant corrupt and neo-patrimonial practice of the 
PA, its perception to have co-opted many of the counter-elites, the Palestinian people 
became disillusioned with their leadership. Consequently, Hamas’ consistency in 
criticising PA leadership and their corruption (where many of Hamas’ leadership were 
arrested by the Palestinian security apparatus) became the main opponent contesting the 
legitimacy of the PA (and its officials) as a governing entity and the Peace Agreements 
to offer any viable solutions or path towards reaching a solution for the Palestinian 
question.
626
  
 
Hamas’ initial reaction to the establishment of the PA had been disdain: its leadership 
questioned both the status and power of the PLO as a representative negotiating body, 
and the nature of the concessions it had made to Israel. Instead, Hamas argued for both 
an on-going struggle against Israel and the simultaneous Islamisation of Palestinian 
society. In 1993, and despite some popular sympathy with their position, Hamas was 
unable to convince the broader population of its own credibility and legitimacy as an 
alternative to the PLO, and the viability of continued Intifada against Israel. 
Furthermore, it was unable to prevent the PLO’s signing of the Oslo Agreements, its 
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return to the OPT, or the establishment of the provisional PA (and the PLO’s 
domination of it).
627
  
 
For Hamas, the 1996 elections provided a political space in which to challenge the 
legitimacy and actions of the PA through social and ‘political’ activities, although it 
refused to participate in them on the grounds that this would in turn legitimise both the 
PA and the Agreements with Israel.  Hamas maintained their non-participatory stance 
to demarcate their own non-compromising position to what they believe were Israeli 
and U.S./Western co-optation of PA and PLO elites. To have acknowledged the Oslo 
Accord and Israel’s right to exist—by participating in the elections—would contradict 
their entire political ideology, making their political position untenable. The simplicity 
of Hamas’ ideology of Palestinian nationalism encompassed in social change that could 
be accomplished through Islamisation—which differed from the secular counter-elites’ 
espousal of nascent democratic processes, and the Outsider elites neo-patrimonial 
approach, both of which included political dialogue with Israel and an increasingly 
detached attitude from the masses in the post-Oslo period—gained Hamas increasing 
popular support.
628
  
 
Nevertheless, Hamas’ refusal to participate in the 1996 election initially created a 
backlash in terms of popular withdrawal of support.  However, concerned that non-
participation would make them irrelevant, and in response to demands from their own 
members unofficially they encouraged members to run as independents for the 
parliamentary election.  It was of little surprise given their high profile political and 
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social activities during the latter stages of the Intifada that some of the Hamas 
candidates running as part of the Islamic independents were elected to office despite the 
overarching Fatah hegemony.
629
  However, part of the reason that some of the Islamic 
candidates were able to successfully win seats derived less from the Hamas’ popularity 
than from the fact that many had fought alongside their Fatah counterparts during the 
Intifada and, having served in grass roots leadership roles and often been imprisoned 
for their political activities, they thus had personal legitimacy within local communities. 
Nevertheless, as Jamil Hilal observed, as a result of Hamas’ refusal to officially 
participate in the 1996 election, and despite the election of Hamas Independents,  the 
popularity of the movement reached an all time low of a mere 10 percent of popular 
approval.
630
  
 
To demonstrate their on-going opposition, Hamas sponsored a series of suicide and 
bomb attacks through their military wing, Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, against Israel. 
Hamas’ rationale behind the sponsored series of suicide and bomb attacks against Israel 
was not only to delegitimize the PA, negatively influence the peace process, but also in 
reaction to Israeli actions.
631
 Furthermore, the attacks took place (though not always) 
strategically following significant events.  In the period of nine days from 25 February 
to 7 March 1996, Hamas carried out four suicide bomb attacks which claimed over 
sixty lives, mainly Israelis. The ‘timed’ bombing occurred exactly forty-days following 
the traditional mourning period for the Hamas’ chief bomb maker, Yahya Ayyash, who 
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was assassinated by the Israelis on 5 January 1996.
632
 Also during this period, which 
followed 1996 election and in light of Arafat’s claim that he had popular mandate to 
pursue the peace process which would include curtailing armed resistance, Hamas 
conducted the abovementioned series of attacks where Arafat was blamed for giving 
authorization. In response to the bombings, Israel arrested approximately 1000 
Palestinians from the West Bank disregarding PA jurisdictions which illustrated 
Arafat’s and the PA’s lack of sovereignty and powerlessness vis-à-vis Israel.633   In 
March 1997, days after the breakdown of talks between Arafat and the Israeli 
government, where Arafat rejected Israel’s decision to limit land transfers to 
Palestinian and in its place build settlements between Jerusalem in Bethlehem, Hamas 
carried out a bomb attack at Café Apropos in Tel Aviv whereby Arafat was again 
accused of being in collusion with Hamas.
634
 Hamas’ (as well as Islamic Jihad’s) armed 
activities also questioned Arafat’s ability to control opposition groups, provide security 
for Israel, and his sincerity in pursuing the peace process.  
 
Interestingly, reminiscent of the dichotomistic characteristics of its ideological roots the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood with Hassan al-Banna’s social change and Sayd Qutb’s 
revolutionary approach, in parallel to their armed resistance activities, Hamas dedicated 
special attention and investment to their charity organisations where they cater to 
dispossessed Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
635
 Their charitable 
organisations supply much needed humanitarian, social, educational and health services 
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through their charities in towns and refugee camps that, as they pointed out, existing 
institutions (in this case the PA) failed to provide.
636
  According to a 2000 conference 
address by the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UMPMR) president 
Mustafa Barghouti, a physician and political activist, Palestinian NGOs’ provision of 
social services in the OPT had not greatly decreased in the past four years.  In the OPT, 
NGOs (inclusive of Hamas’ charity organisations) have been the main provider of these 
services (usually provided by the state) where they provide nearly 60 percent of health 
care services, manage 42 percent of hospitals and 90 percent of disability rehabilitation 
centres, and approximately 100 percent of preschool education services.
637
 The 
provisions of social services escalated the reputation of the providers. In this case, 
Hamas (through their charitable organisations) was endowed with legitimacy as a social 
movement organisation and a political entity to address the grievances of the 
occupation.   
 
But despite being the new “main” opposition (particularly Hamas) to Fatah, the PA, 
and Israel, the Islamist groups did not gain real ground against the more popularly 
supported PA-dominated Fatah group for some time.  According to polls taken between 
March 1994 and April 2000, support for Islamist groups still ranked far below the more 
dominant Fatah group; popular support for the Islamic groups hovered at around 15 
percent, Fatah at 42 percent, the combined left-wing at 8.3 percent, non-affiliated 
individuals at 20.9 percent and others
638
 at 13.8 percent.
639
 Only after the breakdown of 
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the 2000 Camp David Accord was there was an observable steady increase in popular 
support for the Islamic groups.  
 
The disillusionment with the peace process and the failure of the 2000 Camp David 
talks to produce any resolution to the Palestinian question and disputed issues i.e. 
Jerusalem, refugees and right of return, al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount), and 
Israeli security culminated in the 27 September 2000 Palestinian Second Uprising (al-
Aqsa Intifada).  Although there was already a breakdown in the Israeli-Palestinian talks 
following the 2000 Camp David Accord, the catalyst which sparked the al-Aqsa 
Intifada was Likud opposition leader Ariel Sharon’s insistent visit to al-Haram al-
Sharif which was a holy place for the Muslims. Sharon’s visit to the Muslim’s third 
most holy site al-Haram al-Sharif accompanied by a thousand armed Israeli soldiers 
(and accused by Arafat as being with the permission of the Israeli government) was 
perceived by Muslims as a deliberate provocation to illustrate Israeli power and 
claimed control over the site.
640
 
 
The Second Intifada consolidated the support for the Islamic groups, particularly 
Hamas, and specifically in the refugee camps, where refugees were the most excluded 
from the post-Oslo process.
641
 The renewed militantism of the Palestinian population 
was not confined only to Islamist groups. The Second Intifada saw the establishment of 
the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, a group affiliated with the military wing of Fatah which 
demonstrated how widespread the frustrations with the failed Oslo process had 
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become.
642
 The Israeli government, meanwhile, accused the PA leadership of planning 
the Intifada as a means of regaining the international diplomatic initiative.
643
 The PA 
was also charged (which they vehemently denied) with colluding with the Islamic 
groups, which took the most initiative in the more violent dimensions of the Intifada, 
through provision of financial resources and coordination of activities and attacks on 
Israel. The PLO in turn accused the Israeli government of using the al-Aqsa Intifada as 
an excuse to absolve themselves of any blame in the breakdown of the Camp David 
talks and to place the sole responsibility on the PA leadership. This breakdown of talks 
led to escalation of violence and attacks—Israeli incursions and arrests in the West 
Bank and Gaza as well as Palestinian suicide attacks against Israel. 
 
The al-Aqsa Intifada produced a hybrid popular movement with a specified type of 
military activities.
644
 The first suicide bombing of the al-Aqsa Intifada was conducted 
by the Islamic Jihad which started another lethal wave of suicide bombings after a year 
of ‘cease-fire’.645  The Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak responded by implementing 
an IDF plan to pressure Arafat to stop the violence by targeting and attacking PA and 
the Force 17 personnel, offices and security posts.
646
 While these strategies aimed to 
force Arafat to eliminate the use of violence, it had a reverse repercussion where 
violence escalated and weakened Arafat’s ability to control the Palestinian Security 
Force.
647
 However, these strategic approaches used by Barak as measures of pressure 
became a de-facto routine policy following Ariel Sharon’s ascent to the Prime 
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Minister’s office in March 2001. At the commencement of his term in office, Sharon 
authorised, along with his cabinet, Operation Bronze which aimed to effectively 
destroy the PA and its security forces and to reoccupy PA controlled areas.   
 
By May 2001, the Mitchell Report was published which sought to end the violence and 
resume talks. The Mitchell Report, which was commissioned after the September 1999 
Sharm Al-Shaykh Summit to provide recommendations on how to prevent the 
escalation of violence and resume talks, recommended that in order to have a cease-fire, 
to build confidence between the two parties, and for the negotiations to resume, the 
Israeli government should halt all settlement building.
648
 Furthermore, the Israeli 
government should avoid 100 percent friction points particularly when Palestinians 
come in contact with armed Israelis. From the Palestinian side, they recommended that 
Arafat should renounce all forms of terrorism and make clear to the Palestinian people 
and all Palestinian political groups that “terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, 
and by taking all measures to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators.” 
649
 Moreover the PA should take all measures to “apprehend and incarcerate terrorists 
operating within the PA’s jurisdiction.”650 
 
Despite these recommendations, violence from both side persisted. Suicide bombing 
continued in 2001 with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad responsible for most the activities. 
Sharon’s Operation Bronze was fully implemented in 2002 whereby it successfully 
destroyed the Palestinian security infrastructure. By 2002, the al-Aqsa Brigade began to 
take prominence in these attacks alongside Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.  By 2002-
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2003 it became evident that Arafat had been channelling support to the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ 
Brigades through financing, salaries, purchasing weapons and providing trainings for 
the military wing. Fatah’s internal directive which called upon its men to “use weapons 
sparingly, economize on munitions, and preserve the clandestinity of actions” was 
indicative of Arafat’s method of approach.651  
 
Nevertheless, by 2003 the Israeli government had set-up new security lines and 
established buffer zones around Gaza to eliminate the resistant movement’s most 
prevailing demographic stronghold.
652
 This weakening of the Islamic groups’ 
powerbase by the Israelis resulted in two forms. First it gave the Islamic groups more 
credibility in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Second it eliminated them as a 
prevailing force over Fatah led PA.  
 
Some Palestinian scholars, as with Ezbidi, have argued that Arafat was counting and 
expecting the failure of the Peace Process and needed an alternative which came in the 
guise of a military wing.
653
 However, what can be surmised is that the involvement of 
the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades denoted an internal division not only within Fatah but 
within the PA where Arafat was losing control not only over different factions within 
the territory but also with his security apparatus.  The PA counter-elites sought the 
negotiation tables as a means to resolve the deadlock while Fatah’s militant wing 
believed that the more effective means to reach a final status talk is through combative 
attacks—both of which were supported by Arafat. This two-way approach toward the 
resumption of talks—formal with negotiations and informal with the military actions, 
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was symptomatic of Arafat’s method of governance. Despite the perceived internal 
fracture between the counter-elites, they were still a cohesive group. Moreover in spite 
of various factions and elites’ reconciliation towards resistance, their political culture 
and behaviour did not change.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 This chapter has described and demonstrated Arafat’s early efforts to impose his 
Outsider PLO elites onto the new provisional PA and how this manifested itself into a 
strategy to co-opt, exclude or sanction Insider counter-elites. Most of the Insider 
Counter Elites sought to promote the democratic character of the new Palestinian 
political entity by engaging in the elections and institutions of the PA. However, Arafat 
used this early advantage, and the positioning of individuals loyal to him personally in 
key positions, to resist these efforts.  PA counter-elites sought to bring Arafat and his 
Outsider elites to account through the institutions of the PA, and equally Arafat used 
his presidential position and his ability to co-opt, exclude or sanction individuals, to 
either resist counter-elite initiatives or simply by-pass them. The institutional weakness 
of the PA meant counter-elites could only impose their democratic will over Arafat 
when they had the support of Israel, the United States, or the International donor 
community. 
 
The method of co-optation in the PA, which was an essential part of the political 
culture of the Outsider, allowed Arafat to incorporate, pacify, and persuade enemies 
and loyalists alike. It also provided him with the needed legitimacy and power.  As the 
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PA sought to reinsert their power following the failure of each negotiation period for 
final status talks, they were faced by challenges for power from opposition groups, 
particularly the Islamic factions who offered an alternative approach to the PA’s 
unfruitful negotiations for a final status with the Israelis. The inability of the 
negotiations to move forward was due to the fact that the PA was bound by the terms of 
the Accords whereby if they failed to keep to all the stipulations (particularly pertaining 
security for Israel), it provided the Israeli regime with the legitimisation to suspend 
talks. The unrealistic demands on the PA particularly to ensure Israeli security as 
priority through the suppression of critics and Islamic oppositions, established (and 
encouraged) a system whereby the PA carried out undemocratic acts and human rights 
violations (contrary to the idea of establishing a ‘democratic’ governing entity) 
reminiscent of authoritarian regimes’ political cultures.  
 
Elite struggle and divisions within the PA over unattainable goals, priorities, and 
Israel’s failure to adhere and implement responsibilities as stipulated in the accords, 
prevented the PA from developing further than its present form of a state-like structure 
with limited power which was rife with corruption and mismanagement. As a result of 
these machinations, complexity, and restrictions, Arafat used the informal and formal 
institutions to bypass restrictions dictated by the Accords.  While the formal structure 
provided a legitimate edifice for the international political powers, the informal 
structure was used by Arafat to pressure the international powers and the international 
community to envision the alternative to the PA, which was not too promising 
especially with threats of rising political Islamic groups.  As such, Arafat’s 
manipulation of the informal and formal systems became one of the major contributors 
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to his later decline in legitimacy due to the methods of ‘containment’ he and the 
apparatus under him utilised. 
 
In order to maintain power, Arafat used methods of politics of survival where he 
allocated (or withheld) posts in the government according to an individual’s degree of 
loyalty, or threat to him, which eventual became part of the system. Moreover, it 
provided the Outsider elites with the tools, due to their occupying significant positions 
in the new government as a result of their loyalty to Arafat while in exile, to dominate 
and dictate PA policy and process. This became a major obstacle for the counter-elites, 
who were often in periphery offices or positions, to formulate a government which 
reflected their ideas of ‘democratic’ processes. 
 
However, the counter-elites were themselves weakened by being placed in a position to 
choose whether they wanted to be part of a government ruled by Outsider rules, or to 
remain as oppositions in which case they could be excluded from the decision making 
process.  Individuals who chose to openly criticise Arafat were sanctioned by other 
colleagues, who saw them as fragmenting the national unity that was necessary to 
retain a credible negotiating position vis-a-vis Israel, or because they themselves were 
unwilling to directly challenge Arafat’s power.  Opposition to Arafat, as the symbol of 
Palestine, was perceived as questioning the Palestinian national movement itself.  
Arafat as the imagined symbol of unity, bridging the Inside and the Outside and 
representing Palestinian resistance as a whole, was to some extent sacrosanct and 
exempt from reproach.  This belief (though had waivered at times but never 
disappeared) that Arafat can bring a resolution to the Palestinian question allowed him 
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to manipulate the system in order to centralise and personalise power in himself and the 
position of the President.  It also enabled him to combine his formal position as 
President with his informal position as head of a neo-patrimonial and largely informal 
network.  
 
The Counter-elites on the other hand did not just set aside the democratic process.  
Rather, following their appointment and election into office, they struggled to assert 
their democratic political culture into the governing and decision making process. 
Progressively they were excluded from power to do this. Consequently the democratic 
counter-elite forces were fragmented as certain groups within sought to either the 
change the system from within, from the outside, or accommodate the new neo-
patrimonial system. As a result, there was an emergence of another component of the 
counter-elite to address local needs and challenges in the shape of political Islamists. A 
democratic political culture still existed in the Palestinian insider population which 
demanded that the political leadership adhere to democratic principles. However, the 
formal political structures progressively excluded its expression whereby the political 
Islamists—whose rhetoric was Islamist though was shaped around a ‘democratic’ 
manner of operation—came to provide that role of representation for the Palestinian 
population.  
 
The inability of political actors and opposition groups to have an open political space 
for inclusive decision-making, and to enforce the implementation of policies 
demonstrated that this was not a state.  However, the PA behaved as a state particularly 
with its given responsibilities as set up by the Oslo Accords. International donors and 
actors like Israel, U.S. and EU could still impose their own preferences and influence 
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on the domestic and international affairs of the ‘state’ which suggests that Arafat’s 
outsider elite were not entirely autonomous and that the democratic counter-elites can 
use this to advance their own ends.  Moreover it denotes that international actors and 
donors’ main concerns were the peace process, as well as each donor/state’s thematic 
goals whether in development, democracy, human rights, women empowerment and so 
forth. 
 
However, as opposition to the PA’s legitimacy increased and the viability of the DOP 
was questioned and challenged, the PA’s undemocratic and despotic behaviour began 
to be more apparent as it sought to silence critics.  The peace agreements presented a 
double-edged sword for the PA. Although it granted them the authority to rule, it 
simultaneously took away their autonomous power as a governing entity. It limited the 
PA in their capacity to challenge the Israeli regime for fear of losing legitimacy with 
the international community. Yet at the same time, to remain accommodating to Israeli 
demands also challenged their legitimacy with the Palestinian people. It therefore 
required Arafat to balance a parallel governing system where the PA would assure its 
survival and gain legitimacy from both the Palestinians and the international powers.  It 
ultimately sustained corruption as the modus operandi of the PA which permeated 
every aspect of the institution. This will lead to the next chapter in analysing the level 
of corruption in the PA. 
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CHAPTER V: 
CORRUPTION IN THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis thus far has indicated how the neo-patrimonial political culture of the 
Outsiders was imported into the Palestinian Territories after 1993, despite it not 
mapping onto the prevailing political culture within the Palestinian Territories or of the 
Insider counter-elites. This imported political culture, which endorsed corruption as a 
political tool, pervaded every aspect of society as corruption became the modus 
operandi for the PA and a normalised mechanism for survival vis-à-vis external 
powers, economic donors, and the domestic political support base. The PA’s lack of 
legitimacy, and its inability to either make progress in peace negotiations or establish 
its own absolute control over the PA institutions, led the Outsider elites which 
dominated the PA structures to resort to developing informal networks and neo-
patrimonial practices to shore up their domestic political base,  consequently 
suppressing democratic principles and possibilities. Arafat used corruption to subdue 
criticism, ensure loyalty and control, and retain his personal political power. Tools such 
as the allocation of monopolies and the distribution of rents such as economic aid were 
used by Arafat and his allies to co-opt and silence opposition, weakening counter-elites 
both directly and by further undermining the efficacy of the institutions through which 
their political culture (a nascent democratic political culture) might otherwise have held 
him to account. Previous chapters argued that this was the result not least of the PA’s 
lack of sovereignty, and the inability of formal political institutions of government to 
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make autonomous decisions. The PA’s economic dependency on external donors and 
the political pressures imposed by the U.S. and Israel which put Israeli security above 
Palestinian democracy and which constantly shored up Arafat as the key agent to 
guarantee this, created insecurity and uncertainty among Palestinians, undermined 
confidence that the formal structures of the PA could deliver for them, and 
consequently encouraged and effectively endorsed corrupt behaviour.  
 
This chapter will identify and examine the specific forms of corruption which were 
most prominent in the behaviour of Arafat’s PA. First, it will examine the allegations 
made of corruption, establishing the narrative of the evolution of corruption in the PA 
and the extent of its embedding. Secondly, it will identify some of the particular key 
actors involved, as well as the process by which the use of corrupt practices enabled a 
parallel system of rule to evolve. Thirdly, the chapter will demonstrate how the U.S. 
and Israeli governments effectively endorsed this form of practice. Fourthly, it will 
assess how Palestinians more widely came to view and understand the corruption and 
finally, it will examine the function of rent in the development of the PA, its influence 
on the PA elites, and its role in supporting the embedding of corrupt behaviour. 
 
RUMOURS AND ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION  
 
Research on corruption is often frustrated by either the undisclosed, unrecorded or 
absent documentation of transactions which might be classified as corrupt. The 
difficulty in tracking corruption is that no party would intentionally leave a paper-trail 
in the wake of such ventures that will directly link them to the activities. Transactions 
generally transpire in a covert manner, disguised under the cover of other legitimate 
transactions, or pushed through during periods of political chaos when evidence can get 
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‘lost’ in  the paperwork, or can be legitimised through a ‘consensus’ of the majority of 
the moment. If the original revolutionary nature of the PLO made it predisposed to 
employing informal networks and neo-patrimonial behaviour, the objective 
circumstance surrounding the establishment of the PA were equally conducive in their 
uncertainty, novelty and political pressure.  
 
Following the signing of the Oslo Accords, international donors—U.S., Japan, E.U., 
Norway and Saudi Arabia—pledged an estimated $3.6 billion USD to be disbursed 
over five years.
654
 The arrival of the provisional Palestinian Authority leadership into 
the Gaza Strip in 1994 brought with it enormous changes to the Palestinian economic 
landscape. Monetary assistance was pouring into the OPT from the international 
community through intermediaries like the World Bank and to some extent the EU, 
655
 
all eager to demonstrate their support for the new peace process. Initial domestic 
problems for disbursement of international donations resulted in donors setting up the 
World Bank Holst Fund.
656
  By the end of 1994, it was estimated that $484 million 
USD were disbursed through the development plan. From donor countries, the main 
donors were the EU with $151 million USD, the U.S. $85 million USD, Japan $82 
million USD, and the Arab countries and Arab Fund $104 million USD.
657
 Additionally, 
$51 million USD was distributed to the PA and to PECDAR.
658
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The Gaza Strip was soon transformed by “the Tunisians”, with conspicuous new wealth, 
night clubs, alcohol, lavish villas, domestic servants, Mercedes cars, indolent 
chauffeurs, and hotels and restaurants serving the Tunisian Outsider elites.
659
  The 
blatant display of their wealth, and their unfamiliar activities and conduct, set them 
apart as a new elite for the area: most Gazans were still recovering from the economic 
impoverishment caused by the First Intifada. Much of the Palestinian infrastructure had 
been destroyed and the local leadership were imprisoned, dispersed or just returning 
from the exile. The entire society could be said to be going through a state of social and 
political reconstruction. As a result of the distinct lifestyles and behaviours of the local 
society and the Outsiders, combined with the fragility of the new state structures, there 
developed an initial sense of distance, distrust, and even abhorrence of the Outsiders. 
However, the situation also created opportunities for individuals to gain wealth and 
status in the new government. As Rex Brynen observed, “[w]eak institutionalization 
and imbalances in social power... encouraged the appearance of opportunistic and 
parasitic forms of criminal corruption.”660 
 
When the PLO came into power through the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, 
their former status as resistance fighters was transformed into a role, nominal, at least, 
entailing the formal duties and responsibilities associated with running a ‘state’-like 
structure. However, the PLO Outsiders did not find it necessary to change any of their 
former practices.  In an interview conducted by As’ad Ghanem with Husam Khader 
from Nablus, a member of the PLC and a vociferous critic of the PA and of Arafat, 
Khader pointed to specific early incidents where the PLO’s mode of practice was 
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transferred and sustained in the PA.
661
 As evidence of the corrupt behaviour of the PLO 
he referred to an incident during the 1988 Palestinian National Council’s first meeting, 
of their eighteenth session, in Algiers, at which UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 were 
placed on the table for debate. Simultaneously, the personal bank accounts of PNC 
members were being imbued with funds. As a result, he claims, both resolutions were 
passed despite contradicting the founding goals and objectives of the PLO. Khader 
likens this to a second incident at the 1996 PNC session in Gaza and at which the PNC 
agreed to repeal the parts of the Palestinian National Covenant which called for the 
destruction of Israel.
662
 The PNC voted to recognise the State of Israel’s right to exist 
and to live side by side in peaceful existence.
663
 In a letter from Arafat to President 
Clinton in reference to their effort to change the PNC’s Palestinian National Covenant, 
published on the State Department Daily Press Briefing on January 22, 1998, “All of 
the provisions of the covenant which are inconsistent with the PLO commitment to 
recognize and live in peace side by side with Israel are no longer in effect.”664 Khader 
argued that without financial incentives to and by PLO leaders, none of these acts and 
resolutions – which were profoundly unpopular with sections of the population -would 
have been passed by the PNC or PLC.   
 
Unlike the defined regulations and duties normally established in formal state 
institutions, the governing structure which the PLO established as the provisional PA, 
and over which Fatah Outsiders presided, had no such clearly defined role and 
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regulations. As such, it presented the idyllic situation to reproduce the informal 
networks and personalised practices of the PLO within the new governing structures. 
Consequently, the PA served as the ideal pivotal-point to manoeuvre resources destined 
for the government to co-opt or finance covert transactions. For example, a January 
1996 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) in response to a 1995 U.S. 
Congress request to analyse the authenticity of series of letters prepared by the PA’s 
Minister of Finance, Mohammed Nashashibi, and the Director General of PECDAR, 
Mohammed Shtayyeh, found issues of discrepancy. According to GAO, the letters 
indicated that approximately $138 million USD from unidentified sources was diverted 
in late 1994 to finance ‘covert transactions’. These ‘transactions’ included purchase of 
land and apartments in Israel, funding sympathetic groups towards the Palestinian 
cause in Israel, and financing a Palestinian journal.
665
 The various cases and allegations 
of corruption that emerged, where officials were misappropriating funds outside the 
parameter of state business, produced an image of unaccountability whereby the PA 
soon became synonymous with corruption and Arafat at the very centre of the web of 
corrupt practices. This process was to shape the entire nature and structure of the PA: 
as Bassam Al Salhi, a member of both the PLO’s Palestinian National Council and the 
PLC observed,  there could not be any ‘real’ issue with corruption per se in the PLO 
because “there [was] no clear budget, [and no] clear finance.”666 The importation of the 
PLO’s political culture into the PA indicated that the attributes of a financial 
accountability which belonged to normal state institutions never existed in the first 
place.  
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Azmi Shuaybi related in our interview that from very early on, the PA displayed forms 
of corruption that were reminiscent of PLO practices during their years of operation in 
the diaspora. These were not limited to the ‘traditional’ method of bribery667 found in 
many post-colonial states, but manifested themselves in more “modern” forms of  neo-
patrimonialism: political co-optation, nepotism, economic monopolies, embezzlement 
and the diversion of state rents.  Evidence mounted that the trail of corruption led right 
to the very top of the PA, that it was the basic mode of operating for ministries 
themselves, not just a form of behaviour which existed alongside or in spite of 
transparent and accountable financial systems. In one case, for example, the Health 
Ministry itself was cited as covering up information leading to corrupt practices. The 
Health Ministry was in charge of transferring medical patients who were unable to 
receive medical attention inside the Palestinian Territories to medical facilities abroad. 
Dr. Ibrahim Abu Hmeid, who was appointed General Director for the Health Ministry 
and in charge of distributing transferred patients, was accused by various Jordanian 
hospitals of embezzlement and accepting bribes. A commission of inquiry was formed, 
composed of the General Control Office, the Health Ministry and the Public 
Employment Department to look into the case against Dr. Hmeid, who was charged 
with embezzling approximately 17,000 JDs.
668
 However, pressure from above (namely 
Arafat himself) was exerted to acquit Dr. Hmeid of all charges. Eventually Dr. Hmeid 
was let off ‘lightly’ considering the extent of his offences.669  As George Giacaman 
commented in our interview, corruption was a method of government practices 
approved through Arafat which became a modus operandi for managing the state, the 
state employees and officials, and its resources. Arafat, noted Giacaman, was not 
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personally corrupt in terms of amassing a fortune but he corrupted others so that he 
could make them beholden to him and so subject to control.  While those around him 
benefited from his neo-patrimonial modus operandi, often amassing millions of dollars 
in the process, Arafat himself lived a very simple and un-ostentatious lifestyle: he 
personally prized power and authority above either his personal wealth or the national 
goal.
670
  
 
Corruption soon spread beyond the institutions of the PA. The weak state structure left 
all elements of society insecure and unprotected by formal processes and rules. As the 
former Minister of Supply, Abu Ali Shahin, himself a Fatah member, remarked during 
an interview conducted with him in Ramallah, West Bank, allegation of corruption was 
not to be limited to the PA but also applied to NGOs. The NGOs in the OPT were, 
according to Abu Ali Shahin, even more corrupt than the PA because the salaries of PA 
officials were a pittance in comparison to those of NGO directors and staff.
671
 More 
importantly perhaps, under Israeli occupation, and in the absence of a Palestinian state 
structure, NGOs had played a key role in both social welfare provision and political 
organisation. According to Khalil Shiha, Director of PARC, NGOs were created 
specifically in response, or to deal with, the Israeli occupation, to provide the services 
that the occupying administration neglected or failed to provide.
672
  
 
However, new NGOs soon emerged in the OPT as new international aid aiming to 
underpin the peace process started to pour in. As such, many that emerged at this period 
were in response to the peace process, international aid, and political dynamics within 
the OPT.  In some cases, NGOs were established specifically to meet international 
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donors’ interest but lacked grassroots interest or affiliation.673 NGOs began to concoct 
‘community’ needs in order to match the sector where donor money was most 
concentrated.
674
 International development agendas began to take precedence over 
genuine local and domestic needs as the possibilities for rent extraction were realised. 
This practice of contriving local “needs” based upon international agendas for greater 
financial gain was not limited to NGOs: Abu Ali Shahin argues that it also extended to 
the PA. The weakness of the PLC and their inability to contain the ambitions of 
individuals, or to hold them accountable, led to many cases of the abuse of power, with 
PA officials diverting international aid rents into their own pockets to augment their 
capped salaries. As well as creating personal companies through which to channel 
international aid revenues, they developed private sector interests which exploited the 
opportunities presented by weak restrictions on their personal political influence. 
 
 
MONOPOLIES, TAXES, JOBS AND KICKBACKS 
 
In the OPT, given the limited and weak economic infrastructure and the dependency on 
external resources, the creation of monopolies in certain sectors was particularly 
damaging, serving to “inhibit free private-sector development and distort market 
prices,” 675 .and creating allocative and other inefficiencies. 676  The absence of 
competition gives the monopolistic companies a carte blanche to dictate the terms and 
prices of the market. Internally, there is no incentive for modernisation or internal 
reforms because of the lack of, or weakness of, competitors and the guaranteed access 
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to the market. Limited scope for competition deterred investors, stalled economic 
reform processes and prevented the establishment of viable, long-term sustainable 
economic ventures. The ‘positive’ elements that monopoly could bring to the state, 
such as capturing certain sectors back from former Israeli control (as in cement and 
petroleum) were insufficient to outweigh the negative aspects of monopolies. 
This behaviour deterring competition and dominating the markets was common in the 
PA monopolies where figures from the PA leadership and their families or friends 
economically benefitted. The PA itself had full ownership as well as part-ownership of 
‘public’ companies, giving it monopolies over certain sectors of the economy.  In the 
PLC’s  1997 Corruption report , it was noted that the original GCO had failed to report 
on the non-tax revenues of three of the PA’s major companies: the Tobacco 
Commission, the Petroleum General Commission, and the Palestinian Commercial 
Service Company (PCSC Cement Company) which held some of the major contracts 
with international companies, donors and governments for development projects in the 
OPT.
677
 The PCSC company for example, which was established in 1994, was set up to 
“meet the Palestinian market need for cement at competitive prices” 678  Public 
companies which enjoyed monopoly status in the OPT were regularly  accused of 
racketeering, extortion, pocketing funds, as well as funding the “off-the-books” 
expenses of the PA. There was also evidence of emerging semi-private/semi-public 
monopolies operating in the OPT. It was estimated that there were around 27 such 
companies in 1997, with control over import trade in various areas including “fuel, 
cement, gravel, cigarettes, flour, steel, building materials—typically with an exclusive 
Israeli supplier and one of the myriad PA security agencies” and the PA was unable or 
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unwilling to control them. 
679
 Two major companies which were implicated in these 
types of activities, and which were closely linked to Arafat’s office, were the PCSC—
headed by Arafat’s economic adviser at the time, Khalid Salam, and the Sharakat al-
Bahr company which was co-owned by the director of Arafat’s office. Companies such 
as these, which were owned or co-owned by the PA and its officials, were eventually 
dismantled or privatised after their ownership and activities became public knowledge 
and caught the notice of donor countries and organisations.
680
  
 
Concerns were raised by some international donors and agencies regarding the way that 
the PA set up monopolies to cut out competition and control certain sectors of society 
and arguably to concentrate the money that was pouring into the OPT into one pot 
which sustained the PA’s own networks. These monopolies controlled the import trade 
in most lucrative sectors in society and cooperating exclusively with an Israeli supplier 
particularly in “fuel, cement, gravel, cigarettes, flour, steel, [and] building materials.”681 
By 1997, it was estimated that about twenty-seven or more of these companies were in 
full operational capacity in the OPT.
682
 PA control over monopolies hindered the 
development of the Palestinian society by being a competitor to local businesses. For 
example, when the PA was informed of a cement deal being signed by a group of local 
businessmen with Nesher cement company (Israeli), the PA rejected the agreement and 
replaced the local businessmen with their (PA) own members and partners.
683
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The 1997 PLC Special Committee Report which looked at the Palestinian General 
Control Office (GCO) 1996 Corruption Report did not engage itself thoroughly with 
issues of PA monopoly because the matter had not been dealt with in the GCO report 
and they were specifically instructed to investigate only the issues raised in the GCO 
report. Nevertheless, this did not signify that the PA did not engage in monopolistic 
ventures or that it not problematic. Rather, Arafat and the PA were notorious for 
granting monopolies to commercial agencies and well-to-do businessmen in order to 
assure allegiance and indebtedness to him.
684
 These monopolies were based on 
favouritism, kickbacks and on personal contacts which established a power base for 
Arafat but ultimately at the expense of the private sector.
685
 Nevertheless, they were – 
for Arafat - a necessary tool for the survival of the PA regime and one which Arafat 
and the Outsider elites capitalised on and developed. 
 
Shu’aybi recounted in our interview that the PLO and PA officials’ monopolies were 
supported by Arafat because they generated profits which were transferred to auxiliary 
accounts and used for Arafat’s ‘non-PA’-related and personal transactions. The 
individuals whose names the businesses were under also benefitted from such an 
arrangement because they were given dividends from the earnings as well as influence 
over other businesses that were dependent on their patronage.
686
 In some cases, Arafat 
turned a blind eye to certain ‘behaviours’ which held individuals beholden to him. 
Many of the PA leaders either set up their own personal businesses on the side and 
supplementary to their government duties and/or received kickbacks for their role in 
setting up business deals, partnerships between foreign and local companies or giving 
specific companies exclusive contracts or access to a certain market. A case in point 
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involved the Ministry of Post and Communication, whose leaders were accused of 
“misconduct of official position”. The head of the General Control Committee 
requested the Minister of Post and Communication to respond to serious allegations of 
legal and financial offences, official powers apparently having been exercised for the 
benefit of companies working with the Ministry. The minister himself was not 
implicated because he was not the Minister of Post and Communication during the time 
of the offences. However the Deputy Assistant of the Ministry, Zuhair Allaham, and 
the Direct General of the Ministry, Muhammand Skaik, were identified as having 
struck up deals with foreign and local companies for personal gain. Skaik was accused 
of expanding Gaza Operator and establishing a new building for the Ministry of Post 
and Communications in Gaza in collusion with specific companies and architects.
687
  
 
This sort of activity sidelined and excluded other companies who were more competent 
and fitting for the types of projects sought by the ministry, i.e. contractors, architects. 
The ministry officials had sole hold on the competition for contracts and the exclusion 
or inclusion of other companies. The PLC Special Committee also raised the issue of 
the Ministry of Post and Communication employees using official phones for personal 
use which were paid for by public money and consequently pointed to an agreement 
signed between the Ministry of Post and Communications and the Palestinian 
Communication Company.
688
 When the PLC Special Committee requested a copy of 
the agreement, the Ministry refused to supply the document for review. Ministry 
officials were also questioned over allegations they had received kickbacks from the 
Palestinian Communication Company for the ‘partnership’. The PLC Special 
Committee recommended that the case be handled by the Executive Authority of the 
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PA and that the two main actors (architects Bassam Hamdouneh and Ayman Matar)
689
 
as well as other actors involved in the allegations be brought to justice. However, like 
many other cases of corruption in the PA particularly involving high officials and 
‘associates’ of Arafat, the charges were either dropped or ignored. 
 
The building frustration over the lack of adequate legal provisions and the failures to 
implement what law there was, or to hold officials and perpetrators accountable, was 
voiced by Hussam Khader, a PLC member from Nablus and a vociferous critic of the 
PA and of Arafat. He publicly accused PA officials of acting like a mafia group, 
controlling and monopolising the economic sector, lacking ethics, and creating 
incitement against the PLC, and seeking to keep the government weak in order to 
continue their unmonitored illicit activities.
690
  Khader related how a certain minister 
who had a monopoly over flour sales in the West Bank had gained a special “import 
permit” from his friend, the Minister of Supply (Abu Ali Shahin), for a shipment of 
5000 tons of flours from Romania. As a result of his lack of knowledge about proper 
storage, the flour was spoiled.  However, he was rescued by a deal with an Israeli 
company who came to Nablus in trucks, conveyed the flour to Israel, repackaged the 
spoiled flour in new packages, and sold them to the Palestinian market. When the PLC 
investigated the allegations, Shahin ordered his Chief of Staff not to provide any 
information to the PLC investigation committee
691
 This Shanin, Ha’aretz 
correspondents Ronen Bergman and David Ratner argued, was the same Fatah activist 
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Abu Ali Shahin who published a manifesto, before the establishment of the PA, calling 
for the eradication of corruption in the upper echelons of the PLO.
692
 
 
As a result of these economic manipulations, international aid to the PA - which was 
designated as a means to strengthen the PA, develop its institutions and infrastructures, 
and consolidate its political capacity - became a financial resource to sustain bloated 
public sector employment, to buttress political factions and PA supporters, and to 
mollify opposition, through Arafat’s personalised administration.693 Corruption in the 
PA was thus described as being encouraged and protracted by “the influx of external 
resources, the uncertainty of transition arrangements, and the weakness of existing 
institutions.”694  
 
The weak state structure has no institutional capacity for adequately recording joint 
entrepreneurial projects, or to restricting the monopolies which emerged, discouraging 
genuine investors.
695
 For example, a PA official would contract with an Israeli 
counterpart (firm or individual) to purchase a product in bulk at a given price; the 
official would then sell the product on the Palestinian market at an inflated cost. The 
profits that proceed from the transaction would be for his personal gain. If Palestinian 
merchants could access the same product, from a different market, at a lower rate they 
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would be visited by the PA security apparatus to “convince” them to purchase only 
from the PA official.
696
  
 
PA officials similarly had a monopoly over the lucrative fuel sector. At the time of the 
April 1994 Paris Protocol, the West Bank and Gaza Strip consumed approximately 40 
million litres of fuel month. The Pedasco fuel company, jointly owned by large Israeli 
fuel companies (Delek, Paz, and Sonol), supplied about 65 stations in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip with contracts until 2000. Under the 1994 Paris economic agreements, 
the PA was obliged to honour any contracts signed between Israeli companies and 
Palestinian customers before the protocol without interference from the PA.  However, 
in a move which violated this protocol, Jibril Rajoub—the chief of the West Bank’s 
Preventive Security Forces—had an ‘agreement’ with Dor Energy whereby his security 
apparatus forced station owners to purchase only Dor Energy fuel. To assure that 
Pedasco did not tread on their territory, Rajoub’s security apparatus blocked Pedasco 
trucks from entering the OPT. Complaints regarding the takeover were turned down by 
the PA. Pedasco filed an injunction against Dor Energy in the District Court but lost the 
case on the ground that the station owners had signed contracts with Pedasco whereas 
Dor Energy had a contract with the PA. Therefore Dor Energy was not responsible for 
station owners rescinding on their contracts.
697
 Consequently, Rajoub’s domination 
over this sector allowed him to take kickbacks from Dor Energy as well as to impose 
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further taxes on the station owners’ vis-à-vis additional financial supplements, the 
profits accruing to the accounts and operation of the Preventive Security Forces.
698
  
 
Another case of using official position for kickbacks and giving monopoly-status to a 
business partner involved the PA Health Ministry in Gaza where certain drugs, which 
were officially banned in the West Bank due to their failure to meet health regulation 
requirements, were used and distributed by the health ministry in Gaza. It came to light 
that certain PA officials used their power in office to approve and set up a coalition in 
Gaza with a pharmaceutical company, Al-Shifa’ Company, to be the distributor of 
drugs to the Health Ministry thus stamping out legitimate and qualified competitors. 
Many of the drugs which were rejected in the West Bank due to packaging issues, 
expiry dates, and the registration of drugs laws, all of which related to criminal 
offences’ and which potentially dangerous to patients,   were approved, relabelled and 
put on the ‘market’ by the Health Ministry.699 Dr. Ziad Sha’th, who was then general 
director of the pharmacy, was charged with deliberately and malignly giving his 
consent for the Al-Shifa company to provide/sell unregistered drugs to the ministry. 
Furthermore, it came to light that the Al-Shifa company collaborated with other 
officials of the PA, including Khamis Najjar, who was at the time General Director at 
the ministry in Gaza and the Civil Affairs Minister, and Jamil Tarifi (who was also 
cited in other cases of corruption), in order to convey these unregistered drugs from 
Egypt, under the ‘assumption’ that they were donated goods, through the Rafah 
Crossing which received Customs and VAT tax exemptions. The drugs were then sold 
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to the Ministry with VAT and Custom tax fees.
700
 The PLC 1997 report requested that 
the Al-Shifa drug case be transferred to the PA Attorney General’s office for 
prosecution alongside with PA officials and ministers who were indicted in the case. 
However, the recommendation met only mild ‘indignation’ but with no real reprimand. 
 
Arafat was able to manipulate the tax system more generally: in the absence of a 
clearly-defined system for directly collecting and transparently re-allocating 
“government” revenues, the PA was only partially accountable for their distribution. As 
a result of the 1994 Paris Protocol, the PA was entitled to four different types of taxes 
to be collected by the Israeli government on their behalf: Value Added Tax (VAT); 
excise taxes on fuel, tobacco and alcohol; income taxes collected from Palestinian 
labourers (from the OPT); and health taxes.
701
 Israel would deduct their service charge 
and remit the taxes to the PA. It could further subtract PA debts towards the Bezek 
Electric Company and Israeli hospitals.
702
 Of interest here is the way in which the PA 
leadership requested that the taxes be transferred. The PA’s Chef de Bureau and 
economic advisor, Muhammad Rashid, requested from the Israeli government that the 
tax money collected on their behalf be deposited into four different accounts in the 
Arab Bank and Palestine Bank in Gaza. Moreover, Rashid requested that a secret 
account be set up at the Bank Leumi’s Hahashmonaim branch in Tel Aviv. Although 
the PA requests “raised Israeli eyebrows” and they were aware of the implications of 
such a non-transparent request, they decided to disengage themselves from the 
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Palestinian domestic economic problems, not question the PA’s motive, and 
consequently proceeded with the PA demands.
703
 The Israeli government’s indulging 
these PA demands, with the full knowledge that it is illegal and informal transactions 
for an official governing body, illustrated the Israeli government’s support and 
encouragement of PA corrupt behaviours. This can also be defined as corruption by 
misusing their official power. Tax transfers to PA accounts amounted to approximately 
72 million NIS in 1994, 792 million NIS in 1995, and 1,391 million NIS in 1996.
704
 
Critics have alleged that these were in actuality PLO accounts under the personal 
control of Arafat and Khalid Salam (Mohammad Rashid) which clearly undermined the 
financial transparency of the PA.
705
 Moreover, it deprived the PA of correct accounting 
procedures
706
 by deliberately merging the PLO with PA institutions. Azmi Shu’aybi 
recounted in our interview, that the co-operation between Israel and the PA (Arafat) 
was further evident when the money was transferred to approved accounts under the 
names of Ministers or close associates of Arafat i.e. Khalid Salam and Mohammad 
Nashashibi, who at the time was Minister of Finance.
707
 The tax revenues transferred 
did not have any stipulations attached to them. It was requisite-free and was placed in a 
transit account from which Arafat was able to transfer funds into other accounts for his 
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own use.
708
 Specifically, the VAT and customs revenues were transferred to the PA’s 
Ministry of Finance, while excises from petroleum were deposited into a “secret” 
account in Tel Aviv only accessible to Arafat and Mohammad Rashid. However, 
domestically collected excises from tobacco and alcohol and profits from PA 
commercial activities and monopolies were transferred to outside accounts not 
affiliated with the Ministry of Finance.  
 
According to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, between the years of 1995 
and 2000 approximately $591 million USD in excise tax revenues was diverted outside 
the Ministry of Finance.
709
 It appeared that most of the diverted excise tax revenue 
from the Ministry of Finance was invested in PA commercial operations that were 
facilitated by the PA subsidiary companies like the Palestinian Commercial Services 
Corporation (PCSC) as well as in their monopolies. These lucrative PA commercial 
investments generated considerable profits which were again diverted from the 
Ministry of Finance budget.  It was estimated that from 1995 to 2000, excise tax 
revenues and profits from these monopolies and commercial investments diverted from 
the Ministry of Finance budget exceeded $898 million USD.
710
 
 
Although these subsidiary public companies and monopolies were presented as entities 
which would help develop and improve the public sector, create jobs, and improve the 
Palestinian economy, in reality, profits from these companies were funnelled back into 
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the companies or coffers of PA senior officials who were running them.
711
 International 
donations and tax revenues collected domestically and from the Israelis were diverted 
to either an auxiliary fund, set up by Arafat, to finance the inflated public sector, or to 
the Ministry of Finance to pay off debts and overheads but not into genuine state 
capacity building.   
 
The revenues were also used to distribute patronage and buy political support through 
generating public sector employment. However, the inflated public sector soon became 
problematic for the PA, forcing it to cut the other budgets of departments in order to 
meet salary demands. As General Danny Rothschild, Israeli government activity 
coordinator in the OPT at the establishment of the PA observed, the PA did not start 
with a clean slate. Instead of removing the existing 21,000 employees which were 
supposed to be dissolved with the departure of the Israeli Civil Administration (mainly 
Palestinians with the exception of IDF soldiers), the PA added 20,000 clerks who 
returned with Arafat from Tunis and an additional 40,000 policemen and security 
apparatus officers which created an unjustifiably inflated public sector.
712
 The PA did 
not redefine its needs, its structures and employee composition to support the PA 
institutions. Bassam Al-Salhi noted in our interview that Palestinian society became 
highly dependent on the employment provided by the PA, which became the main 
employer of the OPT and which created jobs that often duplicated, overlapped or had 
no real function.
713
 By September 1998, the number employed by the PA was estimated 
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at 90,000 and wage costs consumed around 12 percent of Palestinian GDP and about 55 
percent of Palestinian recurring budgetary expenditures.
714
 Ten years later in 2008, 
there were approximately 160,000 people employed by the PA which, according to an 
interview with Al-Salhi, was profoundly detrimental to the political and economic 
development of the OPT. The numbers placed pressure on the volatile budget of the PA 
which, Al-Salhi remarked, was then limited in its ability to work on development 
projects.
715
 Even Muhammad Dahlan, as head of PA Preventive Security in Gaza, could 
not account for the exact number of employee in the security apparatus. He estimated 
the inflated number to be at about 50,000-60,000 actual employees compared to official 
reports of 20,000-30,000 employees.
716
   
 
According to Dahlan, Palestinian society viewed this employment, although a burden 
on the PA, to be a “social issue” because all loyal political activists who had served 
time in prison and actively participated in the Intifada were entitled to be taken care of.  
The PA was obliged to provide an individual with a job for their service and loyalty.
717
 
This social pressure also compelled the PA to divert some of the international funds 
intended for more sustainable development into the PA civil service budget.  In doing 
so, the PA was able to confirm its legitimacy and expand its base of dependent 
supporters. The PA’s Deputy Minister of Economics and Trade, Dr. Mahr al-Kurd has 
also argued that the over exertion of the public sector, and the diversion of development 
finances into this auxiliary fund, was an essential obligation, a positive aspect of the 
Palestinian economy, and a great economic achievement for the PA. To clarify this 
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great PA feat, Dr. al-Kurd rhetorically remarked, if the PA did not create employment 
for these individuals—particularly those who had fought with Arafat—where and how 
would they find work?
718
 Alternatively, Dr. Hisham Awartami, a leading expert on the 
Palestinian economy, has argued that the exaggerated bureaucracy was a time bomb 
waiting to explode. Arafat depended on these individuals as a power-base which would 
be difficult to cut loose. To maintain the PA’s neo-patrimonial system, Arafat’s priority 
was to “invest” the money in paying salaries rather than on sustainable development 
which would create viable jobs for the populace. However, his method was only a 
temporary solution to an imminent economic and political predicament.  
 
Moreover, the involvement of key PA officials and their families in corruption 
allegations progressively and ironically anyway undermined the legitimacy of the PA.  
On one hand the PA leadership verbally condemned corrupt practices; on the other 
hand, they themselves were at the centre of corruption charges and were seen to be 
personally benefitting from dubious negotiations with Israeli and international 
companies.  For example while Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia, also one of the leading 
negotiators during Oslo, was protesting against the erection of Israeli Walls to EU 
leaders, his cement company, Al Quds, was providing cement to the Israeli Ma’ale 
Adumim settlement and for building the wall, particularly along Abu Dis.
719
 When 
confronted with the Associated Press’ (AP) story and the Israeli television claims of his 
hypocrisy, Qureia vehemently rejected the allegations. However, footage showed 
cement trucks leaving the Al-Quds Cement Company headed for Ma’ale Adumim. 
When workers were questioned about the ownership of the company, reporters were 
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told that it was owned by the Qureia family. The question of corruption did not derive 
from his company building the wall, but rather that Qureia had monopoly over the 
cement sector thus securing major bids and businesses. Even Mahmoud Abbas, the 
favourite of the Israeli and U.S. government, viewed as a promoter of peace and 
transparency, and the face for political reform in the PA, was accused by critics of 
corruption. In one of several cases of corruption, Abbas supported and ensured that a 
company owned by his son, Yasser Abbas, shared a monopoly over consumer 
entertainment with Sami Ramlawi (a PA top official).
720
 Another leading PA official 
Nabil Sha’ath, then Minister of International Cooperation, was cited for using public 
money to fund his wedding.
721
 Azmi Shu’aybi also recalled that Sha’ath was also 
named in the 1997 Corruption Report for using state funds to finance a computer 
venture which his company had monopoly over.
722
   
 
The benefits extended to the families of PA leaders. Their children were settled into 
prestigious private educational institutions, their relatives assisted in the establishment 
of new businesses, and provided with personal financial support. Even President 
Arafat’s family was not untouched by the corruption charges. The French government 
launched an investigation into the large-scale transfer of funds worth $11.5 million 
USD from Swiss bank accounts to personal accounts belonging to his wife, Mrs. Suha 
Arafat.
723
  When Mrs. Arafat was questioned in Al-Hayat newspaper in February 2004 
regarding the transactions, she responded that she found no wrong doing on President 
Arafat’s part in sending that considerable amount of money to provide for his family 
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who were protecting the Palestinian interests abroad.
724
 The Outsider elites and their 
cohorts’ attitude towards, and understanding of, this corruption were astounding, 
portraying a detachment from reality on the ground and a disengagement from the 
situation of the Palestinian masses. 
 
LEGAL EVASIONS 
 
Corruption charges and concerns were raised by international donors and by the PLC 
itself. The PLC’s 1997 Corruption Report clearly identified the abuse of monopolies by 
members of the PA and the mishandling of funds. However, no PA officials were 
formally charged or convicted and imprisoned by the courts for corruption.  Instead, the 
PA leadership proved intolerant of corruption-related accusations.
725
 If PA officials or 
cohorts were unfortunate enough to be taken to court, there was usually a loophole 
within the law—considering that the law system governing the OPT varied and was 
often contradictory due to the peculiar historical incongruent miscellany of legal 
legacies—which could be utilised to argue in their favour. The judicial system 
governing Gaza is based on Egyptian law whereas the West Bank operates on the basis 
of Jordanian Law, and both include elements of British Mandate Law and Israeli IMOs. 
As a result, an accused can often be acquitted not on evidence but on his ability to 
retain a good lawyer, good connections, or friends or family in high places who can 
exploit the gaps and inconsistencies in the system. This was usually the case with the 
PA elites. Instead the law was used to protect the PA elites. During the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, when international pressure was at its height for the PA to deal with 
corruption issues, individuals were brought to trial on matters of corruption, drug 
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smuggling, and incitement against the state particularly those who were vocal in their 
criticism of the government. Cases like these were often associated with the counter-
elites, including figures such as Eyad Sarraj and Daoud Kuttab amongst others. 
 
Both cases were identified because they received international attention and highlighted 
the PA’s effort to suppress any critical voice of their method of governance and 
corruption. As with Eyad Sarraj’s arrest and false charges as a result of his criticism of 
the PA’s human rights violation, neo-patrimonial rule and practice of corruption, which 
was mentioned in Chapter IV, Kuttab sought to document internal debate. As the PA 
gained international attention on the rampant corruption of the PA, the PLC held a 
session where a debates on the recent publication of the 1997 PLC corruption report. 
Kuttab, owner of al-Quds television station and an independent journalist, was arrested 
and detained for one-week on the basis that he violated his contract with the Ministry of 
Communications and the PLC (although he had a permit to broadcast PLC sessions) 
when he broadcast the famed corruption debate session—which he was prohibited from 
broadcasting.
726
  It was reasoned that the PA (Arafat) feared what the PLC would say 
regarding the charges of corruption. The PA’s censorship and failure to allow for the 
broadcast of the debate deprived them of the opportunity to mend their reputation and 
present an image of transparency towards the national and international community. 
Nevertheless, with mounting pressures from the international community and the 
Palestinian society, Kuttab was released from custody.
 727
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The PA’s inability to deal with its corruption was in part attributable to the 
simultaneous failures to progress the Peace Process – the two were connected in what 
amounted to a revolving circle. Arafat’s ability to maintain the popular legitimacy of 
the PA depended on his ability to deliver tangible benefits from the advance of peace 
negotiations. He was constrained in the latter by the weakness of the PA relative to 
Israel, and consequently his dependence on Israel (and the process’ arbiter, the U.S.) to 
make relevant concessions. That very weakness whereby the PA could not challenge 
the Israeli regime meant that there was even less incentive for Israel to make those 
concessions, constantly eroding the legitimacy of the PA itself. On the other hand, even 
if the PA was in a strong position, Israel would still not concede although perhaps may 
be pressured to engage in some genuine effort. In order to bolster the PA’s and thus his 
own personal legitimacy, assure their survival, and expand his power through the PA 
over Palestinian society, Arafat was compelled to foster alternative means of 
‘management’. One can observe the PA’s increasing use of international financial 
assistance, and diversion of excise taxes and revenues from PA owned/partly owned 
companies to accounts outside of the Ministry of Finance in order to, inter alia, invest 
in PA commercial ventures through the PCSC, to deliver patronage to both prominent 
individuals (through corruption and privileges), and to support public sector 
employment.
728
  
 
The use of this parallel budget where it has been estimated that millions of dollars of 
formal budget went towards the expansion of the informal network and purchase of 
loyalty was at the cost of developing and building infrastructures.
729
  This corruption, 
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however, and the neo-patrimonial means of governing, in turn reduced the credibility of 
the PA, with the PLC lacking the institutional power to consistently constrain Arafat 
and in fact only being able to do so when it suited Israel and/or the International 
Community that it should. The PA as an institution became weaker, Arafat’s 
dependence on corruption became higher, and the PA became weaker still. 
 
Corruption, therefore, became embedded in the practice of the PA. The lack of a 
consistent body of law, the arbitrary implementation of existing laws, and loopholes in 
the judicial system allowed many of the Outside elites on whose loyalty Arafat 
depended for his political power, to exploit the opportunities presented to them to 
engage in corrupt practices and escape any legal repercussions. In doing so, they 
undermined the efforts of international donors and Palestinian Insider counter-elites to 
build credible financial structures that could underpin a future democratic state of 
Palestine. As notes Khan, “Since evidence of corruption, monopolies, centralized 
power, and slow progress towards democratization could be readily found within the 
[PA], the good governance and neo-patrimonial model suggests that these factors, 
monopoly, corruption, etc. played an important role in impeding Palestinian progress 
towards a viable statehood.”730  
 
With increasing dissatisfaction over the PA’s rampant corruption and neo-patrimonial 
rule, frustration over donor money being diverted to private funds and accounts, the 
international donor community heavily criticised the PA’s corrupt and neo-patrimonial 
rule—particularly the PA’s lip-service to donor concerns. It reached a state of crisis in 
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1999 when dispute nearly erupted between international donors and the PA.
 731
  In 
order to restore relations between the donor community and the PA, the IMF Resident 
Representative, Salam Fayyad, proposed a reform initiative with Arafat which targeted 
three areas. The PA would establish an Economic Policy Framework where first, PA 
revenues would be consolidated into one account (Single Treasure Account—STA). 
Second, the Ministry of Finance will manage the Gaza payroll unit to control the hiring 
process. Third, all PA commercial assets will be subject to international audits and 
profits will be transferred to the Ministry of Finance.
732
 The consolidation of PA 
finances was perceived as the first step towards appeasing the concerns of international 
donors. Nevertheless, establishing an economic reform framework did not necessarily 
signify that the PA would abide by the agreements or implement the said initiatives.  
As the IMF recognised, there is a difference between agreement in general and the 
issuance of Presidential decree, and implementation of said reforms.
733
 
 
 
PATRONAGE/NEO-PATRIMONIALISM PRACTICES 
The difficulty with Arafat’s PA was that the weakness of its institutions combined with 
the possibilities presented by massive injections of international donor aid, meant that 
there were many opportunities for unscrupulous individuals to benefit, and that Arafat 
himself have every reason to exploit this in turn in order to bolster his own grasp on 
power. He was able to transfer the neo-patrimonial style of rule which he had 
developed within the PLO in exile into the OPTs, and superimpose it on the formal 
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structures of the PA. Whilst Insider counter-elites sought to assert their own nascent 
democratic culture, they were themselves vulnerable to the influence of Arafat’s efforts 
to exert patronage: he retained symbolic status as the unifying icon of the Palestinian 
national movement; he had coercive and unrestrained apparatus at his disposal to 
sanction dissenters; and the possibilities for co-optation became magnified as the peace 
process and the PA itself failed to deliver on the economic aspirations of the people. 
 
Michels believed that formidable leaders rise to power through lies and cunning.
734
 
However, in Arafat’s case, one could describe him more as resourceful and cunning. 
He was shrewd and sharp in pinpointing the weakness of elites and those that 
surrounded him and using them to his advantage.  He encouraged the practice of 
corruption through financial provision for the elites, their families, their personal and 
business ventures, and then by turning a blind eye to some of their practices, using the 
weakness of the PA institutions to work in their favour and protect them.
735
  
 
The families, relatives and friends of those close to the president’s office or officials of 
the PA were also rewarded and given certain privileges, such as custom exceptions on 
cars, home furnishings, scholarships and so forth.
736
 The Minister for Civil Affairs, 
Jamil Tarifi was cited by the PLC Special Committee for personally influencing and 
implementing such special privileges for Arafat’s ‘people’.737 The Ministry of Civil 
Affairs was also charged with impinging upon the authority of the Ministry of Finance, 
and in violation of the law, to provide customs exemptions. The PLC found that the 
Minister and Ministry of Finance had issued letters to the Minister of Civil Affairs to 
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respond to demands that he cease unlawful infringement upon their authority and 
issuing customs exemptions which was reserved for the Customs Exemption 
Department under the Ministry of Finance.
738
 Tarifi was also accused of conducting 
business and profiting for his cement company in his official capacity. For example, 
Tarifi would close the border to other importers while his company (Al-Karmel 
Company) imported cements. Tarifi was accused of securing a deal with his partner 
(Palestinian Company of Services run by Mr. Khaled Islam) where Islam would pay 
Tarifi $2.5 million USD for every ton of imported cement.
739
 In addition to exemptions 
to returnees, the Ministry also issued them to friends and cohorts. This contributed to a 
significant loss of state money.
740
 Although Tarifi was charged with misusing his 
position in office, he received no more than a slap on the wrist basically in the form of 
public criticism because in 1999, Tarifi still served as the Minister of Civil Affairs.  By 
2003, Tarifi had not been prosecuted of any corruption changes and still occupied the 
same position.
741
 
 
How PA officials understood this corruption is evidence of the embedded nature of the 
political culture which they represented. During an informal World Bank Ad Hoc 
Liaison Committee (AHLC) meeting in Washington, D.C., PA representatives present 
at the meeting denounced the assertions of corruption implicated by the PLC’s 1997 
Corruption Report. They asserted that the reasons for the missing funds, or ‘forgone 
revenues’, were “deliberate policy decisions rather than evidence of wrongdoing.”742 
This was the same explanation that Mohammed Shtayyeh, gave in response to the GCO 
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and PLC corruption report during an interview with him in Ramallah, in which he 
suggested that “wrong policy” does not denote or imply “corruption.” The allocation of 
tax exemption to returnees was according to Shtayyeh wrong-policy not corruption 
because it was a policy that was voted upon and passed by the majority.  
 
The PLC Special Commission also found that between the periods of January to July 
1995, medical expenses for treatment abroad were estimated at $24 million USD which 
was 20 percent of the Health Ministry budget. When the deputy minister of Health was 
questioned regarding these expenses, it became apparent that some of the referrals were 
made “without going through the Ministry of Health” furthermore it “...c[a]me directly 
from the Chairman to the Finance Ministry and [that] the expense...[were] then 
deducted from the Health Ministry budget.”743 It was clear that formal procedures were 
considered to be just ‘formalities’ not necessary protocols for PA ministerial decision 
making, and that officials believed  they could be bypassed in order to accommodate 
the needs of both Arafat and his close associates and ministers.  
 
As the previous chapter explained, the PLC report demands and recommendations for 
change were for the most part ignored by Arafat, who only made a symbolic reshuffle 
of his cabinet, but kept the ministers who had been accused of corruption and 
misconduct. At the same time, he added ten more ministerial appointments which were 
drawn mainly from the PLC to ensure parliamentary endorsement and to silence the 
critics.
744
 Ghassan Al-Khatib expressed his observation in in a personal interview that 
the appointments of the most vocal critical members of the PLC was perceived by 
many analysts as “an attempt to co-opt the Palestinian Legislative Council which 
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became the leading opposition body to the mistakes of the Palestinian Authority as well 
as being one of the typical Arafat tricks to divide and co-opt the growing opposition 
role of the Palestinian Legislative Council.”745 It would appear to be the case because 
the PLC became less active and critical in these matters since that. However, as 
Ghassan Al-Khatib remarked upon, the decrease in criticism from the PLC could also 
have been due to the fact that at the time things became increasingly tense with Israel 
(until the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000) and internal issues were relegated to 
only secondary importance. Without a finally-determined, sovereign status, the 
Counter-elites who sought to give democratic substance to the PA institutions were 
always vulnerable and therefore unable to take a real stand on the issue of corruption or 
the wider issue of Arafat’s style of management which it represented.   
 
Further evidence of the pervasive political culture which endorsed this behaviour and 
rejected the notion that it constituted corruption, is evident in the many scholars and 
former cohorts of Arafat who have come to the defence of Arafat, arguing that he was 
not a corrupt man amassing fortunes for his personal gain but rather was a generous 
man who set out to take care of those (and their families) who had supported him in the 
past and/or have lost their lives as a result. In my interview with Basem Ezbidi, he 
recalled that during Arafat’s 30 years of fighting, he allocated from his ‘personal 
expenses’ monthly allowances to families who lost a member during the struggle. This 
practice continued under the PA, with the “personal funds” being drawn from PA 
revenues. Arafat’s justification for this informal patronage was that these individuals 
had fought with him during the revolutionary period and therefore deserved to be 
rewarded for their services.
746
 Ezbidi argued that he did not perceived Arafat’s action 
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as corruption. Rather, he considered it “...the most noble types of behaviour anywhere 
to have a sense of appreciation and respect and connection to people who really 
provided you with great help when you desperately needed it.”747  This use of state 
resources in informal manner for non-state activities was symbolic of the PA. However 
following continuous pressures from donors for actions against members of the PA, the 
PA surprised the international community when in June 2000 it, for the first time, 
published detailed reports of its payrolls and investments, and promised reform.
 748
 This 
corresponded with many situations. First, it was a renewed effort towards reform in 
order to “secure diverted revenue and improve transparency.” 749  Second, this was 
following the breakdown of the Sharm al-Shaykh Summit and a renewed effort on both 
sides to resume talks. Third, fear of a reduction in donor funding to the PA. Fourth, the 
2000 Camp David Accord was on the agenda. This was performed as a sign of good 
will which was to illustrate PA’s (Arafat) sincerity in resuming negotiations, a renewed 
effort towards reform and transparency which coincidently the 1999 IMF Economic 
Reform Framework agreement signed by Arafat had sought to accomplish.
750
  
 
 
AN INFORMAL PARALLEL SYSTEM OF RULE 
 
As defined in Chapter I, neo-patrimonialism involves the use of official office for 
personal gain and is ‘legitimised’ through the ascension to office through ‘legal’ or 
formal means. As Rex Brynen noted on neo-patrimonialism, it combines and overlays 
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informal elements of patrimonialism with the formal legal structures of the state.
751
 In 
the PA’s case, Arafat’s method of governing, once “elected” to the post of President, 
was the use of neo-patrimonial relationships of reward for loyalty or conversely 
punishment for independence, a strategy which was replicated downwards by senior 
officials who could exert their own patronage through distribution of financial and 
other assets. The PLO’s position within the provisional PA allowed for a relatively 
smooth transition of its existing revolutionary and patrimonial political culture, via the 
legitimisation process represented by an electoral process which it structured itself, into 
the leadership of the PA. Moreover, the OPTs was so economically, politically and 
socially traumatised by the impact of occupation and Intifada, that when the new PA 
government sought to alleviate some of this hardship through means of patronage and 
neo-patrimonial influences, and despite the reservations of democratic counter-elites, 
the population initially saw this as credible and legitimate fulfilment of its obligations.  
 
The occupation, followed by an ultimately unsuccessful but nonetheless extremely 
painful Intifada, had left local opposition groups fragmented and unable to cohere into 
an effective political opposition to Arafat. This wider political structural weakness 
made it easier for Arafat to co-opt opposition individuals, and he was able to use the 
formal PA institutions and official positions within it, to tempt them to come under his 
ultimate control. In doing so, Arafat drew upon the immeasurable authority of his own 
personal position, not only his formal position as Ra’is or President of the PA, but also 
his charismatic and symbolic position as the figure-head of the Palestinian National 
Movement and leader of the revolutionary PLO. Again, the formal and informal were 
                                                          
751
 Brynen, R. "The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestinian Politics." Journal of Palestine Studies 25, 
no. 1 (Autumn, 1995), p. 25 
CHAPTER V: CORRUPTION IN THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
 
308 | P a g e  
 
combined, each being used to consolidate the power gained through the other, a truly 
neo-patrimonial combination. 
 
Crucial to this construction of simultaneous and overlapping formal and informal 
systems of rule, was Arafat’s status as the ‘chosen’ candidate of the international 
community who believed, as U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross wrote in his memoir, 
that he alone had the ability to control the fragmented Palestinian society and neutralise 
opposition to the peace process.
752
 Arafat was able to play on this, demanding resources 
to support the formal institutions of the PA, but retaining his personal control over how 
they were distributed.  During the period from 1994-2000, the PA experienced account 
deficits between 20-35 percent of their GDP where they were bailed out by donor 
assistance for capital projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The exact amount of 
donor disbursements to the PA is unknown due to the lack of monitoring systems, 
either by the PA or by international institutions.
753
 The World Bank did, however, 
assemble an informal report based on surveys of donors and consultation of PA fiscal 
records. In their 1998 West Bank and Gaza Strip Update, it was estimated that the 
period from 1993-1998, the PA received $2.45 billion USD in disbursement out of a 
$3.55 billion in pledges however unemployment jumped to 30 percent in contrast to 
only 5 percent pre-Oslo.
754
 A more concise 2000 World Bank report indicated that the 
PA received an estimated $419 million USD in 1998, $482 million USD in 1999, and 
$549 million USD in 2000, primarily for infrastructure, technical assistance, and 
capacity building projects.
755
 With such funds at his disposal, it was small wonder that 
Arafat wielded such personal power over the institutions and personnel of the PA. The 
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fact that he (mis)used the funds to enhance the fortunes of those loyal to him, to co-opt 
opposition, and to finance his own security forces to suppress dissident voices when 
that failed, did not escape the notice of Israel and the United States, but in so far as 
these tactics kept the PA on the negotiations path meant that, however much they 
disapproved, restraining him was not their first priority. In short, they silently endorsed 
his management of two parallel governing systems, the informal and the formal. 
Ironically, these same two systems allowed him to bypass some of the conditions and 
constraints on his own power imposed by the Oslo Accords.  
 
This overlap of power and functions between the PLO informal and the PA formal 
power structures meant that in time they became indistinguishable, at which point the 
PA ceased to exist as a viable state-building institution. The countervailing power of 
Arafat’s office allowed him to have unprecedented control over all aspects of the PA’s 
institutions and functions. The PA’s cabinet and the PLO Executive Committee were 
considered to be interchangeable because their duties, functions and member 
overlap.
756
 They were like two peas in a pod. For example, meetings of the PLO 
cabinet usually took precedence over PA cabinet meetings when it came to policy 
decision making. As Inge Amundsen and Basem Ezbidi observed, a formal body made 
up of a loosely defined group of PA and PLO officials (though dominated by the PLO) 
assumed the responsibility for policy decision making and was “not subject to 
accountability to either the PLC or any other PNA body.”757  Their decisions were final. 
Thus the dual and parallel structures of the PLO and PA both competed as well as 
coalesced. Indeed, it appeared that the PLO and its leadership council, the PNC, had 
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more power and considered itself more legitimate as the representative of the 
Palestinian people and state for while they were free and able to negotiate with external 
powers, especially Israel, without the limitation set by the Oslo Accords, the PA and 
the PLC were restricted by the Oslo Accords. As such, it gives credence to the belief 
and allegations that although the PA was the official governing body in the OPT, it was 
the PLO that held uncontested power and authority and to whom the PA deferred.   
 
According to a report by a U.S. audit agency of budget reports by the PA during its 
early years, certain PLO expenses like salaries of former PLO militia members who 
were hired on by the PA, payment to martyrs’ families, and pensions were transferred 
to the PA’s budget. Likewise, PA expenses were paid by the PLO and were not 
included in the PA’s budget.758  Perhaps it was this parallel structure that allowed 
Arafat to accomplish what he did throughout his tenure in office. He was not only able 
to attain the interests of the PLO but also able to serve the interest of international 
donors on the side, which generated more funding poured into the OPT that ultimately 
helped to achieve PLO/PA goals. 
 
 
U.S. AND ISRAEL’S ENDORSEMENT AND RESTRICTIONS 
 
The PA at its inception nurtured a close relationship with Israel, the U.S. and 
international donors due to its dependency on international political support and finance.  
But this was an asymmetric relationship, with the PA forced to be more acquiescent 
towards Israeli demands than enjoyed broad Palestinian popular support, International 
powers supported and endorsed Arafat, despite the growing evidence of his corrupt 
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leadership,  providing him with power and authority in order to keep the peace process 
alive. They did not push for or set up—critics argue ‘purposefully’—a strict mechanism 
for institutional checks and balances. The privileges and power (to a lesser extent) were 
also extended to those around Arafat and many of them took advantage, as has been 
observed, this absence of checks and balances in the system. TAs the PA’s negotiating 
policies, as well as many other of its ‘misguided’ policies, and including the evidence 
of corruption and personal enrichment on the part of PA leaders, came to be key 
concerns of the PA’s opposition, they were quickly and “efficiently” suppressed by 
Arafat’s security services, drawing at that point little criticism from Arafat’s 
international (and Israeli) interlocutors..  
 
However, when the Peace Accords failed to lead to a final settlement, and as 
negotiations themselves stumbled in the face of, according to Israel and the United 
States government, Arafat’s intransigency and his inability (or unwillingness) to 
sufficiently reign in militant Islamist opposition groups, Israel and the United States 
proved more willing to criticise Arafat and the PA for their corruption and human 
rights violations. The PA rampant corruption was even acknowledged by the U.S. State 
Department where they stated that "there are at least thirteen known monopolies under 
the control of no more than five individuals who are members of the PA's inner 
circle."
759
 Monies from these monopolies, according to these same officials, are used in 
large part to pay the salaries of police and other agencies, which donors no longer 
finance 
 
These types of criticism against Arafat and the PA often resulted in the withholding of 
international funds until Arafat was able to establish a truce with internal opposition 
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groups and a subsequent decrease in attacks on Israel. It was a measure of the control 
imposed by the international powers on the PA, and its weakness in resisting such 
pressure. This was witnessed in the Israeli government’s withholding the transfer of tax 
revenues to the PA in December 2000 as a result of the al-Aqsa Intifada.
760
 By 
withholding the transfers, Israel confronted the PA with the difficulties associated with 
disgruntled civil servants whose wages could not be paid. In sum, Israel knew Arafat 
used the transfers to distribute patronage in the form of salaries and they used this 
against him when it suited them to do so. 
 
When the peace process appeared to be on-track, however, Arafat was left with a free 
hand to manage the OPTs as he chose. As former U.S. Envoy to the Middle East 
Dennis Ross remarked in his memoir, “Neither we [U.S.] nor the Israelis questioned 
what Arafat was doing internally. At this point, we both felt [Arafat] was the only one 
who could manage the Palestinians. As we would hear often from Rabin, we shouldn’t 
be pressing Arafat on human rights or even corruption.”761 
 
The Israeli government was criticised for encouraging and ‘entertaining’ the 
authoritarian PA regime. In a 2002 interview with Jerusalem Post’s Carolyn Wick, 
Ross was questioned why the Clinton administration was not proactive in addressing an 
increasing authoritarian and corrupt PA. He responded that the Israelis were not 
particularly concerned with the rate of corruption inside the PA so why should the 
administration show special interest in it.
762
   In fact, the Israeli government was fully 
aware, encouraged and even “entertained” by the fact that the top leadership of the PA 
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was more concerned with their own continued influx of funds rather than their domestic 
political problems. In the Bergman and Ratner report, they related how at the height of 
the clash between Israeli Defence Force (IDF) soldiers and Palestinian policemen 
regarding the Western Wall tunnel which ran underneath the Al-Aqsa mosque, a senior 
PA economist urgently contacted Aryeh Zeif, who was then Director of Customs (for 
the Israeli government) and responsible for the transfers of funds to the Palestinians. 
The PA official’s concern was not the violence, or an effort to resolve the problem, but 
rather to know if the Israelis could move up the transfer by two days because of an 
upcoming PA holiday.
763
 
 
The uncertainty of the peace process contributed to the corruption as many high 
ranking Palestinian officials were unsure of their future status and sought to enrich 
themselves while they could. Their grasp for control of monopolies was encouraged, or 
at least ignored, by the Israeli and U.S. government. For example, Israeli political and 
security sector leaders hastened to court (among others) Arafat’s economic advisor, 
Muhammad Rashid, PA security apparatus strongmen Muhammad Dahlan and Jabril 
Rajoub, Deputy Minister of Economics and Trade Mahr al-Kurd, Minister of Planning 
Nabil Sha’ath, Abu Ala and Arafat’s chief lieutenant and number-two man Abu Mazen, 
at the expense of disenfranchised Palestinian businessmen.
764
 Not only were such co-
opted Palestinians reliant on the peace process to secure their new business interests, 
but they were easier to deal with for Israel, compliant and self-interested. Moreover, 
this dependent relationship meant Israel could control the development of an 
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autonomous Palestinian sector which might even have posed competition to Israeli 
firms themselves. 
 
By supporting the elimination of economic competitors to the monopolies held by the 
PA officials in cement, cigarette, gas, petroleum, telecommunication etc., Israel (and 
the U.S. by turning a blind eye to blatant abuse of power) was undermining the legal 
and economic frameworks of the OPT. Even those who were involved in monopolies 
and nepotism were heralded by Israel and the U.S. and Western media as emblems of 
reform in the PA.  For example, Muhammad Dahlan was a persistent promoter of 
transparency in the PA, but was criticised by many for his monopoly over gas in the 
Gaza Strip where his security force “persuaded” petro-station owners to buy gas from 
his company at an inflated rate. Moreover, Dahlan’s loading pitchfork company, which 
was manned by the preventive security force at the Erez checkpoint, “required” every 
merchant and truck owner to pay a tithe or “donation” to the security apparatus, Force 
17. 
765
  By giving these PA officials a “cut-of-the-profit” during the transition years of 
the PA, Israel co-opted the Outsider elites into assuring the continuance and stability of 
the peace process.
766
 As one Gazan merchant—and a former Fatah member observed: 
“We live in amazing, shameful times, but you should know that every revolution has its 
fighters, thinkers and profiteers.  Our fighters have been killed, our thinkers 
assassinated, and all we have left are the profiteers.  These don’t think even primarily 
of the cause, they don’t think of it at all.  They know that they are just transients here, 
as they were in Tunis, and, as with any regime whose end is near, they think only of 
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profiting from it while they can.”767 It appeared that the vociferous criticism against the 
PA official’s modus operandi came from the Palestinians while an astounding silence 
emanated from the Israelis and international community’s side.   
 
Israel, the U.S. and the International Donor Community also used the financial support 
of the PA as a means to exert pressure on Arafat to contain dissident voices, and 
particularly Hamas as it became increasingly vociferous and even popular in the face of 
the failing peace process. During significant periods where the PA’s legitimacy was 
questioned by the international community, Arafat was forced to prove their ability to 
control any conflict or dissention within, in other words his worthiness to be the 
recipient of financial support, by collaborating with Israel in the arrest and 
assassination of members of Hamas’ armed wing. Following the February to March 
1996 suicide bombings by Hamas in Israel, Arafat was pressured by Israel to destroy 
the Islamic oppositions. As such, 1,200 suspected Islamists were arrested, about thirty 
Hamas institutions as well as the Islamic University were raided, and the Gaza mosques 
were placed under the jurisdiction of the PA.
768
  The PA security sector’s tactic of 
brutal searches and mass arrests of Islamist oppositions at Islamic universities have 
been heavily criticised by the Palestinian media and denounced by oppositions as in the 
service of the occupier. 
769
 
 
The difficulty with removing Hamas from the political scene was perceptively put by 
Ahmad Khalidi: “Hamas is...most emphatically not a problem of law and order that can 
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be rooted out or crushed by military means.” 770  They were a legitimate political, 
religious, and social entity in the Palestinian society. However, the additional pressures 
from the U.S. to curtail all violence against Israel which was exerted through the 
distribution (or withhold) of financial ‘aid’ to the OPT urged the PA to stamp out the 
opposition with violent means.  Israel also issued coercive tactics against the PA by 
withholding transfer of tax collected for the Palestinians, granting (or elimination) of 
incentives, to encourage and hasten collective actions against Hamas members 
especially following the failure of the 2000 Camp David Accord and the eruption of the 
al-Aqsa Intifada. Israel accused the PA of corruption and funding terrorist groups and 
therefore suspended tax transfers. It was estimated that by end of 2002, there were 
approximately $500 million USD in withheld taxes in Israel’s custody.771 
 
 
POLITICAL RENT 
In sum, the financial assistance which was transferred to the PA amounted to political 
rent. Rent, according to Martin Beck, is a “special sort of income which is neither the 
result of capital investment nor labour...[furthermore] unlike profits, no re-investment 
is required in order to receive future rents, which means that rents are in principal at the 
recipient’s free disposal.”772  In the case of the PLO and PA, the transfers amounted to a 
particular form of rent, political rent that is a “financial aid that is not balanced by 
economic equivalents.” Furthermore, and ironically given the under-developed status of 
the OPT economies, the PA’s fundamental political underpinnings directed them 
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towards seeking out this kind of rent above all others, since it was more useful and 
pliable for sustaining their own survival. For the Outsider elites this was nothing new: 
the PLO as a revolutionary group had relied heavily on Arab political rents and they 
were used to managing their structures, operations and behaviour accordingly.  The PA 
in turn, although set up supposedly with a formal democratic state-like structure which 
should establish transparent financial management and regulation, was to become 
equally dependent on political rent and, in the absence of either sovereign control over 
its own internal processes or a clearly developed financial and regulatory system, was 
to internalise those same behaviours. Indeed, the populations of the OPTs had also  
been reliant on international aid since the 1948 Israeli-Palestinian war, and in particular 
with the establishment of sizeable refugee populations supported by the United 
Nations
773
 and other international organisations, donors and governments who provided 
humanitarian and developmental  assistance.  Unfortunately, the society that was built 
up from this experience became absorbed and to a high degree reliant on political rent.  
 
The aid which was intended to provide ‘temporary’ assistance and to alleviate hardship 
in the OPT under the occupation—while international governments and the two 
conflicting parties resolved their political impasse—and to provide a ‘support’ basis to 
propel the Palestinian population to be self-reliant, became an integral part of the 
society, making it more complex and difficult to become self-reliant and develop an 
independent and sustainable economy.  
 
With the establishment of the PA, they fell into the same trap of dependency. The early 
stage of development for the PA was quite brief (between 1994 with the return of the 
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Outsiders, until the reoccupation of the territories by Israel following the second 
Intifada) and therefore did not allow it the time needed to mature and develop—which 
leaves the reader to wonder whether the PA would have taken on a developmental 
state-like character if it was given the necessary time politically and economically to 
develop on its own.
774
 However what came to be surmised was that the PA did not 
develop the capacity to regulate and monitor rents and to direct it to more economic 
viable and profitable ventures for the OPT.  Furthermore, the PA did not have the 
power, or perhaps willingness, to punish those who took advantage of the rent 
opportunities. Neither did it have an institutional system of checks and balances to 
monitor and control the transfer, allocation and distribution of rents or those in charge 
of the rents. Rather, the political institutions and infrastructure of the PA as well as its 
powerlessness vis-à-vis Israel and external powers and its inability to control its 
population through legitimate means because they neither had legitimate state power to 
impose any laws and policies or legitimate use of force, although they legitimately 
ascended into office, propelled the PA towards certain behaviour of rent management 
as well as developed a certain ability to pursue specific rents which were most 
conducive to the political survival of its elites but detrimental to the development of the 
state structure.
775
 The new ‘state’-like structure that was established on political rent, 
particularly from the U.S. and Europe, undermined its ability to develop a sustainable 
political economy and to rely on its own income and profit, thereby consequently 
becoming increasingly dependent on its external ‘donors’. The question that has been 
raised by Khan et. al is if the direction for state development had already been 
predetermined and encouraged by external powers. Considering the weakened political 
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and economic position of the PA, and their limited power and politico-socio-economic 
independence dictated by the Oslo Accords, it would seem more plausible that the PA 
would proceed towards certain beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of practice and 
management. They were beholden and subjected to the carrot and stick treatment by 
donor countries and organisations, who were connected to the external powers, and on 
whom the PA was reliant in order to function, for without their financial support the PA 
would collapse because it was unable to shoulder its extensive financial burdens. As 
such and because of this dependency, if the PA failed to comply with the agendas or 
wishes of the donors, funding would be conveniently ‘delayed’ or all together withheld 
under the pretext of PA violation of one act or another. Therefore funding, which was 
critical to the PA’s survival, would only pour into the OPT when the PA satisfied or 
upheld the agenda or ‘requests’ of the donors. As related to me by Mr. Nasser Tahboub, 
Assistant to the PA’s Minister of Finance, International Donors and the U.S. had given 
Arafat a free-rein in controlling the funds because they wanted him to “use the funds to 
nullify, moderate, and manipulate the political factions and when Arafat decided that he 
is not going to do it for their benefit they started to criticise him on transparency 
issues.”776 
 
The PA was kept economically vulnerable and was unable to have the military 
capabilities to stand up to external actors or to counter internal criticism for their 
dependency on the external actors.
 777
 As a result, governmental policy towards internal 
opposition groups and individuals took on a ‘militaristic’ policing characteristic in 
order to simultaneously suppress internal criticism while adhering to external demands 
that they control every aspect of the Palestinian society (realistic demand or not) which 
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created further rift in the society. It therefore appeared that political rents released to 
the PA for development, rather than strengthening and consolidating the PA and 
Palestinian society, weakened and de-legitimised the government, becoming a tool for 
PA officials with which to further their personal ‘business’ interests. Furthermore, the 
PA relied heavily on this source of ‘income’ to alleviate their budgetary concerns (bills 
and salaries) and therefore used it also to finance the works of the security apparatus. 
According to Beck, a conservative estimation of the 1996 donor assistance to the PA 
totalled US $977 million which was 30 percent of the PA’s budget, making it a high 
percentage rarely surpassed by other political rentiers.
778
 Thus, the PA’s acute 
dependency on political rent in many ways contributed to the limitation and retardation 
of the political, economic, and social development of the Palestinian society.  Political 
rent had also to a high degree hindered and impeded this development in the OPT by 
creating a society which was exceedingly reliant on ‘hand-out’ money, which required 
no labour -induced ventures, financial re-investment, or sense of accountability. 
Furthermore, the political infrastructure and institutions were not equipped with 
measures to enforce accountability on any level. Political rent did not produce 
sustainable economic ventures since businesses were still limited by Israeli restrictions 
on movement, trade, and the  unpredictable policy of destroying infrastructures as  
retaliation to opposition Palestinian groups or PA non-compliance. Politically, many of 
the elites controlled and manipulated the political rents that were transferred to the 
PA/OPT to expand on their resources, influence and power because there was 
uncertainty to the survival of the PA and no viable outlet for the funds to develop 
anything sustainable in the OPT—due to Israeli military orders and policies.  
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Consequently, the dependency on rent supported a political culture that became 
efficient in its ability to manipulate funds for personal gains. Although political rents to 
the PA were seen as indispensable, they negatively impacted internal development 
because the “priorities of the foreign aid effort...[were] not in line with the development 
aspirations and needs of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip.”779 Furthermore, international aid failed to bridge the socioeconomic gaps as a 
result of years of occupation and had not provided a stimulus for sustainable economic 
development.
780
 Rather than address the local needs of the OPT, donor organisations 
attached their own agenda to the funds provided which were not compatible with or 
conducive to the development and need of the society but rather accomplished the 
agenda of the international donor countries. As Mohammed Shtayyeh stated, “every 
donor is driven by his political vision or position in relation to the question of 
Palestine”781 therefore his political agenda is his priority regardless of what is actually 
needed on the ground. Donors usually have a pre-prescribed agenda which does not 
necessarily meet the social and economic needs of the country. In the Palestinian case, 
donors were concerned about issues of democratic development, human rights, the 
environment, gender and so forth which was not necessarily what the NGOs or the 
society need but many NGOs applied these requirements to their organisation agenda 
and proposals as a means to fund their ongoing activities and overhead costs.
782
 PA 
officials raised concerns that rather than invest in the physical infrastructure, 
agriculture and economic development, donor assistance focused more on donor 
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agenda where it even overfunded projects such as gender (for example) which were not 
the priority or what was needed by the people in the OPT.
783
  
 
As a consequence of international overfunding of specific projects which were not 
pertinent to the political reality on ground, many PA officials used the opportunity 
presented by this incongruency in actual and perceived needs to exploit
784
 some of 
these funds for personal advantage. Moreover, temporary organisations were set up 
specifically for donor money and once funding runs out, the organisations collapse.
785
 
As observed and maintained Salim Tamari in my interview conducted with him, this 
was what Khan et. al refer to as “dependency on short-term foreign funding.”786 Ali 
Jarbawi added his voice to this criticism in my interview with him that “accountability, 
responsibility, and transparency, all of these are [to] the donors and not [to] the 
people.”787 
 
In fact, given the uncertain future of the PA, it was inevitable that some of the core 
elites would “extract as much and as fast as possible”788 from the system while they 
still held power. The mentality of the political elites inevitably filtered down to the 
society as the only means to accomplish something and to bypass the bureaucracy was 
to go through the informal network which meant that one had to ‘pay’ in one form or 
another in order to access resources, doctors, permission, jobs or other resources. An 
individual may also be a ‘gate-keeper’ where he is ‘paid’ in order to open the doors for 
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those seeking assistance. As Helga Baumgarten, a lecturer at Birzeit University who 
has lived in the Palestinian territories for the past 24 years, remarked in my interview 
conducted with her, “the worst example of a rentier system and even a rentier society, 
and rentier culture is the Palestinian society. It is on every level down to the level of 
students.”789  Baumgarten was dismayed with the social change in society in that on 
every level of society for the past decades “people will not do anything for nothing.” 
She stated that if one asks a person for something to do, they will ask you how much 
you are willing to pay.
790
  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has demonstrated the extent of corruption within the PA, and some of the 
most visible ways in which it was enacted. The availability of extensive political rents 
enabled PA leaders to take advantage of the weak and under-developed state 
institutions, particularly those relating to financial management and accountability, to 
divert these rents to their own personal advantage through monopolies, kickbacks, and 
privileges. They were encouraged in this by Arafat himself, who utilised the same 
institutional weakness to ensure that PA revenues were diverted to alternative back 
accounts and could then be used to shore up his own power and legitimacy through 
distribution of patronage and the consequent co-optation not only of opposition critics 
but also of the large section of the population which became dependent on public-sector 
employment. He also used it to fund his extensive security apparatus which could 
equally be used to sanction and silence critics. 
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To do this, Arafat took advantage of the opportunities to run simultaneous, albeit 
overlapping and ultimately merged, structures and networks of rule: the formal PA 
structures and the informal PLO structures which he had brought with him from Tunis. 
Manoeuvring between the two gave him flexibility not only to act in a neo-patrimonial 
way in order to bolster his own power and legitimacy, but also to evade some of the 
constraints placed upon him by the Oslo Accords, the establishment of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council and the continued dominance of Israel over all decision-making.  
 
Arafat was allowed, even encouraged, to do this by Israel and the United States, for 
whom the priority was the continued security of Israel and a peace process which 
secured that. By encouraging and securing Arafat and his close associates’ dependence 
on political rents and the autonomy to decide/define how to use them, the U.S. and 
Israel secured his compliance in suppressing opposition to the peace process or militant 
attacks against Israel. They only intervened in 2000 to object to corruption and abuses 
of power by Arafat and PA elites when they could, and in doing so, put pressure on him 
to return to this docile role rather than seeking to restore his domestic legitimacy with 
the Palestinian population by holding back from an offensive against Hamas and other 
militant groups in the wake of a failing peace process and a new Intifada.  
 
The Palestinians, both those who had been exiled to the wider Arab world, and those 
who had remained within the OPTS, were accustomed to the political and economic 
deficiencies which were encouraged by political rent, having been dependent on 
external economic assistance for decades. Thus, when the PA institutions proved too 
weak to curb the excesses of Arafat and his cronies, they adjusted to modes of 
behaviour which cascaded corruption down into the heart of society. The political 
culture of Arafat’s neo-patrimonial rule was dispersed from the Outsider elites through 
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society, incorporating some of the Insider counter-elites and leaving the rest unable to 
do anything substantial to constrain him. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
   
INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis had set out to understand why corruption was endemic in the Palestinian 
Authority.  As such, it sought to answer the following research question: What leading 
factors sustained and proliferated corruption in the Palestinian Authority? In order to 
answer the research question, the thesis first examined existing theories on why 
corruption was endemic in developing states.  As such, different theories were explored 
before selecting specific compound theories which would address corruption in the 
Palestinian Authority. In addition to the theoretical approach, fieldwork research was 
conducted in the Occupied Palestinian Territories through interviews and participant 
observation.  This was supplemented by secondary texts. Second, the thesis explored 
the research question first through a historical approach which examined elites’ 
formative years in the Palestinian Territories. As such, it identified the types of elites 
that emerged with each epoch of time, their socialisation process, their political and 
social experiences, and the political cultures they finally came to adhere to. Third, the 
thesis then examined the formulation of the state that emerged after the Oslo Accords. 
As such, it necessitated a documented analysis where it examined the stipulations and 
conditions prescribed by the Oslo Accords and the political culture of the Outsider 
elites in how they influenced the final construction of the PA state institutions and 
identified/compiled the elite composition that came into power. Fourth, the behaviours 
and attitudes of divergent elites and their struggle for power in the PA was explored in 
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order to understand how, in the process, their political culture came to influence the 
function of the PA and its institutions. Last, the thesis documented corrupt cases in the 
PA and how it was linked to ‘whom’ and ‘how’ the PA was originally constructed.   
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
In order to answer the research questions, the thesis first set out to understand and 
identify corruption and why it became a prevalent character of many developing states. 
The thesis therefore drew on existing theories which sought provide explanations on 
why corruption was rampant in developing states. The thesis then reviewed literatures 
on corruption and then provided a more comprehensive definition where practices of 
PA would be measured against in order to understand the level of corruption, if any. As 
such, Max Weber’s concept of traditional patriarchal system was explored, particularly 
how it operates in society and its eventual influence on the state-formation process. A 
patriarchal system’s influence in the state’s formative years contributed to the 
emergence of a specific type of hybrid systems: patrimonial and neo-patrimonial 
political systems. The neo-patrimonial system, which was coined by S.N. Eisenstadt, 
became more evident in states following post-colonial entailed both a formal (state 
structure) and an informal (traditional patriarchal structure) governing mechanism. The 
chapter then explored neo-patrimonialism in detail in this thesis due to the implication 
of gaps and incongruencies between the formal and informal structure whereby 
corruption became a mechanism whereby to bridge the gaps. Consequently, corruption 
practices were incorporated into the state structure as a means for survival and 
expansion of power for the governing regime. This led eventually to analysing weak-
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states theory, particularly the work by Joel. S. Migdal, which was an identifying 
characteristic for post-colonial states. The post-colonial state had neo-patrimonial 
tendencies and was therefore apt to be ‘weak’ as a result of the processes they had 
advanced through on their path to statehood.  The regimes in post-colonial states also 
utilised practices such as politics of survival—strategic allocation of positions in the 
government—in order to maintain security and power. 
 
The thesis then explored the leadership composition—identified as elites in their 
particular society—and their political orientation.  Elites, as identified by Gaetano 
Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, were identified to carry particular political orientations 
depending on their education, upbringing, experiences, and political socialisation 
processes. The role therefore of elites is crucial in how they influence state formation as 
well as in how they define the characteristics of the state.  The thesis lastly looked at 
the role of elites’ political cultures and how elites’ political culture influences the 
decision making processes and how state affairs and resources were administered. 
Depending on the political culture that elites in leadership position came to espouse, 
they either contributed to the eradication or exacerbation and continuance of corruption.   
 
These theories were then applied when examining corruption in the PA to assess if 
these factors were either the root causes or contributed to corrupt behaviour in the PA. 
As such, the theories were measured against each chapter of this thesis from the 
formation of the elites, the construction of the PA, the elite intra-struggle within the PA, 
and finally the documented cases of persistent corruption in the PA. By having laid out 
these theories, the thesis set out to demonstrate how each theory was inter-related and 
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significantly explained the extent and nature of corruption in the Palestinian Authority 
through each chapter.  
 
Chapter One had set out the theoretical tools in order to understand why corruption was 
endemic in post-colonial states which would also give an understanding to the 
prevalence of corruption in the Palestinian Authority. As such, the chapter provided a 
literature review on existing theories on corruption and to assess why it was an endemic 
part of developing states. The chapter therefore first reviewed theories on corruption. 
Following this analysis, the author then provided a synthesised definition for corruption. 
The chapter then examined Max Weber’s ground-breaking work on traditional 
patriarchal system particularly its influence on the type of states that emerged following 
colonialism. Under Weber’s definition, it located a type of system that was in existence 
during the colonial period which was considered a hybrid form of patriarchalism: 
patrimonial. It was thus identified as a system which arose as a failed attempt at 
modernising the patriarchal system because it contained an element of patriarchalism in 
the new state structure. Eisenstadt’s work on neo-patrimonial system, on the other hand, 
emphasised that despite political modernisation, democratic and electoral processes in a 
new state, it employs a parallel formal (modern state structure) and an informal 
(traditional patriarchal structure) governing system. As such, the chapter analysed post-
colonial states (with weak-state institutions) that emerged encompassing these hybrid 
systems with neo-patrimonial leadership. The leadership composition—particularly 
identified to be elites—was also examined because of their influence on the decision 
making process and formation of the state structure. As a result of the often 
incongruency between the informal and the formal system, corruption was used by 
elites to bridge the gap between the two systems. Therefore, the political culture that 
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elite espoused was thus important to analyse because they would consequently 
influence the nature and behaviour of the state institutions.  
 
Chapter Two had set out to identify and analyse the different stages of elite formation 
in the Palestinian Territories based on a historical analysis from the Ottoman Empire 
until the Oslo Accord. It examined the Palestinian elites’ formative years and their 
development of varying political cultures. As such, this chapter came to identify the 
Outsider’s elite political culture which was neo-patrimonial in nature. This was a result 
of their political socialisation in the diaspora and experience under Arab ruling regimes. 
The Insider counter-elites on the other hand had come to espouse a nascent democratic 
political culture as a result, ironically, of being under occupation by the Israeli regime. 
The chapter demonstrated how the different elites’ political cultures came to play a 
significant role in the formation and later function of the Palestinian Authority.  
 
Chapter Three demonstrated how the Oslo Accords created a PA with weak institutions 
and neo-patrimonial leadership. This derived from various factors.  First, the design of 
PA institutions reflected the Outsiders political culture based on their experience and 
understanding of a governing structure under Arab authoritarian regimes. As such, it 
not only gave exclusive power to the President’s office but it failed to create a fully 
independent Judicial, Executive, and Legislative body. Second, the Oslo Accords 
limited the ability of the PA to develop into an independent governing entity by linking 
Palestinian social, economic and political development to Israeli security. As a result, 
PA efforts toward any form of disengagement and independence from Israel, as well as 
reaching final status talks, fell victim to each Israeli administration’s reinterpretation of 
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the peace agreements, and demands for security. This eventually led to a struggle for 
power between the Outsider elites and the Insider counter-elites inside the PA, resulting 
in the sideling of the Insider counter-elites inside the PA. 
 
Chapter Four examines the Outsider elites’ and Insider counter-elites’ struggle for 
supremacy and how this impacted the political culture espoused by the Palestinian 
Authority. The chapter demonstrated how the incompatible political cultures of the 
PLO and the Counter elites were encouraged to compete with each other for primacy 
by external actors and sustained by weak institutions.  In order to control the elite 
struggle and manage the peace process, Arafat instituted a parallel system (formal and 
informal) of governance. As such the chapter illustrated that during the period of 
struggles between the Outsider elites and Insider counter-elites, it observed a 
dichotomy in support from external actors (Israel and U.S.). External actors indirectly 
supported the informal political culture of the PLO through the endorsement of Arafat 
through silent endorsement of his undemocratic PA practises, i.e. inaction against 
human rights violation, corrupt practices etc. Second, they supported the formal 
structure of the PA through its institutional relationship with the Israeli government and 
diplomatic relations with the U.S. As such, challenges to the PA (and to Arafat’s neo-
patrimonial rule) soon gained strength from oppositions particularly from the PLC, the 
NGOs, and from the Islamic groups. It finally culminated in the signing and passing of 
pertinent laws which restricted his power. 
 
Finally, Chapter Five demonstrated that the set-up of the PA made it inevitable to be 
corrupt. It found that the various peace agreements that were signed between the PA 
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and the Israeli government demanded that the PA meet specific security criteria before 
reaching a final status talk. As such, the PA employed particular acts which violated 
human rights, suppression of oppositions, and establishment of a parallel system of 
formal/informal governance in order to meet the demands of the external actors (Israel 
and U.S.).  The chapter demonstrated that due to the PA’s weak-state structure, its lack 
of legitimacy, and inability to enforce laws and policies, Arafat resorted to his informal 
networks in order to strengthen his position, control dissident groups, and to regain 
legitimacy through co-optation or coercion. This enabled and supported the exercise of 
corrupt practices which eventually became embedded in the PA structures.  This 
chapter concluded that the neo-patrimonial rule, under which the PA functioned and 
operated, weakened the Insider counter-elites and undermined the development of the 
PA institutions into a truly democratic entity. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
The thesis found that the initial secret negotiation process for the establishment of the 
PA which brought to the table negotiating parties a politically decrepit PLO Outsider 
elites and the Government of Israel with asymmetrical power relations, and excluded a 
thriving Insider elites, produced agreements under the Oslo Accords—containing 
contradicting and often unrealistic stipulations and expectations—which eventually 
subjected the newly formulated PA to a position where it would inevitably use 
corruption as a means for survival.  Furthermore, its non-state status and neo-
patrimonial regime did not give it legitimacy or ultimate authority (under the Oslo 
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Accords) resulting in the institutionalisation of corruption as a modus operandi of the 
PA.  
Several factors came into play into this equation which configured into the use, 
encouragement and sustaining of corruption. First, the establishment of the PA by the 
Oslo Accords as a government in transition transpired while under occupation. This 
bestowed it with characteristics of a state yet with all the trappings of a post-colonial 
state. A conflicting dichotomy of colonial and post-colonial legacy was instilled into its 
formation creating incongruency in its governing structure where informal and formal 
structures were concurrently used by the PA leadership. The MEPP sustained a 
Palestinian Outsider leadership under Arafat to govern the PA at the expense of the 
Insider elites who had legitimacy within the OPT due to their active participation and 
leadership against the Israeli government during the Intifada.  
 
Second, the Outsider elite increasingly illustrated neo-patrimonial political culture 
which reflected their clandestine revolutionary experience in the diaspora and their 
repression under the Arab regimes. This was at the expense of Insider counter-elite 
leadership who, on the other hand, encompassed a nascent democratic political culture 
as they were mainly excluded from key leadership positions in the PA. The imported 
Outsider political culture endorsed corruption as a political tool and became the 
operational norm for the PA. As a tool, Arafat used corruption to influence the system 
through the co-optation of oppositions, the foregoing of democratic processes, and the 
silencing of criticism which ultimately undermined the efforts of the counter-elites 
towards institutional development and reform.  
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Consequently, the MEPP created a weak state with neo-patrimonial leadership. As a 
result of the PA’s weak institutions, the leadership (mainly composed of Arafat’s 
Outsider elites) were able to manipulate the system in order to remain in power as well 
as expand their control, network and wealth through their official position. Moreover, 
having a weak-state structure, the PA lacked the legitimacy or the authority to 
implement law and order.  As such, it needed an alternate means for control in order to 
meet the security requirements of Israel under the MEPP.  Therefore, Arafat enlisted 
parallel formal and informal governing structures to comply with the demands of both 
the international powers (U.S. and Israel) and the Palestinian masses through the use of 
the formal and informal structures. The parallel governing structure was able to control 
the counter-elites by using his presidential formal power, and managed the Outsider 
elites by serving as their patron for economic, political, and social needs. Subsequently, 
counter-elite efforts toward institutional reform were impeded by the Outsider 
leadership’s aim to maintain political primacy and external actors’ (mainly the U.S. and 
Israel) need to keep the MEPP alive.  The PA’s non-state status with weak-state 
ailments, external actors’ endorsement of Arafat’s neo-patrimonial rule and human 
rights violation, and forego of democratic principles for the sake of security and 
survival of the MEPP sustained and necessitated corruption in the PA.   
 
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This research faced some limitations. First, analysing the PA in the context of a state 
entity had its challenges because I was applying state structure theories to a non-state 
entity.  However, the state-like structures, institutions, and behaviour of the PA enabled 
the application of these theories.  There was also limitation in interview sample due 
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language barrier and restriction in movement as such interviewees were limited to those 
able to communicate in English, and those residing in the West Bank and Israel.  
However, these were augmented by other sources such as reports, articles, informal 
interviews, participatory observation, and secondary interviews.  
 
FURTHER RESEARCH  
Further research can be based on this thesis particularly a full analysis on the positive 
and negative impact of international donations in the developing world, role of 
international donors in influencing the agenda of the recipient states, the effect of a 
donor-dependent culture, and acquiring genuine economic and democratic political 
development and sustainability of their societies. This aspect of a donor driven society 
can help in understanding the role of corruption in creating and sustaining a donor-
dependent culture and the difficulties in building and cultivating genuine sustainable 
development.  
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The PA institutions need to be strengthened in order to reduce corruption through 
provision of standardised measures, and a monitoring process for PA institutions will 
aid its institutional development. This will strengthen PA institutions and the public 
sectors. There needs to be a deconstruction of political culture and priorities. Moreover, 
there needs to be a permanent solution to the Palestinian question which would 
establish a viable state structure with internal mechanism to control, monitor and hold 
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individuals accountable. As such, it will eliminate the justification for corrupt practices 
in order to bypass restrictive measures towards democratic state building, development 
and progression. By providing the means whereby they can demand accountability, and 
impose sanctions on officials’ activities and control and use of state resources to 
accumulate personal wealth. Moreover, international donor states and organisations 
should be liable for upholding and implementing rules and regulations to assure 
accountability both from their own organisation as well as from the receiving country. 
As such, on an international level, development agendas designed for receiving 
countries should first include a preparatory stage where focus/consultancy groups of 
local experts, government officials, and communities should provide inputs on 
local/domestic priorities and needs. This can reduce superfluous and futile projects 
which may provide means for corruption by officials and make-shift NGOs. On a 
national level, by involving the local communities in the policy making process it will 
encourage and promote transparency and accountability from local representatives and 
governments officials. This can be accomplished through the reduction of redundant 
projects, allocation of priorities based on local needs and not based on donors agendas, , 
and assurance of governmental and international donor accountability.  
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Declaration of Principles 
 
On Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
 
(September 13, 1993) 
 
The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-  
Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian 
Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put  an end to 
decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual  legitimate and political 
rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and 
achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation 
through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the, two sides agree to the following 
principles:  
 
ARTICLE I  
AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
 
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East  peace 
process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self- Government 
Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not  exceeding five years, leading to a 
permanent settlement based on Security  Council Resolutions 242 and 338.  
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace 
process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the 
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.  
 
ARTICLE II  
FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD  
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of  
Principles.  
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ARTICLE III  
ELECTIONS  
1 .In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern 
themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general  political 
elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and  international 
observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.  
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in 
accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of  holding the 
elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of  this Declaration of 
Principles.  
3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the 
realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.  
 
ARTICLE IV  
JURISDICTION  
 Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for 
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.  The two sides view 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be 
preserved during the interim period.  
 
ARTICLE V  
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS  
1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the  Gaza Strip 
and Jericho area.  
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than 
the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel 
and the Palestinian people representatives.  
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: 
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and 
cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.  
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should 
not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.  
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ARTICLE VI  
PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal  from 
the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military 
government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as 
detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory 
nature until the inauguration of the Council.  
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic 
development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the 
Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, 
direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the 
Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the 
two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as 
agreed upon.  
 
ARTICLE VII  
INTERIM AGREEMENT  
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim 
period (the "Interim Agreement")  
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the 
Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities 
from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The 
Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative 
authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial 
organs.  
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the 
inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and 
responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.  
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, 
the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a 
Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export 
Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority 
and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed 
upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and 
responsibilities.  
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5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and 
the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.  
 
ARTICLE VIII  
PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY  
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of  the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police  force, while Israel 
will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against  external threats, as well 
as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for  the purpose of safeguarding 
their internal security and public order.  
 
ARTICLE IX  
LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS  
1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim 
Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.  
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in 
remaining spheres.  
 
ARTICLE X  
JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE  
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and 
any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of 
this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli- Palestinian Liaison Committee will be 
established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common 
interest, and disputes.  
 
ARTICLE XI  
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS  
 Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the 
West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of 
Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established 
in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in 
the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.  
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ARTICLE XII  
LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT  
 The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in 
establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of 
Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of 
Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These 
arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide 
by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and 
disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.  
 
ARTICLE XIII  
REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES  
 1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve 
of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out 
in accordance with Article XIV.  
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its 
military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.  
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented 
commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal 
security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.  
 
ARTICLE XIV  
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA  
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol 
attached as Annex II.  
 
ARTICLE XV  
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES  
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of 
Principles. or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be 
resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established 
pursuant to Article X above.  
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2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of 
conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.  
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, 
which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both 
parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.  
 
ARTICLE XVI  
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL 
PROGRAMS  
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for 
promoting a "Marshall Plan", the regional programs and other programs, including 
special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol 
attached as Annex IV.  
 
ARTICLE XVII  
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS  
1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.  
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes 
pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.  
Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993 
For the Government of Israel 
For the P.L.O. 
 
Witnessed By: 
The United States of America 
The Russian Federation 
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ANNEX I  
PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS  
1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the 
election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.  
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following 
issues:  
a. the system of elections;  
 
b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal 
composition; and  
 
c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed  arrangements 
for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and 
TV station.  
 
3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will 
not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to 
practical reasons.  
 
ANNEX II  
PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA 
STRIP AND JERICHO AREA  
1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into 
force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli 
military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include 
comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent 
to the Israeli withdrawal.  
2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military 
forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of 
the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period 
not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.  
3. The above agreement will include, among other things:  
a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli 
military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.  
b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, 
except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually 
agreed matters.  
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c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the 
Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad 
holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who 
will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as 
police and police officers.  
d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.  
e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee 
for mutual security purposes.  
f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of 
an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic 
support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional 
and international parties to support these aims.  
g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho area.  
4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both 
parties regarding passages:  
a. Gaza - Egypt; and  
b. Jericho - Jordan.  
 
5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the 
Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles 
will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the 
Council.  
6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area 
will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be 
changed in the interim period.  
 
ANNEX III  
PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC 
AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS  
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing Committee for 
Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:  
1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program  prepared 
by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the 
management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include 
proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable 
utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.  
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2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, 
which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, 
purchase and sale of electricity resources.  
3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, 
which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, 
particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint 
exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the 
construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the 
construction of oil and gas pipelines.  
 4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and  Action 
Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development 
Bank.  
5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, 
which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will 
provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program 
will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, 
communications lines, etc.  
 6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, 
which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility 
study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these 
zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.  
7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, 
which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli- Palestinian Industrial Research 
and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide 
guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, 
computer and science-based industries.  
8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in 
social welfare issues.  
9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-
Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational 
training centers, research institutes and data banks.  
10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures 
in this sphere.  
11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of 
communication and media.  
12. Any other programs of mutual interest.  
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ANNEX IV  
PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS  
1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in 
promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the 
participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and 
institutions, as well as members of the private sector.  
2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:  
a. an Economic Development Program for the 'West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  
b. a Regional Economic Development Program.  
A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza strip will 
consist of the following elements:  
1. A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.  
2. A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.  
3. An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and 
communications, etc.)  
4. A Human Resources Plan.  
5. Other programs.  
B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following 
elements:  
1. The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle 
East Development Bank, as a second step.  
2. The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated 
exploitation of the Dead Sea area.  
3. The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal.  
4. Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.  
5. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort 
for the prevention of desertification.  
6. Interconnection of electricity grids.  
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7. Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, 
oil and other energy resources.  
8. A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.  
9. Regional cooperation in other spheres.  
 
3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate 
towards their success. The two parties will encourage intersessional activities, as well 
as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.  
 
AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON 
INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS  
A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS  
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the 
Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the 
same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.  
B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS  
 
Article IV  
It is understood that:  
1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for 
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, 
settlements, military locations, and Israelis.  
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, 
responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.  
 
Article VI (2)  
It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:  
1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised 
Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be 
transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the 
following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, 
and any other authorities agreed upon.  
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2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.  
3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary 
allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These 
arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take 
into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.  
4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian 
delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer 
of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.  
Article VII (2)  
The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and 
cooperation.  
Article VII (5)  
The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the 
powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.  
Article VIII  
It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation 
and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the 
transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in 
a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.  
Article X  
It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli 
and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by 
them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee.  
It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint 
Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint 
Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee 
will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
______________________________________________________________________ 
380 | P a g e  
 
Annex II  
It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be 
responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of 
settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads 
freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.  
Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993. 
For the Government of Israel 
For the P.L.O. 
 
Witnessed By: 
The United States of America 
The Russian Federation
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